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Introduction
God created the land of Bougainville and since time immemorial the land of Bougainville, when 
God created it, it was isolated and separated from PNG, Australia and other islands by sea. It was 
complete with mountains of her own, valleys, rivers and other plains. Complete with ecosystems, 
fish and other aquatic wildlife, forests and other vegetation. 
Blaise Iruinu
To survive, we looked within our culture, our traditional society and ourselves. In almost all areas 
of Bougainville, women traditionally own the land. The land is sacred and protected by men on 
behalf of the women. The men as guardians share leadership with women, taking the responsibil-
ity in open debate to protect women from potential conflict; however, women have the power to 
veto decisions, and therefore are involved in the final consultative process. 
Women’s Lincoln Statement, Lincoln Peace Talks, 1998
Five years ago, Jubilee Australia and its partners conducted research in the villages located in 
and around the former Panguna mine.1 The mine was one of the largest operating copper-gold 
mines in the world until the Bougainville civil war forced its closure in 1989 (see below for 
a more detailed history). For some years now, it has been at the forefront of debates about 
Bougainville’s economic future. Many, including the Autonomous Bougainville Government 
1. The research was a collaboration with the Papua New Guinean NGO Bismark Ramu Group and the International 
State Crime Initiative.
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(ABG), have argued that Bougainville needs 
mining, and in particular needs to reopen 
Panguna, for the island’s development. 
Possible future mining on Bougainville is not 
just limited to Panguna and minerals explo-
ration has already commenced elsewhere on 
Bougainville, with four exploration licences 
issued to Australian, Canadian and Filipino 
mining companies as of February 2018.2 As 
Bougainville plans for its long awaited inde-
pendence referendum, the two questions 
of mining and independence have become 
increasingly fused in the public discourse: 
independence requires economic self-suffi-
ciency and this is only possible through min-
ing revenues. So the argument goes.
Based on the research conducted five years 
ago, Jubilee and its partners published a 
report in 2014 called Voices of Bougainville. 
The report argued that many Panguna com-
munities were not ready for a return to large 
scale mining and its socio-economic, cultural 
and environmental impacts that had resulted 
in a brutal conflict that caused so much pain 
and destruction. The work was criticised on a 
number of counts, but perhaps the most tell-
ing was the criticism that even if the essence of 
the report was correct, and that the people of 
Panguna were uneasy about the mine, 
2. Post Courier, Four Mining Exploration Licences 
Issued for Bougainville, 18 February 2018.
The project’s intent is to offer a 
sober reflection on the possibilities 
and realities of an extractives-led 
development path for Bougainville as 
well as examining the availably and 
viability of an alternative path.
nevertheless, Bougainville needed the reve-
nues. The Island’s economic necessity, it was 
said, overrode local concerns, sensitivities and 
impacts.
This project was undertaken in response to 
that criticism. Its primary aim is to examine 
the choice facing the people of Bougainville: 
the question of ‘to mine or not to mine’? The 
project’s intent is to offer a sober reflection 
on the possibilities and realities of an extrac-
tives-led development path for Bougainville as 
well as examining the availably and viability 
of an alternative path. Given the uniformity 
of the official discourse in recent years, and 
the prevailing wisdom reflected in previous 
debates that extractive-led development 
is necessary, it was considered important 
to make the case that there is actually an 
alternative choice available to the people of 
Bougainville. 
It is somewhat unfortunate that the debate 
about mining and the debate about 
Papua New Guinea and Bougainville
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Reading the papers, one is constantly 
struck by the importance of land in 
the Bougainvillean worldview and in 
Melanisian culture more generally.
independence have become conflated. These 
two existential questions, while interrelated, 
are not best addressed as a single binary 
choice. Doing so obscures important issues 
and realities that need to be addressed for 
informed debate and rights-based deci-
sion-making. Even if the referendum is 
defeated and Bougainville remains part of 
Papua New Guinea (PNG), the pressure for 
mining is likely to continue and its resump-
tion cannot be ruled out. In this scenario, 
generating sufficient revenues will most 
likely continue to be a challenge – for exam-
ple the disbursement of grants by the PNG 
Government to Bougainville is by some 
accounts not consistent or timely.3 As this 
report will show, Bougainville is likely to 
be dependent on aid from one source or 
another for some time, regardless of whether 
it becomes independent and regardless of 
whether it chooses to restart mining. It is 
therefore important to start an honest and 
realistic discussion about the revenue raising 
challenges facing Bougainville irrespective of 
its decision on independence and to consider 
what some solutions to this challenge might 
be. 
This is all the more important because there 
continues to be very little public debate 
within Bougainville on its future develop-
ment path. An exception to this was the 2017 
Bougainville Tax and Revenue Summit, which 
debated how Bougainville can raise revenue 
and income, grow the economy and raise the
tax base for service provision.4 As one partic-
ipant noted, the summit was at least 15 years 
overdue, but nonetheless it finally initiated an 
important discussion on fiscal self-reliance.5 
3. Presentation by Secretary of the Department of 
Finance and Treasury to Bougainville Tax and Revenue 
Summit, 27 to 29 September 2017, http://www.abg.gov.
pg/images/misc/5._ABG_Fiscal_Position_and_Way_
Forward.pdf.
However, it is important to note that the 
summit lacked meaningful participation by 
most Bougainvilleans and as such did not 
result in broader public debate on the issues it 
considered.
The question of ‘to mine or not to mine’ is 
a common thread running through many 
of the contributions to this publication. 
Nevertheless, important as this issue is, the 
papers raise deeper questions, ones that both 
incorporate and even transcend the mining 
debate.
Reading the papers, one is constantly 
struck by the importance of land in the 
Bougainvillean worldview and in Melanisian 
culture more generally. Several authors 
repeatedly refer to the importance and 
centrality of the concept of custodianship 
when describing the relationship between 
Bougainvilleans and their land. This relation-
ship encompasses caretaking responsibility 
towards the natural environment that is so 
important in Melanesia, although land has 
other importance as well, not least as a de 
facto source of social security. The idea that 
the land of Bougainville is a gift to its people, 
one that brings with it a concomitant duty for 
Bougainvilleans to ensure its protection, is 
elegantly captured in the concept of sacred 
land. The cherished belief of Bougainvilleans 
that their land is sacred is found in 
Melanesian literature and Melanesian polit-
ical discourse, as reflected in the writings of 
the scholar and poet Blaise Iruinu and in the 
Women’s Lincoln Statement, extracts of which 
constitute the opening lines of this chapter.
Land ownership in Bougainville is matrilin-
eal. It is through this land tenue that the 
4. Bougainville Revenue and Tax Summit 27-29 Septem-
ber, http://www.abg.gov.pg/revenueandtaxsummit/
about.
5. Satish Chand, Transitioning to fiscal self-reliance 
in the Autonomous Region of Bougainville, Keynote 
address at the Bougainville Revenue and Tax Summit, 
27 to 29 September 2017, http://www.abg.gov.pg/
images/misc/3._Chand_2017_Transitioning_to_fiscal_
self_reliance_in_the_ARoB_(Chand).pdf. 
connection between the duty to protect 
the land and the desire to respect the role 
that women play in Bougainvillean culture 
emerges so forcefully. The question of land 
and culture is also inherently tied up with the 
nature of colonialism. Contributions in this 
collection touch on the question of coloni-
alism in a couple of ways: first, by showing 
the continuing importance of using the lens 
of colonialism to understand Bougainville’s 
troubled history, specifically the crisis and 
the civil war. Second, by identifying the 
threat of contemporary forms of colonialism 
and the repetition of practices that exploit 
Bougainville’s resources while disadvantaging 
its peoples, albeit with a somewhat altered set 
of actors. 
A final theme that runs through the papers 
is the interconnectedness of the economic 
with the political and the related question of 
what good governance means and implies in 
the context of decision-making pertaining to 
economic development options. While some 
contributions look at the issue from a purely 
economic point of view, it is clear from other 
papers that politics is never far from the story. 
How much revenue a state needs to support 
itself is not a simple question: it depends on 
the type of state that is being supported, the 
aims, and the cultural and governance frame-
work on which it rests.
So, while this publication may use a rather 
simple device – the question of whether 
Bougainville should restart mining or not 
– as a prompt to precipitate discussion and 
debate, it transpires that just posing that 
question opens up a whole range of other, 
perhaps more interesting questions. Whether 
readers come to this report with an interest in 
the narrow economic debate around mining 
or in its broader political and cultural dimen-
sions, we hope that through their engagement 
with the discussion they come to share our 
perspective that these questions are insepara-
ble from each other. 
Before we introduce the authors and describe 
their contributions in more detail, we are 
Photo credit: Ben Bohane/Australian War Memoria
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 From a hilltop position, two Bougainville Revolutionary Army guerrillas look down on 
the Panguna mine site in central Bougainville, circa 1994
aware that the papers presume some prior 
knowledge of Bougainville and the Panguna 
mine. To aid those unfamiliar with the story of 
Bougainville, a short description of its recent 
history is given below.
Bougainville: the historical 
context
Bougainville, the largest of the Solomon 
Islands, was annexed by the Germans and 
the British in the late 1800s without any 
attempt to obtain the consent of its diverse 
peoples.6 In 1946, Australia formally took 
over control of the Island under the United 
Nations Trusteeship System. In the final years 
of its control, despite the strong opposition 
of the local communities, Australia initiated 
the opening of the world’s largest copper 
mine in Panguna. Conzinc Rio Tinto (CRA), 
an Australian subsidiary of Rio Tinto com-
menced exploration in 1964. Bougainville 
Copper Pty Limited (BCL), a subsidiary of 
CRA, was incorporated in 1967, and an agree-
ment concluded with the colonial admin-
istration, again without the consent of the 
concerned Bougainvilleans, providing it with 
an 84 year lease enabling a highly profitable 
mine to commence in 1972. The subsequent 
Australian-led incorporation of Bougainville 
into PNG in 1975 was met with strong opposi-
tion from many Bougainvilleans. Following 
major protests, including the conducting by 
Bougainvilleans of their own independence
6. This overview of the Bougainville experi-
ence is based on a number of sources including 
O'Faircheallaigh C. (1990) ‘The Bougainville Crisis’ 
1(1) Policy, Organisation and Society (1990) pp30-35; 
Havini M & V Johns ‘Mining, self-determination and 
Bougainville’ in Evans G., J Goodman & N Lansbury 
(eds) Moving mountains: communities confront min-
ing and globalization (London: Zed Books, 2002); 
Kenema S ‘An Analysis of Post-Conflict Explanations of 
Indigenous Dissent Relating to the Bougainville Copper 
Mining Conflict, Papua New Guinea’ eJournal of the 
Australian Association for the Advancement of Pacific 
Studies Issues 1.2 and 2.1, April 2010 and a series of 
podcast interviews and conferences and video and 
radio documentaries involving C O’Faircheallaigh, A 
Regan and ABG President John Momis, among others. 
referendum, an autonomy arrangement was 
reached in 1976.
Despite the strong condemnation by 
Bougainvilleans of the proposed Panguna 
mine and hostility to CRA’s presence in and 
around Paguna,7 it continued to be promoted 
by Australia as the means to ensure the eco-
nomic viability and development of PNG in 
its transition to independence. No effort was 
made to hold meaningful consultations with 
the concerned Bougainvilleans or to equip 
them with an understanding of the extent of 
the potential impacts of the mine on their cus-
tomary laws, their way of life and social fabric 
and their environment.8 Instead of seeking 
their consent,9 between 1969 and 1988 the 
Australian colonial administration, and sub-
sequently the PNG government, deployed riot 
police when faced with dissent. Tear gas, jail-
ing and violence were used against landown-
ers including women landowners.10 People 
were displaced from the mine site and port 
areas without their consent and their agricul-
tural based livelihoods were destroyed, with 
inadequate compensation provided to cover 
their basic needs. 
Grossly inadequate, and arguably criminal, 
environmental practices consisting of dump-
ing approximately a billion tonnes of min-
ing waste containing heavy metals into the 
Kawerong and Jaba Rivers, with tailings dams 
to store waste from the 2.5 km wide and 400 
m deep mine crater ruled out due to the risk 
of seismic activity. The Jaba River was heavily 
polluted and much of the environment 
7. Jubilee Australia, Voices of Bougainville, (Jubilee 
Australia: Sydney, 2014) p 8.
8. Jubilee Australia, Voices of Bougainville, (Jubilee 
Australia: Sydney, 2014) p 8.
9. A 1928 Mining Ordinance which provided the Admin-
istration with powers to grant “access to native land 
…without reference to the [traditional] owners” was 
invoked to authorize the project.
10. Matrilineal inheritance being common under cus-
tomary law in Bougainville. Violence against women 
was particularly prevalent during the construction 
of port facilities in the land of the Rorovan people. 
(See Jubilee Australia, Voices of Bougainville, (Jubilee 
Australia: Sydney, 2014) p 8).
from the mine site to the coastline destroyed. 
Massive siltation and contamination of sur-
rounding lands deprived the affected peoples 
of their means of subsistence. Social issues 
also accompanied the huge influx of outsid-
ers into the island during the construction 
period and resentment grew due to the lim-
ited employment opportunities available for 
Bougainvilleans in the subsequent mining 
operations. 
Frustration grew at inadequate compensation 
(the Australian government having refused 
to pay compensation for the loss of land) and 
benefits (which were insignificant relative 
to the enormous profits generated by the 
mine) flowing to the impacted landowners 
and Bougainvilleans in general. This, cou-
pled with the mine’s profoundly destructive 
environmental, social and cultural impacts 
and the failure of the PNG administration 
(due in part to parliamentary instability) to 
adequately address the growing resentment 
among the younger generation of landowners, 
led to protests and sabotage of mining compa-
ny’s infrastructure in 1988. Resistance inten-
sified following the use of violence by mobile 
police units deployed to suppress opposition, 
forcing the company to shut down operations 
in 1989. A full-scale guerrilla war for inde-
pendence ensued. PNG removed its military 
and police presence from Bougainville in early 
1990 and the Bougainville Resistance Army 
declared independence. In response PNG 
imposed a sea blockade, restricting access 
to food and medical supplies, drastically 
compounding the hardships faced by the 
Bougainvilleans. In total it is estimated that 
the conflict claimed the lives of up to 20,000 
people, some 10% of the island’s population, 
with tens of thousands more displaced.
In 1997, following a failed peace seeking ini-
tiative, PNG unsuccessfully sought to deploy 
South African mercenaries on the island in 
a final bid to retake control of the mine. In 
2001, a peace agreement was finally reached 
between PNG and leaders representing the 
people of Bougainville. It envisaged expand-
ing autonomy powers of the Autonomous
In total it is estimated that the 
conflict claimed the lives of up to 
20,000 people, some 10% of the 
island’s population, with tens of 
thousands more displaced.
Bougainville Government (ABG) with the 
option for an independence referendum within 
15 years of its election – the referendum is 
expected to be held in June 2019. The outcome 
of the referendum is subject to ratification by 
the PNG Parliament. One of the basic princi-
ples affirmed in the agreement is that “[t]he 
autonomous Bougainville Government will 
have sufficient revenue-raising powers avail-
able to it to become financially self-reliant”,11 
something which, based on existing revenue 
streams, the ABG has argued necessitates a 
return to large scale mining. For example, in 
2013 ABG President John Momis said that “I 
think, once the mine is open, Bougainville will 
be very well off, and we can manage to recon-
struct Bougainville and promote sustainable 
businesses”.12 And again in 2014, the President 
stated that “it is my view that without the mine 
it will be nigh impossible to generate enough 
revenue to run the autonomous govern-
ment”.13 More recently though, the ABG placed 
a moratorium on exploration and mining at 
Panguna – although it must be emphasised not 
on all exploration and mining in Bougainville 
– with President Momis saying that “we will 
not allow [the Panguna] project once again to 
reignite the wounds of the Bougainville cri-
sis and distract our focus for restoring peace 
and our preparation for our referendum in 
2019”.14 Nevertheless BCL and RTG Mining (an 
Australian headquartered and listed company) 
continue to vie for the rights to Panguna.
11. Bougainville Peace Agreement para 134.
12. Business Advantage PNG, Interview: John Momis, 
President, Autonomous Bouginville Governmnet, 9 July 
2013, https://www.businessadvantagepng.com/inter-
view-john-momis-president-bougainville/.
13. Bougainville 24, “Only mine can drive autonomy - 
Momis,” 20 February 2014.
14. Aloysius Laukai, ‘Momis announces moratorium on 
Paguna mining and exploration’, Asia Pacific Report, 
23 December 2017, https://bit.ly/2wlYtLN. 
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Australia’s historical and 
contemporary role in 
Bougainville
Australia is deeply implicated in the tragic 
events that unfolded in Bougainville as its 
colonial Government bore a substantial 
responsibility for the conflict which the mine 
triggered. The Australian State essentially 
imposed the mine on the islanders, including 
through the use of force, refused to compen-
sate them adequately for their losses, and 
provided substantial financial assistance to 
the PNG defence and police forces during the 
early years of the conflict.15 Australian com-
panies, including Rio Tinto and its suppliers, 
and Australian citizens also benefited 
15. O'Faircheallaigh C. (1990) ‘The Bougainville Crisis’ 
1(1) Policy, Organisation and Society (1990) p30, and 
Kristian Lasslett. “State Crime by Proxy: Australia and 
the Bougainville Conflict,” British Journal of Criminolo-
gy, 52:4 (2012).
significantly from the mine’s operation.16 
Australia consequently shares the responsi-
bility to ensure redress and remedy. Rio Tinto 
also has an independent responsibility to pro-
vide for and cooperate in the remediation of 
the serious human rights harms it caused and 
to which it contributed.17 Its failure to do so 
through the conduct of an environmental
clean-up and compensation of landowners 
(a responsibility which it should share with 
the Australian government), having profited 
enormously from the mine, continues to be 
subject to strong criticism in Australia as well 
as in Bougainville.18
16. For example inflows to Australia were estimated to 
be to the tune of $400M in 1988, see O'Faircheallaigh C. 
(1990) ‘The Bougainville Crisis’ 1(1) Policy, Organisation 
and Society (1990) p33.
17. UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human 
Rights (OHCHR: Geneva, 2011) https://www.ohchr.
org/Documents/Publications/GuidingPrinciplesBusi-
nessHR_EN.pdf. 
18. D Flitton ‘Rio Tinto's billion-dollar mess: 'unprin-
cipled, shameful and evil'’ 21 August 2016, https://bit.
ly/2ci0AYm.
Australia, it should be noted, continues to 
have significant influence over what hap-
pens in Bougainville. Australia delivered 
$46.8 million of development assistance to 
Bougainville in 2016-17. Of this, $13.9 mil-
lion (30%) was delivered through dedicated 
Bougainville programs supporting improved 
governance ($5.09 million), economic devel-
opment ($3.05 million), peace building, 
stability and youth ($4.7 million) and gender 
equality ($1.05 million). The remaining $32.9 
million was delivered through Australia’s 
Papua New Guinea-wide programs.19 
Australian aid has included funding for a 
range of advisers, experts and volunteers 
supporting mining negotiations, legislative 
drafting, strategic and legal advice, policy 
development and analysis. The stated pur-
pose of the activities has been ‘to support 
the ABG’s efforts to ensure policy decisions 
on mining are transparent, consultative, and 
acceptable to Bougainvilleans, as well as 
conducted in a way to minimise the risk of 
conflict’.20 The level of Australian aid deliv-
ered through the Australian Government’s 
dedicated Bougainville programs represents
approximately 20% of the ABG’s total recur-
rent expenditure (although development 
assistance is considered ‘off budget’ funding). 
This is significant in terms of its monetary 
value and the influence such funding might 
have on how the ABG makes important policy 
decisions.
The papers in this report
This report contains contributions from aca-
demics and practitioners from Bougainville, 
elsewhere in the Pacific, and globally. These 
papers draw on the lived experiences of many 
of its authors, and on many years of research
19. Australian Government, Department of Foreign 
Affairs and Trade, Aid Program Expenditure Report 
2-16-17, Papua New Guinea http://dfat.gov.au/about-
us/publications/Documents/papua-new-guinea-ap-
pr-2016-17.pdf.
20. Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Legis-
lation Committee Supplementary Budget Estimates 
2014 Questions on Notice/In Writing (23 October 2014) 
Question 82.
and public policy experience. Through the 
papers by Bougainvillean and Melanesian 
authors it provides a unique local perspec-
tive on the issues we explore. Members of 
our team also visited Bougainville in January 
2018, and the conversations and interactions 
they had helped shape the report. 
The chapters span a range of interrelated his-
torical, political, economic and legal issues, 
including: the colonial/historical context; 
institutional factors that might aid with 
peace building efforts, good governance and 
development; the economic challenges of an 
extractives-based economy; the potential for 
agriculture based on sustainable livelihood 
practices; the contributions the fishery sector 
could make to Bougainville’s development; 
and the roles that might be played by women, 
by young people and by a rights-based 
approach in bringing about a bright future for 
Bougainville.
Kristian Lasslett begins the collection by 
providing a more detailed overview of 
Bougainville’s history, reminding readers that 
colonisation has not yet disappeared and that 
the struggle against colonialism is not over. 
Ruth Saovana-Spriggs then providers her 
own overview of Bougainville’s recent history 
focusing on the important role women played 
in the peace and recovery processes, and 
outlines a possible future agenda for women’s 
organisations in Bougainville.  
Next Catherine Coumans challenges the prem-
ise that good governance is all that stands 
between mining and positive development 
outcomes, highlighting ongoing efforts by the 
mining sector itself to undermine attempts 
to introduce better governance in places 
like Bougainville. Economist Paul Flanagan 
offers a case study from PNG on the distort-
ing effects the resources sector can have 
on national economies, warning a possible 
future independent Bougainville to be careful 
of repeating PNG’s mistakes. Luke Fletcher 
and Christopher Prince then consider what 
revenues might flow to government from 
the Panguna mine if it was to be reopened Photo credit:  Ben Bohane/Australian War Memoria
Moses Havini, a Bougainville Revolutionary Army/Bougainville Interim Government 
spokesperson in Australia during the crisis, at a rally in Sydney, NSW, circa 1997.
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and concludes that, at least in the short to 
medium term, very little will.  
Helen Hakena and Kate Lappin describe how 
the Panguna mine had an irreparable, dev-
astating impact on women. They argue that 
an extractivist-based economy is not a model 
for a gender equal society and propose ways 
for Bougainville to move towards a more just 
and equitable economy. Cathal Doyle then 
explains the importance of free, prior and 
informed consent (FPIC) given the current 
context in Bougainville. He notes that indige-
nous peoples must not only be free to give or 
withhold their consent to particular projects 
– such as Panguna – but must also be empow-
ered to participate in the identification and 
assessment of, and exercise choice between, 
a range of alternative development options 
available to them.   
Turning to livelihood related issues, Catherine 
Sparkes and Joel Simo explore the importance 
of customary land across Melanesia and in 
Bougainville. They argue that it underpins 
a life that most rural Bougainvilleans are 
already living – one that blends the non-cash 
contributions of the land-based traditional 
economy supplemented with cash earned 
from small-scale income generating activities. 
Wesley Morgan then provides a regional over-
view of the future of agriculture in the Pacific 
and offers some insights that may be useful 
for Bougainville. Transform Aqorau then 
considers off-shore fisheries and argues that 
independence, if that is what Bougainvilleans 
vote for, will provide Bougainville with an 
opportunity to pursue a forward looking, 
innovative, rights-based approach to fisheries 
and oceans management. 
The penultimate contribution to the report 
gives readers a personal reflection from 
Theonila Roka-Matbob, a young woman who 
grew up around Panguna during the crisis. 
In the paper Theonila describes what life was 
like during the crisis and her hopes for the 
future of Bougainville.  
The final paper considers the possibilities 
for governance in Bougainville beyond the 
modern colonial-capitalist system. It asks if 
a ‘Bougainvillean’ form of good governance 
might address the challenge of persistent 
clientelism, bribery and corruption and initi-
ate democratic and transparent governance 
across the island of Bougainville.  
We conclude this report with some reflections 
as to how the current decisions on independ-
ence and mining represents an opportunity 
and potential turning point for Bougainville 
and indeed the rest of Melanesia. We also 
make some recommendations for policy 
makers, which aim to draw together the com-
mon themes and conclusions of the different 
papers, to the extent that this is possible. 
The hope is that these conclusions will pro-
mote informed debate in Bougainville and 
elsewhere, including in Australia, on the key 
issues the report seeks to explore.  
While outside actors do have influence and a 
role to play, what happens in Bougainville in 
the future is up to the people of Bougainville 
to determine. As many of the contributions to 
this report attest, Bougainvilleans have their 
own history, knowledge, social institutions, 
cultural assets, traditional economy and sys-
tems of customary land tenure which provide 
a vital foundation on which Bougainville’s 
future can be built. Outside actors, includ-
ing us, must recognise and support this 
foundation.  
This report is being published along with a 
short film, Bougainville: Long Han Blong Yumi 
(Bougainville: It's In Our Hands). The film has 
been made for a Bougainvillean audience and 
explores many of the same issues explored 
in the report. Together we hope they con-
tribute to facilitating an informed debate on 
Bougainville’s future. 
Introduction
In policy and academic circles, when attempt-
ing to make sense of the Bougainville conflict 
and associated struggle for independence, 
one word is rarely uttered, especially in the 
present tense: colonialism. When it is used, 
‘colonialism’ is employed to frame an histori-
cal period now long passed. But can a process 
as immense as colonisation, which prosecutes 
its objective of cleansing civilisations indig-
enous to the subjugated territory through 
political, economic, cultural, linguistic, 
legal, pedagogic, spiritual, and psychological 
means, simply disappear when one flag is 
lowered, and another raised?  
Colonialism has not disappeared.1 Its pres-
ence on Bougainville looms large in govern-
ment and market structures, social norms 
and religion, language and ideas, education 
and notions of ‘common sense’. Its presence 
is hidden, because so many of the institu-
tions, ideas and norms, that were forcefully 
introduced into Melanesian society initially 
by external powers, and then administered by 
local managers who took control with the 
‘granting’ of independence (under the tute-
lage of foreign advisers and consultants), have 
been cloaked through sanitising language 
such as modernity, development, rule of law, 
democracy, government.
These different terms, in their own way, 
attempt to define the process of colonialism 
– forced acceptance of foreign institutions, 
cultural norms, economic systems, etc. – as 
neutral acts of progress, from a primitive 
past. They also assume there is one ulti-
mate destination – copying the institutions, 
values, and systems of the coloniser. In so 
doing these terms disguise the fact that a 
particular form of modernity, development, 
rule of law, democracy and government has 
been introduced on Bougainville, which was 
formulated from outside by foreign powers, 
with their own self-interest in mind. They also 
disguise the fact that alternative ways exist for 
Melanesian societies to progress their
1. Grosfoguel, R., ‘The Epistemic Decolonial Turn’, 
Cultural Studies, 21(2-3), 2007, pp 211-223; and 
Maldonado-Torres, N., ‘On the Coloniality of Being’, 
Cultural Studies, 21(2-3), 2007, pp 240-270.
THE CRISIS BEGAN IN 1886: A 
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When a people are depicted as prim-
itive and savage, this denotes an 
ideological framework which gifts 
to Western European society a rich 
history of discovery, innovation and 
social advancement, while deny-
ing the same to the communities of 
Bougainville. 
own history, without emulating the coloniser, 
whose own society is exhibiting signs of decay 
and decline.
The above issues were absent from my first 
major research project, which sought to doc-
ument and analyse how the Australian and 
Papua New Guinea Governments organised 
with Bougainville Copper Limited a brutal 
military incursion, designed to quell the 
1988 uprising and reopen the Panguna mine. 
Following this research, I was fortunate to 
collaborate with a number of Bougainvillean 
intellectuals, who introduced me to bodies of 
thought that were circulating informally on 
the island, but not published in the journals 
and monographs, which academics con-
ventionally trawl through when conducting 
research.
Gradually, I disconnected from the more 
accessible analyses of Bougainville’s history 
coming out of Western higher education 
institutions and think-tanks and became 
much more interested in how intellectuals 
from Bougainville understood their complex 
history, and the lessons it holds for the future. 
These were not intellectuals with a PhD, or 
who could necessarily speak the language of 
the coloniser (i.e. English). Rather, they were 
the respected custodians of history and ideas 
emerging within the scientific laboratory of 
the village, where knowledge is produced 
through discussion, reflection, oration and 
art.
This led to a prolonged engagement with 
communities living in mine-impacted areas. 
Powerful pools of local knowledge at a 
village level exist in the north and south, on 
the coasts and in the mountains, there is no 
denying that. But it was felt that beginning 
at the epicentre of the Bougainville conflict 
– which centred at least in the first instance 
around the Panguna mine – might be the 
most fertile place to find alternative histories 
and ideas for making sense of ‘the crisis’, in a 
way that is radically different to the dominant 
accounts published in the books and journals. 
To make these rich currents of Melanesian 
knowledge available beyond the immedi-
ate locale, a research team made up of local 
intellectuals and foreign collaborators, filmed 
over 130 hours with custodians from the mine 
impacted area.    
This paper will give a brief insight into the 
rich vein of knowledge this project tapped 
into. Drawing on insights provided by local 
theorists, it will explore the fault-lines of 
contention which the processes of colonisa-
tion triggered, and how these fault-lines can 
be traced to the construction of the Panguna 
mine, and the subsequent conflict its opera-
tion triggered. Attention will also be given to 
the anti-colonial roots of the uprising against 
the Panguna mine, and the process of cul-
tural healing painfully brought into being by 
the subsequent period of military violence. 
This paper will conclude by looking at the 
enduring colonial legacies impacting on 
Bougainville and the opportunities which the 
independence referendum offers for putting 
these legacies under a critical spotlight.
Land, culture and 
colonisation
When Bougainville was invaded and then 
occupied by external powers (invasion and 
occupation are not commonly used terms 
but are more factually accurate than euphe-
misms such as ‘administered’, ‘settled’, or 
‘pacified’), their officials maintained intricate 
records. The detailed files emerging from the 
Australian period of colonial administration 
(1914-1975) are kept in Canberra, a significant 
journey from Bougainville, the region to 
which they relate. Close examination of these 
records provides a revealing insight into the 
ideology and thought processes of those serv-
ing the colonial administration.
The human target of the colonial regime – 
those to whom it must administer and ‘civi-
lise’ – are described in these records though a 
range of derogatory labels, such as ‘primitive’, 
‘savage’, and more sedately through the catch 
all noun, ‘the natives’.2  The regime officials 
using these phrases were not specifically 
malicious people; this was the common par-
lance within administrative circles, and they 
were simply men of their times. This should 
not excuse us, however, from understanding 
their times, and how it informs the here and 
now. 
When a people are depicted as primitive and 
savage, this denotes an ideological framework 
which gifts to Western European society a rich 
history of discovery, innovation and social 
advancement, while denying the same to the 
communities of Bougainville. It eviscerates 
and flattens the latter’s own long period of 
social advance, which is rich with discovery, 
innovation, and change. These labels also 
frame history as a set of linear sequences, 
where human beings evolve from a state of 
‘primitiveness’ to the heights of civility, epit-
omised by Western style government and 
global capitalism. Those who are heir to the 
latter are thus humans of a higher order, 
whereas the heirs to the alternative social sys-
tem are a throw-back to a primitive period in 
human history. A mandate is thus created for
2. Barnes, C., Papua and New Guinea - Development 
of Copper Resources at Bougainville, Confidential for 
Cabinet, Submission No.36, Copy No. 39, 13 January 
1967; Cleland, D. M., Draft Correspondence from D. 
M. Cleland, Administrator, Papua New Guinea, to Rt. 
Rev. Bishop L. Lemay, S.M., Catholic Commission, Post 
Office, Sohano, Bougainville, 31 August 1966; and Hay, 
D.O., Correspondence from D. O. Hay, Administrator, 
Papua New Guinea, to G. Warwick-Smith Esq. O.B.E, 
Secretary for Territories, Department of Territories, 
Canberra. A.C.T., 30 August 1968.
Photo credit: Christina Hill
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Arawa, in central Bougainville, was largely destroyed during the war.
the rule of the one by the other, in the name 
of tutoring the primitive to a sufficient state of 
civilisation.   
A formidable critic of this racist standpoint is 
Blaise Iruinu, one of Bougainville’s foremost, 
yet little known, theoreticians. Iruinu is cus-
todian of a highly organised oral tradition of 
historiography. This tradition retraces preco-
lonial civilisations on Bougainville, to better 
understand the rich lineages of social institu-
tions, cultural assets, science, and methods of 
education to which its communities are heir. 
All of these civilisations, he argues, contain 
features that must be retained if Bougainville 
is to create a resilient and sustainable 
political-economy.
At the core of these civilisations – as varied 
as they are – is a deep-seated sense of commu-
nal obligation, a strong fiduciary duty to future 
generations, and complex relationship with 
land that is woven with respect and balance. In 
Iruinu’s view3 (and this is a point also empha-
sised by Pokpok island Chief Peter Garuai4 and 
Tinputz academic Dr Ruth Saovana5), land is 
the nerve centre of Melanesian society; it con-
nects people, regulates relationships, binds 
the present day to the past and the future. It 
is the source of social security, and the base 
for identity, memory, culture, and spiritual-
ity. Iruinu and others, such as Bruno Idioai,6 
contend that these relationships that centre 
upon land, are a model for sustaining future 
generations. This understanding of land stands 
in notable contrast to the relationships and 
associated cultural practices introduced by the 
colonial regime.
3. Iruinu, B., Interview – The Panguna Seminars, Arsam 
International, Bougainville Peoples Research Centre 
and Fourth World Films, 25 August 2015.
4. Garuai, P., Interview – The Panguna Seminars, Arsam 
International, Bougainville Peoples Research Centre 
and Fourth World Films, 12 November 2014.
5. Saovana, R., Gender and Peace: Bougainvillean 
Women, Matriliny and the Peace Process, PhD Thesis 
(Australian National University: Canberra, 2007).
6. Idioai, B., Interview – The Panguna Seminars, Arsam 
International, Bougainville Peoples Research Centre 
and Fourth World Films, 27-28 November 2014.
Accordingly, land was a predictable fault line 
of contention. For the colonial administra-
tion, who were convinced of the superiority 
of their own system, land was a resource that 
could be sacrificed to the point of exhaustion 
if the anticipated profits were sizable enough. 
Linked to this posture were a set of cultural 
values which encouraged citizens to build 
an identity around individualism, consumer-
ism and urbanisation. At the same time, the 
communal obligations that lie at the centre 
of Melanesian society were replaced by social 
connections mediated through markets and 
an abstract allegiance to nationality.7
For those communities on Bougainville con-
fronting these values and relations extolled 
by the colonial regime, it was not simple 
arithmetic that these processes exported from 
Europea should replace the social systems 
bequeathed by Melanesian foremothers and 
forefathers. Peter Garuai notes it was a par-
ticularly ambiguous situation.8 Newfound 
access to items like steel axes, which could 
cut down labour time in the garden, was cer-
tainly welcomed. However, once this access 
was married to accepting a much wider range 
of political and economic institutions, the 
cost-benefit ratio became increasingly more 
problematic.
Nevertheless, local communities were not 
contending with an outside force that was 
inclined to leave, or indeed to abandon its 
mission. Colonisation was a calling that could 
not be denied, such was the belief of the colo-
nial powers in the superiority of their civilisa-
tion and the necessity of occupying countries 
viewed as ‘less-developed’. As a result, local 
misgivings were not an insurmountable bar-
rier. Indeed, while consent is an essential rule 
7. see Denoon, D., Getting Under the Skin: The Bougain-
ville Copper Agreement and the Creation of the Panguna 
Mine (Melbourne University Press: Melbourne, 2000) 
and Hawksley, C., ‘Constructing Hegemony: Colonial 
Rule and Colonial Legitimacy in the Eastern Highlands 
of Papua New Guinea’, Rethinking Marxism, 19(2), 
2007, pp 195–207.
8. Garuai, P., Interview – The Panguna Seminars, Arsam 
International, Bougainville Peoples Research Centre 
and Fourth World Films, 12 November 2014.
governing our interpersonal relationships, 
at the level of colonial geopolitics consent 
is irrelevant. Refusal or opposition is not a 
reason to leave, but a barrier to be torn down. 
On Bougainville, the administration pursued 
its colonial mission – especially after WWII – 
with zeal. The choice offered to Bougainville 
was to drift off in a state of primitive stasis, 
or become active participants in the colonial 
project, so communities could be inducted 
into a new civilisation, which was modern 
and developed.9
For communities confronted with this choice, 
they faced the unedifying prospect of all 
the cultural assets and relationships dear to 
their heart being stigmatised as primitive; 
while the values and systems they were being 
told to accept, they had no connection with, 
or passion for. Elders such as Chief Antony 
Taruito, recall a feeling of violent disloca-
tion.10 The rules and norms communities 
were intuitively accustomed to were being 
eroded, and replaced with a foreign system. 
In the transition people felt trapped in a void. 
Nevertheless, this did not precipitate a moment 
of eruption; this would come later, in 1988.
Colonialism’s power, in its more austere form 
– which typified the Australian administra-
tion – is that its mission to gradually unpick 
the roots of local civilisations, and impose 
on them new forms, occurs in a gradual and 
piecemeal fashion. There is never a clear 
moment of dispossession or cultural gen-
ocide. It is more of a gradual fading than a 
sudden bang.
Soon, however, the Australian regime began 
to anticipate the colonial project it introduced 
would need to be handed over to local man-
agement first through self-government and 
9. Cleland, D. M., Draft Correspondence from D. M. 
Cleland, Administrator, Papua New Guinea, to Rt. Rev. 
Bishop L. Lemay, S.M., Catholic Commission, Post 
Office, Sohano, Bougainville, 31 August 1966 and South 
Pacific Post 17/2/1967, pp.7-8.
10. Taruito, A., Interview – The Panguna Seminars, 
Arsam International, Bougainville Peoples Research 
Centre and Fourth World Films, 22 July 2015.
The mine itself was an explicit attack 
not simply on an asset, but the nerve 
centre of local societies: the land, 
without which they cannot exist in 
any form they would be welcomed or 
recognised.
then political independence. It thus rapidly 
increased its investment in local managers 
who could run the newly introduced political, 
market and cultural machinery, and further 
entrench it in the country.11 This process, to 
be sustainable in the long term, required a 
significant injection of funds. The copper and 
gold ore-body in Bougainville’s Crown Prince 
Ranges offered a welcome revenue boost.12
But in pursuing the mine the colonisation 
process lost its primary weapon, its gradual 
and piecemeal nature, which diluted its more 
contentious effects. The mine itself was an 
explicit attack not simply on an asset, but the 
nerve centre of local societies: the land, without 
which they cannot exist in any form they would 
be welcomed or recognised. The tensions col-
onisation was pregnant with were laid bare by 
the Panguna mine, in their most explicit form.
Mining and resistance to 
the colonial project   
When the colonial administration initiated an 
industrial scale open cut mine in the Panguna 
region of Bougainville, in partnership with 
Rio Tinto, it created an existential threat to 
the life of those who stood in its shadow. Its 
construction and operation would produce 
hundreds of thousands of tons of effluent 
daily that would go on to destroy surround-
ing land, waterways, and ecosystems.13 The 
mine’s operation would also precipitate 
new economic practices, migration pat-
terns, cultural changes, and a shift in the 
urban environment, all of which corroded 
the relationships and processes essential to 
the reproduction of local social structures.14 
For the Australian administration, executing 
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this process in a controlled and organised 
matter was their right as a colonial power. 
The Administration understood that however 
carefully orchestrated this transition was, 
it would precipitate resistance. This resist-
ance was regarded by colonial officials as the 
emotional over-reaction of a primitive people, 
which Australia, as the father nation, needed 
to cautiously chide, with some sensitivity to 
what was being lost.15
To chaperone Bougainville through this turbu-
lent period, the colonial administration opted 
for a mixture of persuasion (via kiap patrols 
and propaganda campaigns), alongside the 
strategic application of armed force.16 What 
administration officials failed to appreciate 
by and large, was that resistance to the mine 
was not the unthinking reflex of a primitive 
people facing an anxious journey into moder-
nity. Rather, resistance was the considered 
strategy of a people who were not prepared 
to surrender their cultural sovereignty, set 
against a well-known backdrop of decimation 
in the colonial south. Indeed, communities 
anticipated in very precise terms - which were 
loudly articulated at the time - that the mine 
would, on the one hand, export local wealth 
abroad, and on the other, outside problems, 
such as environmental damage and social 
11. Griffin, J., Nelson, H. and Firth, S., Papua New Guin-
ea: A Political History (Heinemann Educational Austral-
ia: Richmond, 1979).
12. Downs, I. (1980). The Australian Trusteeship: Papua 
New Guinea 1945-75 (Australian Government Publishing 
Service: Canberra, 1980).
13. Vernon, D. ‘The Panguna Mine’, in Regan, A. J. and 
Griffin, H. M. (eds.) Bougainville: Before the Conflict 
(Pandanus Books: Canberra, 2005).
14. Lasslett, K, State Crime on the Margins of Empire 
(Pluto Books: London, 2014).
15. Daw, T.E., Correspondence from T.E. Daw, District 
Officer, to the Director, Department of District Adminis-
tration, Konedobu, 15 June 1967 and Hay, D.O., Corre-
spondence from D. O. Hay, Administrator, Papua New 
Guinea, to G. Warwick-Smith Esq. O.B.E, Secretary for 
Territories, Department of Territories, Canberra. A.C.T., 
30 August 1968.
16. Warwick-Smith, G., Correspondence from George 
Warwick-Smith Esq., Secretary, Department of Territo-
ries, Canberra, to Douglas Hay, Administrator, Territory 
of Papua and New Guinea, 2 February 1967. 
conflict, would be imported into 
Bougainville.17 While these critiques were 
dismissed by colonial officials, history would 
reveal that, in the long run, local knowledge 
and analysis proved superior to that of the 
Australian regimes.
Despite a prolonged campaign of resistance 
that featured road blocks, industrial sabotage 
and protest, operations at the mine began in 
1972. The fragmented nature of the resistance, 
spread as it was across rugged rural stretches, 
as well as the superior arms and resources 
commanded by the colonial regime and mining 
company, meant the operation could be shep-
herded into being without a clear mandate.
Its effects, as communities warned, were 
wide-ranging and life-changing. Some took 
advantage of the opportunities opened up by 
entering into business, or gaining employ-
ment at the mine. Others endured profound 
social dislocation. With land and environment 
inevitably eviscerated, the loss was more than 
economic. It was denial of access to cultural, 
customary, economic, and spiritual practices 
essential to community traditions, individual 
senses of personhood and social security.18 
The result was a sense of collective and indi-
vidual displacement.
No person was a bystander. Those who did 
not directly suffer the trauma of this loss, 
empathized with compatriots who did.19 And 
it ought to be underlined, this was trauma. 
People in the mine impacted area recall 
suffering severe mental distress as they were 
swept into conflicting paradigms;20 on the 
one hand there were introduced sets of
17. see for example Daw, T.E., Correspondence from 
T.E. Daw, District Officer, to the Director, Department of 
District Administration, Konedobu, 15 June 1967.
18. Pokamari, T., Interview – The Panguna Seminars, 
Arsam International, Bougainville Peoples Research 
Centre and Fourth World Films, 6 August 2015 and 
Totobu, M., Interview – The Panguna Seminars, Arsam 
International, Bougainville Peoples Research Centre 
and Fourth World Films, 7 August 2015.
19. Onavui, P., Interview – The Panguna Seminars, 
Arsam International, Bougainville Peoples Research 
Centre and Fourth World Films, 23 July 2015.
practices which ‘civilized’ people were meant 
to embrace. On the other there were the norms 
of indigenous societies, to which people were 
meant to only pay tokenistic homage to.
By the 1980s, these intersecting forces found 
expression in a growing social movement that 
aimed to close the Panguna mine.21 Despite 
its outward form, this was not an anti-mining 
movement – or at the very least this label fails 
to capture the larger historical schisms inform-
ing the movement. The mine was arguably the 
most physical and visceral symbol of a deeper 
social crisis, initiated a century before.22 It con-
centrated and condensed this crisis. The oppo-
sition that emerged in response to the mine 
was not simply questioning then the rights 
and wrongs of extracting ore from the ground. 
Rather, a spotlight was being placed on the 
existential crisis indigenous communities were 
facing, as the colonial project entrenched itself 
on Bougainville no longer under Australian 
management, but the management of localised 
provincial and national governments.
This anti-colonial resistance fused with other 
forces that began to entwine themselves in the 
crisis.23 Nationalist elements on Bougainville 
saw in the emerging crisis an opportunity to 
leverage growing public anger, to seize a greater 
share of the mine revenues for Bougainville.  
This faction of economic nationalists appear 
to have accepted the general direction set for 
Bougainville by the colonial powers as the right 
one. The principal concern was increasingly 
local control over the profits this system was 
generating. Evidence later revealed that key 
economic nationalists were involved in opaque 
business ventures which aimed to leverage the 
20. Taruito, A., Interview – The Panguna Seminars, 
Arsam International, Bougainville Peoples Research 
Centre and Fourth World Films, 22 July 2015.
21. see Lasslett, K, State Crime on the Margins of Empire 
(Pluto Books: London, 2014). 
22. Iruinu, B., Interview – The Panguna Seminars, 
Arsam International, Bougainville Peoples Research 
Centre and Fourth World Films, 25 August 2015. 
23. see Lasslett, K, State Crime on the Margins of Empire 
(Pluto Books: London, 2014).
No person was a bystander. Those 
who did not directly suffer the trauma 
of this loss, empathized with com-
patriots who did. And it ought to be 
underlined, this was trauma. 
discontent to gain control of the mining sector 
on Bougainville.24 This suggests had they led 
the initial revolution in 1988 it would have exac-
erbated the inequalities and colonial processes 
the social movement was challenging.  
Arguably the strongest social faction under-
pinning the movement to close down the 
Panguna mine found its figurative articula-
tion in two young leaders, Francis Ona and 
Perpetua Serero, who assumed control of the 
Panguna Landowners Association, following 
their election in 1987 to its governing board. 
Using this pressure body, they aimed to stimu-
late a movement which would stem all the cor-
rosive impacts pointed to above, allowing the 
mine impacted region to undergo a process 
of renewal where local social systems could 
be revived, initiating a period of cultural and 
social healing.25 Their objective, which was 
widely shared, found expression initially in 
protests, road-blocks and sit ins; it progressed 
to industrial sabotage in November 1988. 
When the Papua New Guinea and Australian 
governments responded to the unrest using 
military force - with logistic support from the 
Rio Tinto subsidiary, Bougainville Copper 
Limited – a decade long period of armed 
violence was initiated.26 A former combatant, 
Jonah Matvai,27 argues that the colonial pro-
ject was always progressed with a gun in the 
background. The Bougainville Revolutionary 
Army in his opinion, seized this gun and used
24. ‘President John Momis implicated in Chinese-Aus-
tralian plot to lift Bougainville mining moratorium’ in 
PNG Exposed, 12 May 2016.
25. Lasslett, K, State Crime on the Margins of Empire 
(Pluto Books: London, 2014).
26. Lasslett, K, State Crime on the Margins of Empire 
(Pluto Books: London, 2014).
27. Matvai, J., Interview – The Panguna Seminars, 
Arsam International, Bougainville Peoples Research 
Centre and Fourth World Films, 23 November 2014. 
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Families still remember those they 
lost, while mothers to this day search 
for children whose remains are 
missing .
it to protect local resources from further depri-
vation. It is hard to imagine the depth of feel-
ing and the seismic stakes that would cajole 
a large number of young people, living in a 
peaceful region, to take up arms against a far 
superior military force. Outside commentators 
have often resorted to racist tropes, describing 
rebels as cargo cultists and terrorists, labels 
that whitewash a much more complex history. 
Such labels do a deep injustice to the suffering 
being resisted and the critique of colonialism 
underpinning this struggle.28
The violence endured during the war period 
cannot be adequately captured here. It tore 
apart families, dislocated successive
28. discussed in Lasslett, K, State Crime on the Margins 
of Empire (Pluto Books: London, 2014).
generations, destroyed considerable infra-
structure, and has left legacies of trauma 
that are being left badly under-treated today. 
Families still remember those they lost, 
while mothers to this day search for children 
whose remains are missing. No side to the 
conflict can escape blame for these atrocities, 
although the evidence strongly suggests a 
significant share of responsibility for gross 
human rights violations goes to the Australian 
and Papua New Guinean states, alongside 
Rio Tinto. These legacy issues deserve serious 
policy attention, and a considerable volume 
of funding, especially for addressing post-con-
flict trauma. However, there are other remain-
ing legacies of the war also worth examining.
Social renewal and 
decolonisation
In their accounts and histories of the conflict 
period, survivors recall a mixture of feelings. 
On the one hand, many can cite traumatic 
Photo credit: Alexandre Berman and Olivier Pollet
Blaise Iruinu experiences at the hands of combatants, or the fear associated with raising a family during a 
prolonged period of displacement. However, 
amidst this violence and ambiguity, survivors 
also point with pride to the resilience local 
cultures demonstrated in providing the glue 
for social life, when the colonial political and 
economic infrastructure communities had 
become partially dependent on was abruptly 
removed, and a military blockade was placed 
around Bougainville. Local forms of cus-
tomary leadership, the strengthened role of 
women as custodians, growth in indigenous 
forms of savvy, and traditional productive 
practices, are all pointed to as integral sup-
port structures that got communities through 
a dark period. But it was not merely a matter 
of survival; these enhanced social trajectories 
signaled a period of cultural renewal. 
This precipitated some extraordinary restora-
tive actions. Emblematic of this phenomenon 
is Bruno Idioai who made efforts to repair the 
harm generated by the extractive industries 
by planting over one million trees and start-
ing a local agricultural college specialising in 
Melanesian agronomy.29 Others who had been 
displaced by the mine returned to their ances-
tral home and rebuilt their communities on 
top of millions of tons of waste rock, enduring 
all the hardship this implies.30
That said, the cessation of the blockade, and 
the onset of the peace process was widely 
welcomed. But not uncritically so. There was 
strong grass-roots support for mending rifts 
between communities and providing new gen-
erations with stability and security. However, 
it is not as clear whether people desire that 
this process should be accompanied by a res-
toration of the institutions and systems intro-
duced during the colonial period. For exam-
ple, in the Panguna region, there remains a 
deep skepticism of industrial-scale mining,
29. Idioai, B., Interview – The Panguna Seminars, Arsam 
International, Bougainville Peoples Research Centre 
and Fourth World Films, 27-28 November 2014.
30. Onavui, S., Interview – The Panguna Seminars, 
Arsam International, Bougainville Peoples Research 
Centre and Fourth World Films, 7 December 2014.
and the economic model this type of project 
is married to, a model that was implemented 
first by the Australian regime acting on the 
advice of the World Bank (both of the which 
remain active voices, supporting the return to 
large-scale mining on Bougainville).31 While 
the call for a ‘small is beautiful’ approach 
to economics has been dismissed by politi-
cians as idealistic,32 it represents an endur-
ing desire at the grass-roots level to find a 
uniquely Bougainvillean path that integrates 
with the world economy and international 
political system, but in a way that is sympa-
thetic to local sovereignty and the mainte-
nance of those cultural systems which proved 
so essential to community life during the 
conflict.33
For those trained to administer the political 
and market institutions bequeathed by the 
colonial powers, questioning the merit of 
Bougainville’s colonial heritage is an existen-
tial threat; much as the mine was an exis-
tential threat to impacted communities. That 
is, questioning in a serious way the merit of 
a national economy grounded in the auc-
tioning of natural resources to foreign inves-
tors, in order to generate revenues that can 
support an introduced Westminster system 
of government, affronts the salaries, profits 
and political interests of powerful actors on 
Bougainville who have become wedded to 
this structure, which now includes notable 
ex-combatant leaders. As a result, we have 
seen politicians and senior policy makers 
try to deny the political opportunity opened 
up by the crisis to dismantle dimensions of 
Bougainville’s colonial heritage, by framing 
it as no choice at all; life, so the assumption 
goes, would be impossible without such 
structures, so we cannot question them. Yet 
living memory on Bougainville recalls life
31. Jubilee Australia, Voices of Bougainville, (Jubilee 
Australia: Sydney, 2014).
32. Momis, J., ‘To Meet Fiscal Self-Reliance we Must 
Open the Panguna Mine’, Bougainville News, 6 January 
2015, https://bit.ly/2OxZxCI.
33. Jubilee Australia, Voices of Bougainville, (Jubilee 
Australia: Sydney, 2014).
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Despite efforts to deny the opportuni-
ties now open to Bougainville, as the 
autonomous region approaches the 
referendum over independence, there 
is ample scope for a wide-scale pro-
cess of critical reflection. 
existing without these structures, under the 
most inhospitable conditions imaginable.
Despite efforts to deny the opportunities now 
open to Bougainville, as the autonomous 
region approaches the referendum over inde-
pendence, there is ample scope for a wide-
scale process of critical reflection. Would 
raising the Bougainville flag, figuratively 
speaking, over the institutions bequeathed to 
it by Australia and then Papua New Guinea 
enable the form of sovereignty desired by 
rural communities throughout Bougainville? 
Is it possible to imagine an independent 
Bougainville dismantling certain colonial 
legacies while retaining others? And what 
space might be opened up in this emerging 
political landscape to experiment with new 
Melanesian models of governance and eco-
nomic organisation that sit sympathetically 
alongside local cultures, social systems, and 
value frameworks?
These questions beget others. Is economic life 
on Bougainville best pursued through lur-
ing foreign investment into natural resource 
projects, supplemented by a local economy 
rooted in forms of private ownership based on 
introduced models of competitive individual-
ism? Is there an argument for focusing policy 
attention on those industries that can be 
locally controlled, with the revenues retained 
on Bougainville? Are there alternative mod-
els of social ownership that could support 
household economic activity, such as cooper-
ative societies, which are more sympathetic 
to Melanesian social systems? Is the current 
form of representative democracy delivering 
accountable results for people? Are there 
alternative models of participatory democracy 
that could be drawn on to facilitate greater
communal control of policy and budget 
expenditure? Can small island democracies 
support the type of bureaucratic system that 
echoes a model used in Australia and the UK? 
Are there alternative economic structures, 
that are more accountable, less corrupt and 
thus reduce demands placed on taxation 
receipts? What are the assets and institutions 
that have been developed in Melanesian soci-
ety that could be scaled up to replace some 
of the ineffective institutions imposed during 
the colonial period? Are there also principles 
and cultural values that could be scaled up 
as a constitutional focal-point which can 
ensure future governments on Bougainville 
remain loyal to local conceptions of the good 
life, rather than conceptions imported from 
abroad on what a responsible country should 
do with its time and resources? How have 
belief systems, gender relationships and 
social interactions been shaped by colonial 
institutions? To what extent are these changes 
compatible with cultural expectations that 
should be upheld as a resource for the future? 
Is the formal education system fit for purpose? 
Does it capture the capacities, skills, knowl-
edge, and teachers, essential to a holistic 
education that equip future generations to 
transmit their cultural heritage and enliven 
national sovereignty? 
These are big questions that interrogate over a 
century of history. They presuppose that there 
is no single destiny for Bougainville, and no 
one right way of doing things. Indeed, these 
questions frame the future as an open process 
with many possible avenues, with conse-
quences for communities on Bougainville that 
can be anticipated; just as the construction 
of the Panguna mine was one potential path 
of history with consequences that could be 
predicted. There are rich veins of thought 
that stretch across Bougainville which could 
provide answers to the above questions, out 
of which a political strategy for the future 
could be engineered. However, elites on 
Bougainville – local and foreign – will not 
easily relinquish control over this strategy 
to a wider populous. As Blaise Iruinu rightly 
observes the struggle against colonialism on 
Bougainville is not yet over.34
34. Iruinu, B., Interview – The Panguna Seminars, 
Arsam International, Bougainville Peoples Research 
Centre and Fourth World Films, 25 August 2015.
Photo credit: Alexandre Berman and Olivier Pollet
Youths from Sipuru Village Assembly come together to build a road and steps in the 
Evo mountains to link up their communities and villages
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Introduction
Bougainville society is largely matrilineal and 
at its core are women and land. Men are also 
part of this inseparable connection, but land 
is owned and passed on from one generation 
to another through the female bloodline. 
There is a connection between women and 
land that is inseparable. However, this con-
nection has suffered from much abuse, viola-
tion and destruction, and women’s position in 
society has been weakened and marginalised 
since the period of colonisation. Unfortunately, 
the status-quo has been maintained by the 
present Government in Bougainville.
The paper briefly covers a number of areas 
with regards to women’s participation in 
Bougainville’s development. Firstly, a brief 
discussion of Bougainville’s matrilineal sys-
tem and women’s place in Bougainville soci-
ety. Secondly, the discussion deals with the 
role women played in the peace process in the 
1990s and early 2000s. Thirdly, yet another 
brief discussion on women’s contribution in 
the post-civil war recovery processes. And 
finally, the paper proposes a possible future 
agenda for women’s organisations.
Women’s place in 
Bougainville society
Bougainville has both traditional and western 
government systems operating in parallel to 
each other. The most common traditional gov-
erning system is the matrilineal system which 
is practiced across Bougainville except in two 
language communities: the Buin language 
community in the south which has a patrilin-
eal system, and the Bougainville-Polynesian 
outliers – the Mortlock and Tasman Islands – 
with a patriarchal system.
To illustrate power and authority women have 
and play in the matrilineal system, I’ll give 
a couple of examples here – this is not an 
exhaustive list but describes some of the laws 
and regulations that underpin matriliny. 
WOMEN’S CONTRIBUTIONS TO 
BOUGAINVILLE’S PAST, PRESENT 
AND FUTURE
AUTHOR: DR RUTH SAOVANA-SPRIGGS
Dr Ruth Saovana-Spriggs is a linguist and socio-political scientist based in 
Bougainville after more than 20 years of working in the linguistics department 
as tutor, researcher, and lecturer at the Research School of Pacific and Asian 
Studies (now the School of Culture, History and Language) at the Australian 
National University, and at the Kiel University’s linguistics department in 
Germany. She currently leads a couple of projects. One is the establishment of 
the Bougainville People’s Research Centre and the second project is a work in 
partnership with local researchers in expanding the work of the Bougainville 
National Heritage Foundation based in Arawa, Central Bougainville. 
CHAPTER 2
In the case of family breakdown or divorce, 
a man packs up and leaves his family empty 
handed. He does not take any share of the 
wealth he and his family had amassed over 
the years of their life together. He has no right 
to own a portion of land (being his wife’s 
land) he may have previously worked on. 
Children remain members of the mother’s 
female bloodline, not the father’s female 
siblings’ bloodline. A Bougainville woman 
is the treasurer and distributor of traditional 
wealth; she is the mother of everything that 
the sub-clan has – land, seas and rivers, cere-
monial places; sub-clans’ traditional arts and 
crafts including designs (hairdos, canoes and 
paddles, designs and colors), songs especially 
chants and dances, etc. On the man’s side, a 
man plays a number of roles and responsibili-
ties, not just as father and husband, indeed he 
plays those roles but in addition it is crucial 
that he learns the history of his wife’s land. 
He is then added to the list of those who are 
the history keepers of the wife’s land: plays 
the role of being the guard, protector and 
A Bougainville woman is the treasurer 
and distributor of traditional wealth; 
she is the mother of everything that 
the sub-clan has – land, seas and 
rivers, ceremonial places; sub-clans’ 
traditional arts and crafts. 
defender of the wife’s land. At the same time, 
he exercises similar roles and responsibilities 
over his own land with his female siblings. In 
the matrilineal context, women and men are 
decision-makers on land matters, marriage 
and bride-price, the distribution of wealth, 
etc. However, women have a veto power and 
could easily veto sub-clan and family’s final 
decisions. Male siblings also share this level 
of authority and power but their exercise of 
this is dependent on women’s ‘tok orait’, per-
mission in Tok Pisin.
This is the level of power and authority 
women have in the matrilineal system that 
saw ex-combatants respect women at a 
Photo credit: Kristy Davies/Australian War Memorial 
Local women conduct a traditional fan dance to celebrate the Arawa agreement, 
signed on 30 April 1998
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The establishment of a western sys-
tem of government in Bougainville 
unfortunately set in an irreversible 
tide against the matrilineal system, 
weakening women’s position of 
power and authority. 
time when women conducted small-scale 
peace missions in their communities across 
Bougainville.
The establishment of a western system of 
government in Bougainville unfortunately set 
in an irreversible tide against the matrilin-
eal system, weakening women’s position of 
power and authority. The current Bougainville 
Mining Act for example, passed by the 
Autonomous Bougainville Government (ABG) 
in March 2015, is a very clear example of the 
continuation of this process of disempower-
ing women. However, it is not impossible to 
reverse the tide today.
Any woman in Bougainville reading this paper 
must understand that women in many coun-
tries have had to fight for their rights on many 
issues. Some such include the right to vote 
and participate in politics; equal opportuni-
ties for employment in the workplace: equal 
pay with their male counterparts: the right to 
have custody over children and to own prop-
erties, and so on and so forth. Bougainville 
women in the workplace now find themselves 
in the footsteps of western women’s rights 
movements on similar issues and matters.
However, Bougainville women do have an 
advantage based on matrilineal laws and 
regulations. How to promote and make their 
traditional positions of power relevant in the 
western government system is a challenge 
they must genuinely deal with. Government 
policies on how to develop natural resources 
deals with the very heart of the matrilineal 
system. In this context, women should not be 
marginalised but actively exerting their influ-
ence and promote their participation in govern-
ment affairs and decision-making processes.
Women’s contribution in 
bringing the war to an end: 
grassroots peace missions
Grassroots women’s peace missions mush-
roomed across Bougainville in the early 
1990s and continued up until 2001. In the 
mid-1990s, these small-scale peace mis-
sions led to the establishment of a number 
of Bougainville-wide women’s organisations 
including the Bougainville Inter-Church 
Women’s Forum led by Sr. Lorraine Garasu; 
the Bougainville Women for Peace and 
Freedom under Josephine Kauona’s lead-
ership; and the Leitana Nehan Women’s 
Development Agency with Helen Hakena 
(a contributor to this report) being the first 
president. Women’s organisations within the 
churches were also active and remain so to 
this day.
Drawing on their matrilineal power and 
authority, women also successfully carved 
out their own space in high-level peace 
negotiations and meetings that were held in 
Bougainville, PNG, Australia, New Zealand, 
the Solomon Islands and elsewhere in the 
late 1990s (see box 1 for an excerpt of the 
‘Women’s Lincoln Statement’).
Women’s contribution in 
the recovery process: 2005 
to 2018
Women leaders of the 1990s have moved on 
since the inauguration of the ABG in 2005. 
What took place was something akin to the 
changing of the ‘old guard.’ Women lead-
ers from the 1990s – who worked tirelessly 
together – have moved on to establish other 
Bougainville-wide projects and programs. 
I will briefly describe two examples (Sr. 
Lorraine Garasu and Sr. Ruby Miringka)-
Sr. Lorraine Garasu was instrumental in bring-
ing women and their leaders together, forming 
the Bougainville Inter-Church Women’s 
Forum in the early 1990s. Much of her time 
and energy was spent on counseling women 
who had been suffering from traumatic war 
experiences: the loss of lives including hus-
bands, experiences of widowhood in time of 
war, rape, mental and emotional issues, etc. 
Guided by the issues and problems she was 
dealing with in the early 2000s, and with the 
support of other Sisters from the Congregation 
of Sisters of Nazareth, Sr. Lorraine set up the 
Nazareth Centre for Rehabilitaion at Chabai at 
the northern tip of Bougainville. Currently the 
Centre works across all regions of Bougainville 
and provides safe houses services in four 
locations (Chabai, Buka, Arawa and Buin), as 
well as engages with their network of Women 
Human Rights Defenders and male advo-
cates. Women and children, who suffer from 
domestic violence and abuse, family break-
down, rape and teenage pregnancy and other 
related socio-economic issues are able to seek 
counseling and support from the Centre. Sr. 
Lorraine has worked tirelessly since before 
Box 1: the ‘Women’s Lincoln Statement’ 
Here is an excerpt, the ‘Women’s Lincoln Statement’ read by one of the women leaders 
at the Lincoln Peace Talks in 1998 in New Zealand. Once again demonstrating women’s 
level of influence, contributing at meetings and negotiations in relation to Bougainville’s 
political status, cessation of the civil war and achieving peace.
To survive, we looked within our culture, our traditional society and ourselves. In al-
most all areas of Bougainville, women traditionally own the land. The land is sacred and 
protected by men on behalf of the women. The men as guardians share leadership with 
women, taking the responsibility in open debate to protect women from potential con-
flict; however, women have the power to veto decisions, and therefore are involved in 
the final consultative process. 
The destruction of this balance of power as held in Bougainville in traditional times oc-
curred through Westernisation in the colonial period. It is a tragic fact that the ignorance 
of external powers exercised in Bougainville by default weakened the traditional balance 
that kept a peaceful and harmonious society. In the recent absence of formal Western 
political structures, our people in social crisis have turned to traditional decision-making 
methods in which women have been restored to their rightful place in leadership. 
Women have built bridges between their families, clans and displaced fellow Bougainvil-
leans by working for mutual survival, whether it be in the bush, in care centres or wher-
ever they have hosted strangers in their own communities. 
[In] our society, although men and women have distinctive roles, they are complemen-
tary. We, women are co-partners with our men and as such we are not daunted by the 
enormous tasks that lie before us to bring about a new Bougainville. In holding to the 
peace message that has spread in Bougainville from Burnham, we, the Women’s Delega-
tion at Lincoln University Leaders’ Meeting, affirm with all our sisters and fellow Bougain-
villeans our determination to make this peace process work until we reach our common 
goal of freedom.1
1. Ruth Saovana-Spriggs, Gender and Peace: Bougainville Women, Matriliny and the Peace Process, PhD 
Thesis (Australian National University: Canberra, 2007).
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the crisis. She is one of Bougainville’s true 
treasures.
Sr. Ruby Miringka (the then sister in charge of 
Nursing Training at the former Arawa Nursing 
College of the 1980s) was an important leader 
in the Bougainville Women for Peace and 
Freedom, at the same time, the Coordinator of 
the Bougainville Community-Based Integrated 
Humanitarian Program (BOCBIHP), which 
was based in the capital of the Solomon 
Islands, Honiara. She and her family, together 
with more than 2,000 Bougainvillean refugees,
fled to the Solomon Islands during the con-
flict. The organisation supported refugees 
living in Honiara and people living up in the 
mountains of Central Bougainville, who suf-
fered most severely as a result of the embargo 
the Papua New Guinea (PNG) Government 
imposed on the people in the 1990s. BOCBIHP 
provided a wide range of support including 
transporting very sick people, pregnant moth-
ers/women experiencing difficulties in child-
birth, basic medicines, secondhand clothes, 
etc. In the late 2000s Sr Ruby founded the 
Bougainville Healthy Community Programme, 
a not-for-profit community program, which is 
very much a carry-over from BOCBIHP and is 
a success story region-wide.2
Post-civil war (2000 to 
2018) women in politics
Bougainville women are fortunate to have three 
reserved seats in the Bougainville Parliament 
(compared to none in PNG). In the 2005 gen-
eral election, three women were elected in 
accordance with the rules established in 
Bougainville’s constitution.
As of the last general election (April 2015), 
Bougainville now has four women parliamen-
tarians. The fourth woman contested the last 
general election as an independent candidate. 
She won! That was a landmark victory for 
all women, showing a growing confidence 
in their ability to participate in politics and 
Photo credit: Elena Leddra/IWDA
Sr Lorraine Garasu, Director of Nazareth Centre for Rehabilitation leadership at that level.
At the community level change is also on 
the horizon with the passing in 2016 of 
the Bougainville Community Government 
Act. This Act establishes urban and rural 
‘Community Governments’ comprised of indi-
vidual wards. Each ward must elect one male 
and one female representative, and the lead-
ership roles for each Community Government 
must rotate between men and women. This 
system – if properly implemented – offers 
women leadership opportunities and expe-
rience at the local level that may well trans-
late to future leadership opportunities at the 
national level.
While there are clearly some success stories, 
there are, on the other hand, opportunities for 
women to improve their participation in gov-
ernance. There is plenty of room for women 
to raise their standard, build confidence and 
promote their ability to participate in the 
political arena, Government bureaucracy and 
in many other areas in the formal and private 
sectors.
The final section of the discussion here is 
an outline of a few issues that are of critical 
importance to Bougainville’s future – that 
might form a possible future agenda for wom-
en’s organisations in Bougainville.
A possible future agenda 
for women’s organisations
Participation and leadership at 
government level decision-making 
processes
There is I believe an opportunity for women to 
establish communications with Bougainville’s 
four female parliamentarians, so that they 
gain some understanding on how the govern-
ment functions with regards to decision-mak-
ing on policies and laws. Gaining such insight 
would strengthen their confidence and enable 
them to increase their participation in 
The fourth woman contested the last 
general election as an independent 
candidate. She won! That was a land-
mark victory for all women, showing 
a growing confidence in their ability 
to participate in politics and leader-
ship at that level.
decision-making processes, potentially 
as members of a future Bougainville 
Government.
Increasing women’s participation in govern-
ment decision-making processes would also 
require women to skillfully integrate matri-
lineal authority and leadership skills and use 
them to navigate their way through the patri-
archal western government system in order 
for them to effectively participate in all affairs 
at all levels of government.
Independence referendum
The tentative date for holding the referen-
dum on Bougainville’s future political status 
is currently scheduled for June 2019 – just 
16 months away from the time of writing 
this paper. Efforts by the ABG to explain the 
concept and complexities involved in the 
referendum has been so far very minimal 
indeed. This lack of information could propel 
women’s groups (the Bougainville Women’s 
Federation and its district branches maybe) 
to launch their own education awareness 
programs on the issue in their respective 
communities.
Resistance to mining and the 
Bougainville Mining Act
Kate Lappin and Helen Hakena, in their con-
tribution to this report, describe how the 
Panguna mine had an irreparable, devastat-
ing impact on women. My concern is that,  
this too may become the dilemma women in 
the Tinputz and Wakunai districts could face 
– becoming their worst nightmare – once the 
Perth-based mining company Kalia Holdings 
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Limited begins exploration, with the prospect 
of mining down the track.
As the Cathal Doyle contribution to this report 
and previous analysis by Jubilee Australia3 
have demonstrated, the Bougainville Mining 
Act will not protect landowner rights (and cer-
tainly not landowner rights to free, prior and 
informed consent) and in some instances
criminalises dissent to mining projects. The 
Bougainville Mining Act contains offences and 
subsequent penalties that are devastating and 
damaging to a person’s integrity, the commu-
nity and Bougainville society as a whole, and
2. For further detail, see, Miringka, R. ‘Community 
Developments And BOCBIHP’ in As Mothers of the 
Land: The birth of the Bougainville Women for Peace 
and Freedom, eds, Josephine Tankunani Sirivi and 
Marilyn Taleo Havini (Pandanus Books, Research 
School of Pacific and Asian Studies, The Australian 
National University, 2004) p 99 – 108.
3. ‘The Devil in the Detail Analysis of the Bougainville 
Mining Act 2015’ (NSW: Jubilee Australia Research 
Centre, 2015). 
may lead to disempowerment, land alienation, 
and environmental destruction once more.
As I said at the beginning of this paper, there 
is a connection between women and land 
that is inseparable. When mining destroys 
land – and it does – it will have a devastating 
impact on women.  Further, there are some 
people who cannot fathom an independ-
ent Bougainville without mining providing 
the economic foundation for this to occur. 
Hence mining is, in my view, one of critical 
importance to Bougainville’s future and one 
that ought to be an area of focus for women’s 
organisations.  
Conclusion
I was invited to the Hahon Reconciliation 
ceremony on the west coast of Bougainville 
on March 30th, 2017. The reconciliation cer-
emony was between the ex-combatants and 
families of the deceased. Here’s part of my 
Photo credit: Christina Hill
Tinputz in North Bougainville where Kalia Holdings holds an exploration licence speech, translated into English:
Bougainville women obviously have a long way to go, to fully realise their political strength 
and influence. They can draw on their matrilineal authority and power – which would provide 
a firm foundation on which they can demand more participation and decision-making power 
in the political system. 
I strongly encourage Bougainville women today to examine women’s traditional and acquired 
power and influence demonstrated during the civil war as they undertook peace missions and 
to draw on that strength again as they attempt to help chart Bougainville’s economic and polit-
ical future. Women in Bougainville have every opportunity under the sun to turn their tradi-
tional and cultural sources of power and authority into active participation in the governing of 
Bougainville – whether it be in the public sector, i.e., the ABG and its bureaucracy, the private 
sector, local-level government, the churches, local non-government organisations, etc. 
We were very vocal during the peace process.
Since the establishment of the [Bougainville Women’s Federation] I have not heard a col-
lective women’s voice, expressing their ideas and views on government policy in whatever 
area the government decides on. You, women, must not think you have no right to follow 
or scrutinise government policies. You have every right. You are the landowners. 
I have not heard a collective women’s voice at any time, not once on the mining law, on 
the referendum. Where do you stand, women?
To our women politicians in Bougainville, how many of you go to women at district level 
to hold discussions with women on such important issues? You should be the first ones to 
go, sit down with the women and explain to them what’s happening in the government.
I have not heard a collective voice from the women. Today, I call for that” 
I strongly encourage 
Bougainville women today to 
examine women’s traditional 
and acquired power and 
influence demonstrated 
during the civil war as they 
undertook peace missions 
and to draw on that strength 
again as they attempt to help 
chart Bougainville’s economic 
and political future.
- Dr Ruth Saovana-Spriggs
“
CHAPTER 2/ GROWING BOUGAINVILLE'S FUTURE              31 
    
30                GROWING BOUGAINVILLE'S FUTURE/ CHAPTER 2  
     
Introduction
Large-scale mining creates long-term develop-
ment deficits1 through long-lasting and costly 
environmental impacts, particularly on water; 
human rights impacts, particularly affecting 
disadvantaged and vulnerable populations; 
impacts that erode democracy and good 
governance, including through corruption 
and regulatory capture; and national and 
local-level economic impacts that impede 
development.
As evidence has mounted since the mid-1990s 
regarding the costs that mining imposes on 
economies and on human development, a 
counter argument has gained traction through 
its promotion by industry lobby groups and
1. Catherine Coumans, ‘CIDA’s Partnership with Mining 
Companies Fails to Acknowledge and Address the Role 
of Mining in the Creation of Development Deficits. Brief 
prepared for the House of Commons Standing Commit-
tee on Foreign Affairs and International Development’s 
Study on the Role of the Private Sector in Achieving Can-
ada’s International Development Interests’, MiningWatch 
Canada, January 2012 https://miningwatch.ca/sites/de-
fault/files/Mining_and_Development_FAAE_2012_0.pdf.
governments supportive of the industry. This 
argument poses that mining could be a source 
of development in conditions of strong gov-
ernance. Put another way, it is argued that 
mining companies are not to blame for nega-
tive impacts on development, but weak gov-
ernments. This argument shifts attention 
and focus away from the harmful practices of 
the industry itself, to the governance of juris-
dictions, particularly in developing countries, 
where mining is taking place.
This paper challenges the premise that good 
governance is all that stands between mining 
and positive development outcomes, provid-
ing examples from Canada, and examines the 
contradictions in the global mining industry’s 
lobby for a focus on good governance in light 
of ongoing efforts by the mining sector itself 
to undermine attempts to introduce better 
governance.2
2. The introduction to this paper draws on a forthcom-
ing paper of the author: “Minding the “Governance 
Gaps”: Considering strategy, policy and agency in 
discourses about mining and governance.” [Henceforth 
Coumans, forthcoming, Minding the Governance Gaps].
MINING AND DEVELOPMENT: IS 
“GOOD GOVERNANCE” REALLY 
THE CURE?
AUTHOR: DR CATHERINE COUMANS
Dr Catherine Coumans is the Research Co-ordinator with MiningWatch Canada. 
She provides expert support for MiningWatch’s research and publications. She 
has written reports, submissions and academic articles on mining since conduct-
ing her Ph.D. research in the Philippines (1988-1990). Catherine also monitors 
national and international government and industry initiatives on mining. Her 
community-level human rights work and work with Indigenous peoples affected 
by Canadian mining companies is focused on the Asia-Pacific region.
CHAPTER 3
The problem – large-scale mining 
creates development deficits
Industrial mining is a source of environmen-
tally detrimental impacts, particularly with 
respect to surface and ground water, leading 
to a contamination footprint that may extend 
far beyond the extraction site. Pollution of 
surface and ground water imposes ongoing 
economic and social costs at both local and 
national levels. Open-pit mining creates mas-
sive amounts of potentially toxic waste that 
must be contained, often in perpetuity. Every 
day leaks and seeps and catastrophic failures 
of mine waste impoundments are a long-term 
source of environmental contamination. In 
some parts of the world, including Papua New 
Guinea, some mines are licensed to dispose of 
this toxic waste directly into rivers, as was the 
case with the Panguna mine in Bougainville. 
Acid mine drainage and associated metal 
leaching is a common and persistent cause 
of water contamination in mining. Treatment 
methods are often expensive, can only miti-
gate not solve the problem, and may need to 
be continued for hundreds and even thou-
sands of years.3
Mining is also implicated in very serious 
human rights impacts with long-lasting 
effects. These impacts occur when commu-
nities, often thousands of people, are dis-
placed by mining;4 governments criminalise 
people who oppose mining impacts and seek 
to defend human and environmental rights; 
mines militarise and private and public secu-
rity employ excess use of force against local 
people including rape and gang rape of local 
women;5 large numbers of external labourers, 
mostly men, are brought into existing commu-
nities around mines leading
3. Moncur, Michael C. 2006. Acid mine drainage: past, 
present...future? Wat on Earth, University of Waterloo. 
https://uwaterloo.ca/wat-on-earth/.
4. S Lillywhite, D Kemp and K Sturman, ‘Mining, 
resettlement and lost livelihoods: Listening to the 
voices of resettled communities in Mualadzi, Mozam-
bique’ Oxfam: Melbourne, 2015) https://www.oxfam.
org.au/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/mining-resettle-
ment-and-lost-livelihoods_eng_web.pdf.
Industrial mining is a source of 
environmentally detrimental 
impacts, particularly with respect to 
surface and ground water, leading to 
a contamination footprint that may 
extend far beyond the extraction site.
to, among others, increases in sexually 
transmitted diseases. These human rights 
impacts, among others, are particularly severe 
for marginalised people including women and 
indigenous peoples.6
Additionally, mining is responsible for det-
rimental local and national-level economic 
impacts through externalising environmental 
and social costs; investor-state contracts and 
trade agreements that contractualise mini-
mum payment of taxes and royalties to host 
governments; extensive subsidies provided by 
governments often under pressure from inter-
national lenders;7 the use by companies of 
accounting practices that cause illicit capital 
flows out of the countries where the resources
5. CERD 2017. EarthRights International, University of 
Toronto Faculty of Law International Human Rights 
Program, MiningWatch Canada. Report to the U.N. Com-
mittee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination 93rd 
session, July - August 2017, for its review of Canada’s 21st 
- 23rd periodic reports. https://miningwatch.ca/sites/
default/files/cerd_final_8.10.pdf.
6. Shin Imai, Leah Gardner, and Sarah Weinberger, The 
‘Canada Brand’: Violence and Canadian Mining Com-
panies in Latin America. [Version 2 November 20, 2016] 
Osgoode Legal Studies Research Paper No. 17/2017. 
Available at SSRN:  https://ssrn.com/abstract=2886584; 
Moisés Arce and Rebecca E. Miller, ‘Mineral Wealth and 
Protest in Sub-Saharan Africa’ in African Studies Re-
view, Volume 59, Number 3, December 2016, pp. 83-105; 
and Cathal Doyle, Clive Wicks and Frank Nally, Mining 
in the Philippines: Concerns and Conflicts (Society of 
St. Columban: West Midlands, UK: 2007) https://www.
iucn.org/sites/dev/files/import/downloads/mining_in_
the_philippines___concerns_and_conflicts.pdf.
7. Bonnie Campbell (ed.), Mining in Africa: Regulation 
and Development (Pluto Press: London and New York, 
2009); Bonnie Campbell, Conclusion: What Development 
Model? What Governance Agenda?, in Bonnie Campbell 
(ed.) Mining in Africa: Regulation and Development 
(Pluto Press: London and New York, 2009); and Bonnie 
Campbell (ed.), Modes of Governance and Revenue Flows 
in African Mining (Palgrave Macmillan: UK, 2013).
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For many years, the industry and 
supportive governments largely 
denied the seriousness of the impacts 
associated with mining [...]
are extracted, often into tax havens; and a suite 
of detrimental economic and social conditions 
described by the terms “Dutch disease” and 
the “resource curse.”8 Dan Haglund, of Oxford 
Policy Management, concludes that miner-
al-dependent countries “are more likely to 
have lower economic development than other 
countries, measured by GDP per capita.”9
The mining industry’s response
For many years, the industry and supportive 
governments largely denied the seriousness 
of the impacts associated with mining, and 
avoided or discouraged discussion of these 
impacts, even as these were raised with 
increasing urgency by civil society organisa-
tions in the global South and North. While 
defiance persists, a global acknowledgement 
of, and discussion about, negative impacts 
associated with mining did get under way 
in the late 1990s, following a series of cata-
strophic mine waste impoundment failures, 
and, in the early 2000s, this critical analysis 
paid increasing attention to human rights
8. The resource curse literature describes a suite of con-
ditions, to which resource-dependent countries likely 
to be subject, that are detrimental to national econo-
mies and likely to perpetuate or exacerbate under-de-
velopment, such as: overvaluation of the real exchange 
rate (RER) leading to price inflation and higher costs 
for local producers, loss of competitiveness and loss 
of development of other economic sectors (so-called 
Dutch Disease); volatility in mineral values; over con-
sumption based on a non-renewable resource; unequal 
distribution of benefits associated with mineral wealth; 
corruption; increased conflict and violence (Auty 1993; 
Sachs and Warner 2001; Leamer 1999; Berman et al 
2017; Meilleur 2010; Ross 2015; Thorp et al 2012).
9. D Haglund, ‘Blessing or Curse? The Rise of Min-
eral Dependence Among Low-and Middle Income 
Countries’, Oxford Policy Management, 2011 http://
www.opml.co.uk/sites/default/files/Blessing%20
or%20curse%20The%20rise%20of%20mineral%20
dependence%20among%20low-%20and%20middle-in-
come%20countries%20-%20web%20version.pdf. 
and economic impacts. A shift occurred in the 
international debate from outright denial of 
serious problems, to more complex discus-
sions about the relative significance of core 
contributing factors and to what the appropri-
ate solutions should be. 
In 2004, the industry association Inter-
national Council of Mining and Metals 
(ICMM), in partnership with UNCTAD and 
the World Bank Group turned to the work of 
a group of academics at Oxford, including 
Paul Collier. Collier’s work on “resource-rich 
and policy-poor countries”10 led to his well-
known and contested11 equations12 that made 
good governance the difference between those 
countries that reap the benefits and those that 
suffer the curse of resource extraction.
A major and ongoing lobby effort by the inter-
national mining industry, supported by the 
home country governments of many mining 
companies, such as Canada and Australia, has 
resulted in new public policy directions and 
the allocation of millions of dollars in public 
funds to programs in the host countries of 
multinational mining companies to help them 
to better govern their natural resources.13
It is time to challenge the focus on weak gov-
ernance as a cause of the development 
10. Paul Collier, The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest 
Countries are Failing and What Can Be Done About It 
(Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2007). 
11. See for example Penelope Simons and Audrey Mack-
lin, The Governance Gap: Extractive Industries, Human 
Rights, and the Home State Advantage (Routledge: 
London and New York, 2014).
12. Collier’s thesis can be summarized in the equations: 
1) Nature + technology + regulation = prosperity. 2) Na-
ture + technology – regulation = plunder (Paul Collier, 
The Plundered Planet: Why We Must, and How We Can, 
Manage Nature for Global Prosperity (Oxford University 
Press: Oxford, 2010)).
13. Bonnie Campbell, Etienne Roy- Grégoire, and Myri-
am Laforce, ‘Regulatory Frameworks, Issues of Legiti-
macy, Responsibility, and Accountability: Reflections 
Drawn from the PERCAN Initiative’ in Julia Sagebien 
and Nicole Marie Lindsay (eds.) Governance Ecosystems: 
CSR in the Latin American Mining Sector (Palgrave Macmil-
lan: UK, 2011); and Coumans, forthcoming. For more on 
this see https://bit.ly/2u8YyBl.
deficits created by mining by looking at exam-
ples from a country with a long history and 
expertise in mining, a country with presumed 
strong governance – Canada.
Canada: “strong 
governance,” but weak 
performance at home
Since 2009 the Government of Canada has 
allocated tens of millions of dollars from pub-
lic funds to programs purporting to develop 
natural resource governance in countries 
hosting Canadian mining companies.14 
Canada’s officials tout Canada’s presumed 
leadership in mining and in good governance 
as valued expertise to be shared. However, 
communities in Canada struggle with the 
same mining-related afflictions suffered by 
communities overseas where Canadian min-
ing companies operate. The following exam-
ples are by no means exhaustive, but give a 
sense of the range of serious and costly  
mining-related problems that undermine 
human development in Canada.
Costly environmental disasters and 
corporate capture of regulators
Containment of toxic waste and tailings is a 
most basic requirement of any mine to ensure 
environmental protection and to safeguard 
human rights and long-term economic oppor-
tunities of local communities. Bowker and 
Chambers’ 2016 in-depth study of global tail-
ings impoundments found that “[t]hroughout 
Canada and all over the world new mines and 
new dams are approved within regulatory and 
legal structures that do not hold miners to 
best available technology and best applicable 
practices.”15 It is therefore not surprising 
14. Coumans, forthcoming, Minding the Governance Gaps
15. Lindsay Newland Bowker and David M. Chambers, 
‘Root Causes of Tailings Dam Overtopping: The Eco-
nomics of Risk & Consequence’, Protections 2016 2nd 
International Seminar on Dam Protection Against Over-
topping, 2016 https://bit.ly/2omODVi.
Photo credit: Chris Blake
Mount Polley after the spill
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The tailings dam failure released 
over 24 million cubic metres of con-
taminated water and mine tailings, 
containing nickel, arsenic, lead and 
copper, into Polley Lake, Hazeltine 
Creek and Quesnel Lake. 
that a 2017 review of global tailing dam fail-
ures by the UN Environment Programme 
(UNEP) found “the number of serious failures 
has increased in the last three decades.”16 
The same report found that of 40 tailings dam 
failures it considered world-wide, between 
2007-2017, seven occurred in Canada, only one 
less than reported in China, the country with 
the worst performance on the list. 
To consider just one example, on 4 August 
2014, a four square kilometre tailings 
impoundment at Canada’s Mount Polley 
mine failed. The open pit copper and gold 
mine owned by Imperial Metals has been in 
operation since 1997 in the Province of British 
Columbia (B.C.). The tailings dam failure 
released over 24 million cubic metres of con-
taminated water and mine tailings, containing
nickel, arsenic, lead and copper,17 into Polley 
Lake, Hazeltine Creek and Quesnel Lake. 
Quesnel Lake is one of the world’s deepest 
fjord lakes, a source of drinking water for 
the local settler communities, as well as for 
Indigenous peoples within the Secwepemc 
Nation, and the lake is the spawning ground 
for up to 25% of all salmon in B.C.. The 
annual salmon run is of economic, social, 
cultural and nutritional significance to local 
Indigenous peoples.
16. Roche, C., Thygesen, K., Baker, E. (Eds.) 2017. Mine 
Tailings Storage: Safety Is No Accident. A UNEP Rapid 
Response Assessment. United Nations Environment 
Programme and GRID-Arendal, Nairobi and Arendal, 
https://bit.ly/2zp9jVd. 
17. CBC News, ‘Mount Polley mine tailings spill: Impe-
rial Metals could face $1M fine’, 6 August 2014 http://
www.cbc.ca/news/canada/british-columbia/mount-
polley-mine-tailings-spill-imperial-metals-could-face-
1m-fine-1.2728832.
Photo credit: Chris Blake
Hazeltine Creek and surrounding forest was destroyed after the spill - it used to be a 3 
feet wide creek, into which salmon and other fish spawned. 
Amnesty International has reported on the 
human rights impacts of the waste spill.18 
An independent panel found that in regard 
to tailings storage the mine had “adopted a 
minimum factor of safety”19 and did not take 
steps it could have to avert the disaster.20 The 
panel also noted the “limited ability of the 
Regulator to influence the design issues”21 
concluding that the only way to reduce dam 
failures is to increase the standards to “[t]
hose developed by the U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers for water dams”22 and to reduce the 
use of dams through a dry-stacking method 
of tailings impoundment.23 The independent 
panel noted that without these significant 
changes to current mining practices “on aver-
age there will be two failures every 10
18. Amnesty International, A breach of human rights: 
the human rights impact of the Mount Polley Mine 
Disaster, British Colombia, Canada, May 2017 http://
www.amnesty.ca/sites/amnesty/files/FINAL_May%20
24_Mount%20Polley%20briefing.pdf.
19. Independent Expert Engineering Investigation and 
Review Panel, 30 January 2015, p. 132 https://www.
mountpolleyreviewpanel.ca/sites/default/files/report/
ReportonMountPolleyTailingsStorageFacilityBreach.
pdf. 
20. Ibid. p. 110.
21. Ibid. p. 115.
22. Ibid. p. 133.
23. Ibid. p. 122.
When tailing dams fail, it is 
Canadian taxpayers who end up 
having to cover the bulk of the costs 
for environmental remediation. 
years.”24 The mining industry has pushed 
back on the findings of the independent panel 
by insisting that “tailings dam failures are 
very rare” and that “[t]ailings dams have a 
high safety record in Canada.”25 Since the 
Mt. Polley spill three more mines have been 
approved in B.C., none of which meet these 
independent panel’s recommendations.26 
Furthermore, no sanctions or fines have been 
levied on Imperial Metals for the Mount Polley 
disaster and the mine has been permitted to 
continue operating. As Bowker and Chambers 
point out, Canadian “[r]egulators have clearly
24. Ibid. p. 118. 
25. Mining Association of British Colombia, ‘Mining As-
sociation of BC is Monitoring The Mount Polley Tailings 
Dam Incident’, 6 August 2014, http://www.mining.bc.
ca/news/mining-association-bc-monitoring-mount-pol-
ley-tailings-dam-incident. 
26. Carol Linnitt, ‘No Charges, No Fines For Mount 
Polley Mine Disaster as Three-Year Legal Deadline 
Approaches’, DeSmog Canada, 23 July 2017 https://
miningwatch.ca/news/2017/7/23/no-charges-no-fines-
mount-polley-mine-disaster-three-year-legal-deadline-
approaches.
The disaster that was the 
Mount Polley tailings pond 
collapse is not over for those 
of us who live and depend on 
the lands and waters, and 
particularly on the salmon 
that have always sustained 
us. What is the point of hav-
ing laws if governments 
and industry are not held 
accountable when they are 
violated?  
- Bev Sellars, Chair, First Nations Women 
Advocating Responsible Mining.27
“
Murky water in a community affected 
by the Mount Polley spill
Photo credit: Damien Gilis
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Globally, countries are not collect-
ing sufficient bonds from operating 
mines to manage potentially toxic 
tailings and mine waste impound-
ments in perpetuity. 
chosen protection and support for the min-
ing industry over reducing public risk and 
public liability.”28 When tailing dams fail, it 
is Canadian taxpayers who end up having to 
cover the bulk of the costs for environmental 
remediation. Independent economic analyst 
Robyn Allan notes that “[u]nder provincial 
rules, bonds posted with the province are 
supposed to cover reclamation after the mine 
closes, not environmental damage from an 
accident, and mining companies are not 
required to prove they have insurance or 
the financial resources to pay for damage 
they cause.”29 B.C.’s Auditor General found 
that the province’s regulator “has estimated 
the total liability for all mines at more than 
$2.1 billion, yet has obtained financial secu-
rities for less than half that amount ($0.9 
billion).”30
The B.C. Auditor General concluded that B.C. 
regulators’ “compliance and enforcement 
activities of the mining sector are inadequate 
to protect the Province from significant envi-
ronmental risks”31 and that “emphasis on 
mining promotion combined with a weak com-
pliance and enforcement program creates the 
risk of regulatory capture for the ministry.”32
27. MiningWatch Canada, ‘News Release MiningWatch 
Canada Files Charges Against B.C. Government and 
Mount Polley Mine for 2014 Tailings Pond Disaster’, 18 
October 2016 https://miningwatch.ca/news/2016/10/18/
miningwatch-canada-files-charges-against-bc-govern-
ment-and-mount-polley-mine-2014. 
28. Lindsay Newland Bowker and David M. Chambers, 
‘In the Dark Shadow of the Supercycle Tailings Failure 
Risk & Public Liability Reach All Time Highs,’ Environ-
ments 4,75, 2017. 
29. Judith Lavoie, ‘British Columbians Saddled With $40 
Million Clean-Up Bill as Imperial Metals Escapes Crimi-
nal Charges’, DeSmog Canada, 28 March 2017 https://bit.
ly/2nvYua8. 
30. Auditor General of British Columbia. May 2016. An 
Audit of Compliance and Enforcement of the Mining 
Sector. p. 6. https://bit.ly/1ZUJVJo.
Legacy cost
A significant and insufficiently recognised 
cost that mining commonly imposes on soci-
ety comes at the end of the mining cycle when 
mines are often abandoned by the operating 
companies in partial or un-reclaimed state. 
Globally, countries are not collecting suffi-
cient bonds from operating mines to manage 
potentially toxic tailings and mine waste 
impoundments in perpetuity.
There are an estimated 10,000 abandoned 
and orphaned mine sites in Canada.33 In the 
Province of Ontario alone there are 4,412 
officially recognised abandoned mines con-
taining over 15,000 mine hazards.34 Based on 
official data made available by some regional 
governments, the estimated liability for con-
taminated mining sites across Canada (most 
of which are abandoned or orphaned) is well 
above $9.1 billion. These estimated costs can 
easily double or triple as the true expenses of 
individual rehabilitations are realised.
One mine alone, the Giant Mine in Canada’s 
Northwest Territories is currently estimated to 
require around $1 billion35 to stabilize 237,000 
tons of highly toxic arsenic trioxide36 left over 
from gold processing and stored at the mine. 
Another $2 million per year will be needed to 
maintain the stabilisation system for the fore-
seeable future. Nearby lakes are already
31. Ibid
32. Ibid. p. 44. The Auditor General notes that “[r]egula-
tory capture occurs when the regulator, created to act in 
the public interest, instead serves the interests of indus-
try” and provides eight signs of regulatory capture. 
33. Bill Mackasey, ‘Abandoned Mines in Canada’ Min-
ingWatch Canada, 2000. p. 4 https://miningwatch.ca/
sites/default/files/mackasey_abandoned_mines.pdf. 
34. 2015 Annual Report of the Office of the Auditor Gen-
eral of Ontario. p. 438.
35. The Economist, ‘Canada’s Giant Mine, Giant head-
ache: Canada’s taxpayers ante up billions to clean up the 
mistakes of the past’, 9 October 2014 https://www.econo-
mist.com/news/americas/21620280-canadas-taxpayers-an-
te-up-billions-clean-up-mistakes-past-giant-headache.
36. Kate Kyle, ‘Toenails, saliva and urine could answer 
questions about Giant Mine’s toxic legacy’, CBC News, 
7 November 2017 http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/
north/arsenic-study-yellowknife-1.4389511.
considered permanently contaminated.37 
Health studies in the local indigenous Dene 
population are ongoing. The final rehabil-
itation solution for this mine has been dis-
cussed, without implementation, for years, 
starting before production stopped in 1999 
and the projected costs for stabilisation of the 
site have risen steadily.
Indigenous opposition to mining and 
impacts on women
The environmental, human, and economic 
costs of mining are increasingly well-known 
and a source of local opposition to newly 
proposed mines globally.38 In Canada, some 
of the most intense struggles to stop mines 
from going ahead have been led by Canada’s 
Indigenous peoples. In 2005, the remote 
Ontario First Nation of Kitchenuhmaykoosib 
Inninuwug (KI) declared their territory out 
of bounds for mining. Nonetheless, in 2006, 
a platinum exploration company, Platinex, 
set up camp on KI’s land. As members of KI 
maintained their opposition and blockaded 
roads to stop mine equipment they found 
themselves sued for $10 billion and six of 
their leaders were found in contempt of court 
and jailed. The community ultimately won 
the right to keep their lands free from min-
ing three years later, after their story gained 
international attention, but the struggle took 
a toll on the community and cost Ontario tax 
payers $5 million to persuade Platinex to give 
up its claim. In British Columbia, the indige-
nous Tsilhqot’in have never ceded their lands 
and have been fighting mining since 1995, in 
defense of their mountain lake, Teztan Biny, 
and the land around it called Nabas,39 most 
recently against Taseko Mines. These are but 
two of many such examples.
37. Bob Weber, ‘Arsenic has changed Giant Mine site in 
N.W.T. ‘indefinitely:’ scientist’, The Canadian Press, 18 
August 2016, https://bit.ly/2ujE20e. 
38. Imai, Shin, Leah Gardner, and Sarah Weinberger, 
The ‘Canada Brand’: Violence and Canadian Mining 
Companies in Latin America, 2016 [Version 2 Novem-
ber 20, 2016] Osgoode Legal Studies Research Paper 
No. 17/2017. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/ab-
stract=2886584 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2886584.
One of the concerns remote 
Indigenous communities have in 
regard to mining is its impacts on 
local women. 
One of the concerns remote Indigenous 
communities have in regard to mining is its 
impacts on local women. Canadian mining 
companies have come under scrutiny for 
sexual violence by private and public mine 
security against, for example, indigenous 
Ipili women at Barrick Gold’s Porgera Joint 
Venture mine in Papua New Guinea and indig-
enous Kuria women at Barrick’s North Mara 
Gold Mine in Tanzania.40 Canada’s HudBay 
Minerals is currently facing court action in 
Canada by eleven Mayan Q’eqchi’ women 
from El Estor, Guatemala who allege gang 
rape by security guards at Hudbay’s former 
Fenix mining project.41
In Canada indigenous women are start-
ing to speak out about the impacts of large 
influxes of construction workers into mine 
camps. A 2017 report42 points to evidence that 
“Indigenous women and girls are subjected to  
the worst of the negative impacts of resource 
extraction at every phase”43 noting that 
particularly increased “incidence of sexually 
transmitted infections (STIs) and HIV/AIDS
39. Dawn Hoogeveen and Tyler McCreary, ‘Struggles 
against gold-mine on indigenous land’ Canadian Di-
mensions, 25 January 2014 https://canadiandimension.
com/articles/view/struggles-against-gold-mine-on-indige-
nous-land. 
40. CERD 2017. EarthRights International, University 
of Toronto Faculty of Law International Human Rights 
Program, MiningWatch Canada. Report to the U.N. Com-
mittee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination 93rd 
session, July - August 2017, for its review of Canada’s 21st 
- 23rd periodic reports https://miningwatch.ca/sites/
default/files/cerd_final_8.10.pdf. 
41. Lawsuits against Canadian company HudBay Min-
erals Inc. over human rights abuse in Guatemala. Choc 
v. HudBay Minerals Inc. & Caal v. HudBay Minerals Inc. 
http://www.chocversushudbay.com/.
42. Gibson, G., K. Yung, L. Chisholm, and H. Quinn 
with Lake Babine Nation and Nak’azdli Whut’en, Indig-
enous Communities and Industrial Camps: Promoting 
healthy communities in settings of industrial change 
(The Firelight Group: Victoria, B.C., 2017).
43. Ibid. p. 8.
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due to rape, prostitution, and sex trafficking 
are some of the recorded negative impacts of 
resource extraction projects, specifically as a 
result of the presence of industrial camps and 
transient work forces.44
Tax avoidance
One of the “benefits” the industry touts to 
offset any negative costs is the payment of 
taxes and royalties. In reality, mining compa-
nies often enter into investor-state contracts 
that minimise the taxes they will be required 
to pay, and provide lengthy tax holidays and 
extensive subsidies from states that are often 
under pressure from international lenders to 
provide these investment friendly incentives.
Additionally, mining companies may use 
illegal accounting practices that cause illicit 
capital flows out of the countries where the 
resources are extracted, often to end up in 
global tax havens. One of the ways to do 
this is through transfer mis-pricing. Transfer 
mis-pricing happens when affiliated compa-
nies, for example a parent and a subsidiary, 
set their own non-market transaction price 
and through this mechanism avoid paying 
taxes on profits in the higher tax jurisdiction. 
This practice robs many developing countries 
of the taxes they desperately need to support 
development.
Again, even countries with relatively strong 
taxation systems, such as Canada, fall prey 
to this practice. Currently, Canada’s Cameco 
Corp., the world’s biggest publicly-traded 
uranium company, is accused by Canada’s 
revenue agency of having avoided some $2.1 
billion in taxes owed to Canada. Cameco 
is accused of having set up a subsidiary in 
Switzerland and selling its uranium at below 
market prices to this subsidiary (transfer 
mis-pricing), thereby making little profit in 
Canada, where tax rates are around 30%. The 
Swiss subsidiary then sells the uranium on 
the global market at market prices and makes 
a significant profit, but that profit is 
44. Ibid. p. 8. 
taxed at the much lower Swiss rate of 10%. 
The Canadian federal government argues that 
Cameco’s subsidiaries in tax havens have “the 
sole purpose of dodging taxes because 
they performed no business activities: all of 
the activities were carried out by its Canadian 
head office.”45
Conclusion
The costs mining imposes on environments, 
local communities and regional and national 
governments create development deficits that 
are particularly hard hitting in developing 
countries. The industry argues that attention 
should be paid not to the practices of min-
ing companies themselves, but to the weak 
governance of some jurisdictions in which 
they operate. This paper has argued that 
these harmful practices by mining companies 
also occur in relatively strong governance 
jurisdictions such as Canada. This review of 
the ongoing harmful impacts of mining in a 
strong governance jurisdiction like Canada 
provides a cautionary tale for Bougainville as 
it contemplates the role mining might play in 
its future. 
There is no doubt that an argument can to 
be made that many of the harms described 
here could possibly be countered by strong 
regulation. However, it must also then be 
recognised that large multinational mining 
companies and their national and interna-
tional lobby organisations consistently and 
vigorously resist strong new regulation, and 
even strong enforcement of existing regula-
tion. This resistance is evident in many spe-
cific instances around the world.46 Broadly it 
can be seen in the increasing use by mining 
multinationals of provisions in trade
agreements and investor state agreements 
that allow them to legally challenge countries 
that try to protect their environments and 
human rights through legislation, policy or 
practices that these companies do not see as 
being in their interest.47
If the mining industry wants to demonstrate 
that it really supports strong governance it 
should be actively lobbying for regulations to 
require, among others: that all water bearing 
tailings dams to be built to the specifications 
of water reservoirs; realisable bonds that will 
actually cover the full costs of rehabilitating 
mines at closure; that only mines be permit-
ted that will not require perpetual care and 
maintenance; the Free Prior and Informed 
Consent of Indigenous peoples, and their right 
to refuse mining on their lands and territo-
ries; that fair taxes be paid in the jurisdiction 
where the resource is extracted; full transpar-
ency around environmental and social risk 
and around financial arrangements, including 
the disclosure of the beneficial ownership of 
mines.
The people of Bougainville have experienced 
environmental devastation, immense social 
suffering and serious development deficits as 
a result of under-regulated mining. Perhaps 
their test for companies that want to mine in 
Bougainville should be whether these compa-
nies can prove they are serious about “good 
governance” by publicly insisting on strong 
regulations that prioritise environment pro-
tection, human rights, free prior and informed 
consent, the fair payment of taxes and com-
munity-driven economic development. 
45. Bruce Livesey, ‘Did this company engineer the larg-
est tax dodge in Canadian history?’, National Observer, 
25 April 25 2016, https://bit.ly/2NCVYvv. 
46. In 1997 so-called “Prove it First” legislation was 
passed in Wisconsin, USA, that “requires that be-
fore the state can issue a permit for mining of sulfide 
ore bodies, prospective miners must first provide an 
example of where a metallic sulfide mine in the U.S. 
or Canada has not polluted surface or groundwater 
during or after mining. So far, the industry has not 
been able to find a single example where they have 
mined without polluting water” (Al Gedicks and Dave 
Blouin 2017). The Wisconsin Mining Association is now 
leading a push by the industry to overturn this law. 
http://www.ienearth.org/wisconsins-mining-morato-
rium-under-attack/ see also  http://midwestadvocates.
org/news-events/news/keep-wisconsins-prove-it-first-
mining-law/.
47. At least nine such cases have been filed by Canadi-
an multinational mining companies under ICSID alone, 
since 2004. See https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/
cases/AdvancedSearch.aspx.
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Overview
This paper explores Papua New Guinea’s 
(PNG) economic development experience 
in order to offer some lessons for a possible 
future independent Bougainville. The focus is 
on using traditional economic tools to exam-
ine the contribution of the resource sector (ie 
mining, oil and gas) and the non-resource 
sector (which includes agriculture, fisher-
ies, manufacturing and wholesale and retail 
trade) to PNG’s economic development. The 
non-resource and resource sectors are ana-
lysed by examining their respective contribu-
tions to incomes, exports, employment and 
the national budget. The paper also considers 
briefly the implications of a high exchange 
rate – caused by the influx of resource sec-
tor-related foreign currency – on the economy 
as a whole.
Measuring PNG’s development progress 
should not be limited to economic measures. 
There are also important social and health 
characteristics that are vital to understanding 
a country’s level of well-being. Generally, 
PNG’s performance is very disappointing and 
on many indicators the worst of any country 
in the Asia Pacific region.
In PNG, it is estimated that1
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39.3% of the population lived below the 
USD 1.90 per day poverty line in 2014 – the 
highest rate in the Asia Pacific region for 
those countries where this information is 
collected
the under 5 mortality rate per 1,000 live 
births is 57  
the prevalence of malnutrition (wasting) 
among children under 5 is 14.3%
the maternal mortality rate per 100,000 live 
births is 215
the incidence of malaria per 1,000 popula-
tion is 185.
There are inevitable difficulties in suggest-
ing that an alternative development path 
would have produced better outcomes for 
PNG. However, PNG’s poor outcomes relative 
to those of its neighbours suggests that eco-
nomically it would have been difficult to have 
done worse short of a descent into widespread 
civil war. A possible future independent 
Bougainville should be careful of repeating 
PNG’s mistakes.
Impact on incomes
The resource sector has been growing as a 
share of the economy with strong growth rates 
while the rest of the economy has declined 
(see Graph 1). This is a classic indicator of the 
“resource curse”.2 Specifically, the non-re-
source sector, after allowing for inflation and 
population growth rates, has fallen from PGK3 
9,800 per capita down to just below PGK
 
1. Asian Development Bank, Basic Statistics 2017 (Asian 
Development Bank: Manila, 2017) https://www.adb.
org/publications/basic-statistics-2017.
6,000 per capita between 1980 and 2017.4 This 
is an extraordinary drop in economic living 
standards of 41%. People in PNG are, on aver-
age, over one-third worse off than they were 
just after independence from Australia. This 
is a damning development failure. No other 
country would want to go down such a path.
2. “The resource curse—that countries and regions with 
an abundance of natural resources tend to have slower 
economic growth, weaker development outcomes, and 
more instability than resource-scarce countries—has 
been a prominent and recurring theme in the academic 
literature on natural resource management, and espe-
cially those concerned with Africa (see, for example, 
Sachs and Warner, 1995, 1997, and 2001). (Charlotte 
J. Lundgren, Boom, bust, or prosperity?: managing 
Sub-Saharan Africa’s natural resource wealth (Interna-
tional Monetary Fund: Washington, D.C., 2013)). 
3. Papua New Guinea Kina, PGK 9,800 is worth ap-
proximately USD 2,950 at today’s exchange rate.
4. The best measure of economic well-being is house-
hold income (see (Joseph Stiglitz, 2009). This informa-
tion is not available in PNG. The closest available proxy 
is non-resource GDP per capita as most of the resource 
sector is owned by international investors and PNG’s 
population has been growing rapidly.
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Graph 1: PNG real per capita incomes 1980 to 2016
Real non-resource GDP per capita 2016 Kina
Real resource GDP per capita 2016 Kina
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At the same time, PNG’s resource sector has 
boomed. It has increased from around PGK 
1,000 per capita to PGK 2,000 per capita. 
Using 5 year averages (to smooth out some 
of the volatility of the resource sector), this 
part of the economy has more than doubled – 
indeed an increase of 129%.
However, the net impact, given the relatively 
small size of the resource sector, is that total 
economic income per capita has decreased by 
29% since 1980.
Impact on exports
At the time of PNG’s independence, the mas-
sive Bougainville Copper mine had been in 
operation for three years. Even then, over the 
first decade of independence, exports of agri-
cultural, fisheries and forest products slightly 
exceeded those of the resource sector. This 
started to change dramatically from 1985 and 
over the last 10 years resource exports have 
averaged 80% of PNG’s total exports with 
agriculture, fisheries and forest products com-
prising just 20% (see Graph 2). This increasing 
export dependence on the resource sector 
may reflect the distorting implications of the 
resource curse on the exchange rate discussed 
later in this paper.
This is an extraordinary level of export 
dependence on the resource sector.  However, 
few of these export receipts stay in PNG. They 
are held in foreign currency accounts to repay 
loans that financed the initial investments 
as well as remitting profits to external share-
holders. On the other hand, given the nature 
of PNG’s agriculture sector with greater levels 
of local ownership, a much larger proportion 
of foreign exchange earned as exports actu-
ally returns to benefit the country. And as will 
be discussed below, record levels of resource 
exports has not translated into significant 
returns to the PNG budget.
This decline in the relative share of agriculture, 
19
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Graph 2: PNG - Share of exports - agriculture and resource sectors
Agriculture, fisheries and forestry (AFF)  Resource sectors
Source:  Bank Papua New Guinea, Quarterly Economic Bulletins (various issues)
Table 1: Moves in export volumes of PNG’s key agriculture commodities
5 year 
aver-
age
Tea 
‘000 
tonnes
Copra 
‘000 
tonnes
Copra 
oil ‘000 
tonnes
Rubber 
‘000 
tonnes
Coffee 
‘000 
tonnes
Cocoa 
‘000 
tonnes
Popu-
lation 
mil-
lions
Logs 
‘000 
cubic 
meters
Palm 
oil ‘000 
tonnes
1976-
80
6.7 93.3 30.1 4.2 46.3 28.7 3.1 510.2 30.7
2012-
2016
2.2 34.8 15.8 3.3 52.6 36.3 8.0 3556.2 502.5
Change -67% -63% -48% -22% 14% 26% 157% 597% 1537%
Photo credit: Christina Hill
Cocoa beans drying, north Bougainville
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The resource sector employs very few 
people – some 0.4% of total employ-
ment – and, in 2016, less than 5% of 
formal sector employment in PNG. 
fishing and forestry products is not just 
because resource exports have been so high. 
When these exports are expressed as a share 
of the economy (or gross domestic product 
(GDP)), there has been a steady pattern of 
decline for the first 15 years of independence, 
some recovery in the 1990s but a distinct fall 
again from just over 10% in 2011 down to 
current levels just over 5%. The extent of this 
decline can be measured in several ways. In 
absolute terms of production (see Table 1), 
there have been falls in exports of tea, copra, 
copra oil and rubber. There have been slight 
increases in coffee and cocoa. The major 
increases have been in logs and palm oil which 
are those areas with the highest levels of for-
eign ownership.
The potential returns from agriculture exports 
could have been much greater if PNG’s agricul-
ture sector had received better support including 
through clear and consistent policy instruments. 
Potentially, for the six cash crops dominated by 
smallholders (those on the left hand side of 
Table 1) PNG could have lifted annual export 
earnings from PGK 1.2 billion to PGK 4.7 billion
if it simply maintained agricultural production 
at post-independence levels per capita, and had 
on-going productivity increases of just 1 per cent 
per year. This has been a major missed devel-
opment opportunity for PNG. Bougainville’s 
agricultural potential is also substantial and has 
not been adequately tapped.
Impact on employment
The resource sector employs very few people 
– some 0.4% of total employment – and, in 
2016, less than 5% of formal sector employ-
ment in PNG.5 Indeed, it is the smallest of 
the measured (or formal) sectors of the econ-
omy employing 14,400 people in 2016. The 
Photo credit: Michael Main
Hides Gas Conditioning Plant, part of the PNG LNG project, during a blockade resource sector does have indirect impacts on other sectors, including the services that 
are provided to the resource sector such as 
transport and food. Estimates are these can 
be three to four times as much as the direct 
employment effects but even with these 
indirect impacts the resource sector still 
represents a small fraction of formal employ-
ment. Employment does temporarily increase 
during the investment or construction phase 
of a resource project. For example, during 
construction of the PNG LNG project, peak 
employment was estimated to have reached 
21,200 in 2012 but has since fallen back to 
2,500 in December 2016.6
Formal sector employment is very small in 
PNG. In 2014, out of an estimated 4.6 mil-
lion people aged between 15 and 64, formal 
wage employment was estimated at 465,000 
people or about 10% of the 15 to 64-year-old 
population. The actual labour force has been 
estimated at 3.1 million, with 2.5 million eco-
nomically active in the subsistence sector or 
in the informal economic sector. The overall 
pattern of formal employment creation in PNG 
has been extremely disappointing and it has 
not kept up with population growth. In fact, 
formal employment has actually started to 
decline in recent years in absolute terms.
Impact on the national 
budget
In PNG, resource taxes and dividends have 
averaged just 13% of PNG total revenues and 
grants since 1975. So nearly 90% of revenues 
to fund PNG’s budgets and development have
5. The figures for the structure of the labour force are 
primarily drawn from Table 8.6 and Table A8.2.1 from 
L Jones and P McGavin, Grapping afresh with labour 
resource challenges in Papua New Guinea (Institute of 
National Affairs: papua New Guinea, June 2015). The 
2011 Census estimate for formal wage employment in the 
“Mining and Quarrying” sector was 9,011 has been in-
creased to 14,441 in line with movements in Bank Papua 
New Guinea’s employment index for the “Mineral” sector.
6. Ernst and Young, Papua New Guinea Extractive 
Industries Transparency Initiative (PNG EITI) Report for 
2016 (PNG EITI: Port Moresby, 21 December 2017), p. 32.
come from other sources and sectors of the 
PNG economy. 
These resource revenues are highly volatile. 
They have moved from lows of under 5% of 
revenue and grants during the early 1980s 
(when Bougainville Copper was not contrib-
uting much to government revenues due 
to lower commodity prices), 1990 and 1991 
(following the closure of Bougainville Copper 
mine) and in 2016 (largely due to excessive tax 
concessions given to the PNG LNG project and 
Ramu Nickel mine). Even with the PNG LNG 
project, and Lihir, Ok Tedi and Ramu Nickel 
mines at full production, the contribution is 
expected to lift to only 6% by 2022. PNG has 
been reducing its tax rates on the resource 
sector down to 30%, it has an ineffective 
additional profits tax, generous depreciation 
arrangements over 10 years even though 
project life is 30 years, has struggled to pay 
for the equity share it takes in projects (from 
22.5% in gas to 30% in oil), allows its royalties 
and development levies (2% each for the PNG 
LNG project) to be calculated on a discounted 
well-head value of production, has granted 
tax holidays of up to 10 years and has allowed 
tax credit claims for infrastructure work out-
side the project site.
Another key feature of PNG’s resource reve-
nues is that PNG Governments have tended 
to spend these expected revenues before 
they are received. PNG has experienced this 
recently with the major expenditure expan-
sion in the 2013 Budget, funding items such as 
a massive decentralisation (and political) pro-
gram by shifting nearly 10% of the budget to 
political constituency funds. This is a charac-
teristic of many other countries and is known 
as the “Presource Curse”.7 The Presource 
Curse describes the adverse impacts of gov-
ernments spending up big in anticipation of 
large resource revenues, and then the fiscal 
problems encountered when these resource 
revenues aren’t as large as anticipated. PNG 
7. J Cust and D Mihalyi, ‘The Presource Curse ‘in 
Finance and Development Vol. 54, No. 4, December 
2017. 
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The underlying revenue crisis facing 
PNG is the fact the resource sector is 
paying very little tax. 
had a similar experience of spending up big 
in the early 1990s with Kutubu Oil and new 
mines leading to rapid increases in spending. 
An unexpected fall in international commod-
ity prices in 1994 led to a major fiscal and 
currency crisis.
Resources taxes have another worrying trend 
in PNG. Average resource taxes are gener-
ally falling while average tax rates on the 
general PNG population are increasing. For 
the non-resource economy, this measure of 
average tax rates has increased reasonably 
consistently from 11.3% in the early 1980s to 
around 16.7% currently.8 It slid back some-
what during the economic crises of the 1990s 
and 2010s, but there has been an underlying 
pattern of increase. In contrast, although 
more volatile, average resource taxes have 
been falling, especially since 1998 and most 
markedly since 2008, and are now under 5% – 
less than one-third the level for the rest of the 
economy.
The underlying revenue crisis facing PNG 
is the fact the resource sector is paying very 
little tax. The reasons for this are two-fold. 
First, the collapse in commodity prices have 
hurt company profitability and therefore 
taxes. However, this has happened several 
times before in PNG’s past, but the outcome 
has never been so bad. The second and most 
likely reason is the pattern of tax concessions 
and tax planning used by existing resource 
projects. For example, the International 
Monetary Fund is very clear that the PNG LNG 
project has a low tax arrangement in compari-
son to similar projects around the world.9 The 
Ramu Nickel mine has been given a 10 year 
tax holiday10 and Oil Search has been a major
8. Average tax rates are defined as the level of revenues 
raised by parts of the economy relative to their GDP size.
9. International Monetary Fund, Papua New Guinea IMF 
Country Report No. 17/411, Washington D.C., December 
2017.
user of a tax credit scheme11 to build major 
infrastructure for sporting events and polit-
ical meetings (such as APEC Haus) though 
projects that have received little public scru-
tiny and are not tendered for. Further, the 
increased sophistication of transfer pricing 
and complex company structures used by 
large global resource companies offers oppor-
tunities to reduce tax liabilities in PNG.12
Impact on exchange rate
The resource curse usually manifests itself 
through two mechanisms. The first is to drag 
precious labour and capital into resource 
projects and away from the rest of the econ-
omy. In the case of PNG, with a general lack of 
formal employment and excess capital avail-
able looking for good bankable projects, this 
pattern of distortion is unlikely to be signifi-
cant. The main exceptions are increased wage 
costs for domestic skilled labour, as well as 
rental prices for scarce housing supply.
The second major mechanism for the resource 
curse is lifting the exchange rate to a higher 
level due to changes to (or distortions of) 
the economy caused by the influx of large 
amounts of foreign currency. This influx of 
foreign currency increases demand for the 
Kina and this pushes up the price of the Kina 
relative to other foreign currencies. PNG’s 
exchange rate – measured by the Real Effective 
Exchange Rate (which considers how prices in 
other economies are moving relative to PNG) 
– has increased, especially since the early 
2000s, and with this the county’s competitive-
ness has declined. Looking forward, the PNG 
Treasury expects the competitiveness of PNG’s 
non-resource sector to continue to decline.
This higher exchange rate effectively acts as a 
tax on all other types of exports (such as
agriculture exports which have declined as a 
10. PNG EITI Report for 2016, p. 41. 
11. PNG EITI Report for 2016, p. 125.
12. Tax Justice Network – Australia, Opening State-
ment/Submission Senate Inquiry into Corporate tax 
Avoidance, 2017 https://bit.ly/2OEpGzY.
share of exports), a tax on all foreign invest-
ment, and a subsidy on all imports and for
all external movements of capital (such as 
buying houses in Cairns or Singapore). Of 
course, none of these things are desirable in 
the context of trying to grow the non-resource 
parts of the economy, and to start reversing 
the 41% decline in economic living standards 
discussed earlier.
A lower exchange would benefit other sectors. 
If for example, the exchange rate was 30% 
lower (or more competitive) then every cof-
fee or cocoa grower would receive 30% more 
Kina when they sold their bags of produce 
at the factory gate or to a commodity trader. 
This is because prices are adjusted according 
to movements in international commodity 
markets which are based on US dollars. As a 
high level of people’s expenditure is on local 
products (such as costs for schools or food 
bought at local markets) this has an immedi-
ate, positive impact on their costs of living. 
Partially offsetting these real income gains 
will be increased Kina costs of some imports 
such as rice.
Further, a lower exchange rate would make 
PNG less expensive relative to the rest of the 
world when it comes to export items such 
as tourism or down-stream processing of 
logs or fisheries. Manufacturers and others 
rightly complain about their high cost struc-
tures relative to those in the Philippines or 
Indonesia for example. This is due to higher 
energy, transport and security costs. All these 
elements would be eliminated with a lower 
exchange rate making PNG a more attractive 
prospect for investment and down-stream 
processing, as well as opening other markets 
for export.
Conclusion
The resource sector has been the major factor 
behind most of the crises that PNG has faced 
since independence, including its current 
economic crisis. The resource sector only 
accounts for 0.4% of formal employment in 
This paper argues that the distort-
ing impacts of PNG’s resource sector 
have exceeded any benefits. 
PNG and has averaged just 13% of PNG’s total 
revenues and grants since 1975. The resource 
sector does though dominate exports and it 
is this domination that serves to distort the 
economy through changes to the exchange 
rate. A higher exchange rate makes it harder 
for non-resource sector exports (such as agri-
cultural products) to complete globally, which 
in turn deprives PNG’s rural population of 
increased incomes. 
This paper argues that the distorting impacts 
of PNG’s resource sector have exceeded any 
benefits. This is reflected in the resource 
sector thriving since independence, with high 
growth rates, while the rest of the economy 
has slid badly backwards. On average, and 
measured by non-resource GDP per capita, 
people in PNG are over one-third  worse off 
than at the time of independence.
An alternative is to focus on areas of compar-
ative advantage that will contribute to more 
equitable and sustainable development and 
on those sectors of the economy where there 
are already high levels of participation, such 
as agriculture and the subsistence economy. 
Bougainville, like PNG, has some extraordi-
nary opportunities. It is ethnically diverse 
and it has huge biodiversity. Its land and seas 
can support agriculture and fisheries, tour-
ism13 and new forms of patents and provide 
new opportunities with greater potential for 
women, the rural poor and small businesses.  
Looking back over the last 40 plus years of 
PNG’s development since independence, 
there has been too much emphasis on the 
resource sector as a focus for development. 
Bougainville can learn from this now and 
need not wait 40 years themselves to draw the 
same conclusion. 
13. See for example Radio New Zealand, ‘Adventure 
tourism growing in Bougainville’, 17 July 2018, https://
www.radionz.co.nz/international/pacific-news/362002/
adventure-tourism-growing-in-bougainville.
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Introduction
Although there are other potential mining 
sites in Bougainville, and exploration licences 
have been approved for some of them, 
Panguna is the only proven mineral resource 
on the island and the only site of an existing 
industrial scale mine. It has therefore been 
at the centre of debates about whether or not 
to restart mining in Bougainville. Panguna is 
also the case for which the best data is availa-
ble. However, the challenges and constraints 
facing these other mines will be similar to 
those facing Panguna.
The Panguna mine also serves as a case study 
for the debates about mining as a whole. It
1. The authors would like to acknowledge the work of 
Roger Moody, whose 2015 paper ‘Panguna: Between a 
Rock and a Hard Place’ on the topic significantly assist-
ed the development of this paper.
makes sense therefore to explore the eco-
nomic viability of reopening Panguna for 
its own sake, as well as for what a study 
might reveal about the benefits or otherwise 
of exploiting other mineral deposits on the 
island.
The aim of this paper is therefore to examine 
three sets of questions:
1.
2.
CAN PANGUNA SAVE 
BOUGAINVILLE?
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CHAPTER 5
What are the various estimates of revenue 
needs for Bougainville? How would inde-
pendence affect these needs? What models 
of government expenditure are these esti-
mates based on?
Is reopening Panguna commercially viable 
from a mining company perspective, and 
(perhaps more importantly) from an inves-
tor perspective? Could Bougainville Copper 
Limited (BCL) or another operator, make 
money from reopening Panguna as BCL and 
3.
The revenue needs for an 
independent Bougainville
Before estimating the potential revenues 
that the Panguna mine could generate 
for Bougainville, we must first explore 
the question of what annual revenues the 
Autonomous Bougainville Government (ABG) 
might need in the long term, assuming that 
the ABG remains, more or less, in its existing 
form. One estimate puts ABG’s total recur-
rent expenditure for 2017 at PGK 162 mil-
lion.2 However, this recurrent budget figure 
excludes other support received from the cen-
tral government such as payments for Tuition 
Fee Free Education. It also does not include 
any funding for a capital budget. The 2018 
budget indicates that Bougainville is expected 
to receive K105 million in additional capital 
funding in addition to its recurrent budget.3 
Given that the ABG usually raises only about 
10% of its revenues, or around only PGK 20 
million in present value,4 this would place the 
total budget more in the PGK 240-250 million 
range.
Estimates of what an appropriate revenue 
intake for an independent Bougainville vary. 
Satish Chand has outlined one possible sce-
nario for Bougainville’s revenue needs. If one
2. Satish Chand, ‘Transitioning to Fiscal Self-Reliance 
in the Autonomous Region of Bougainville’, ABG Tax 
& Revenue Summit, 27 September 2017, 7. http://www.
abg.gov.pg/images/misc/3._Chand_2017_Transition-
ing_to_fiscal_self_reliance_in_the_ARoB_(Chand).pdf.
3. 2018 PNG Budget Volume 2d, 2018, p380. See also 
Tanya Lahies, ‘2018 Budget More Strategic’, ABG Media 
Release, 29 December 2017. http://www.abg.gov.pg/
index.php/news/read/2018-budget-more-strategic.
4. Chand, ‘Transitioning to Fiscal Self-Reliance’, 3, 7-8.
were to make Bougainville’s revenue expend-
iture equal to its current proportion of PNG’s 
expenditure (i.e. 4% of PNG’s), this would put 
its revenue needs at PGK 286 million.5
When considering this number, however, 
we do need to consider what would be an 
appropriate or desirable expenditure level as 
proportion of GDP. For example, PNG national 
government expenditure has varied between 
27% in 2013 and 18% in 2017, reducing as 
GDP grew due to LNG sales and expenditure 
fell due to budget squeezes.6 In comparison, 
Vanuatu’s expenditure as a proportion of GDP 
has been estimated at 17%, whereas that of 
the Solomon Islands is said to be as high as 
43%.7
This therefore begs a question, why is 
Vanuatu’s budget as a percentage of GDP so 
low, compared to the Solomon Islands? This 
may be because Vanuatu is more efficient 
in its spending. Thus, another way to make 
revenues closer to expenditure would be to 
find ways to reduce unnecessary spending 
– through initiatives such as reducing the 
number of ‘ghost names’ on the ABGs payroll 
for example.8
A Vanuatu-level of government expendi-
ture – i.e. government spending similar to 
current revenues but without PNG’s help 
– would still mean that Bougainville would 
have a lot of work to become self-sufficient. 
How much work exactly? Well, given that the 
Autonomous Region of Bougainville (ARB) 
currently gets around 90% of its revenues 
from PNG, it would have to massively increase 
its revenue intake. How might it do this? 
Chand argues that the first step would be to
5. Chand, ‘Transitioning to Fiscal Self-Reliance’, 11.
6. PNG Budget Database 2017 FBO, Released March 
2018, Development Policy Centre, Crawford School 
of Public Policy, ANU College of Asia & the Pacific. 
https://devpolicy.crawford.anu.edu.au/png-project/
png-budget-database
7. Chand, ‘Transitioning to Fiscal Self-Reliance’, 11.
8. Radio New Zealand, Bougainville govt rids itself of 
ghost names on payroll, 5 July 2018, https://www.radi-
onz.co.nz/international/pacific-news/361157/bougain-
ville-govt-rids-itself-of-ghost-names-on-payroll.
Rio Tinto did in the 1970s and 1980s. 
How might earnings from the sale of 
copper and gold from Panguna translate 
into estimates of government income for 
Bougainville? When would these revenues 
start to flow? What assumptions are such 
estimates based upon?
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double its tax efficiency. However, even if it 
could achieve this, it would still need to grow 
its GDP significantly. As Chand has argued, 
this is likely to take many decades.9 
An independent Bougainville would need to 
develop new government capacity in areas 
such as trade, diplomacy, defence, etc. So, 
moving to independence is likely to place 
more pressure on the government’s budget. If 
Bougainville were to move towards independ-
ence, it unclear whether and how much finan-
cial support PNG would continue to provide. 
This, then, is where the case for reopening 
Panguna and other new mines originates: 
Bougainville will take such a long time to 
be self-reliant, the argument is, that min-
ing is the only chance for it to achieve fiscal 
independence. Indeed, the prima facie argu-
ment is strong. The Panguna mine was in 
operation from 1972-1989. Over that time it 
extracted between 50 and 90 million tonnes 
of ore annually, and earned between PGK 
190 million and PGK 500 million annually in 
net sales. Annual tax payments to the PNG 
government varied although tended to fall 
between PGK 20 million and PGK 50 million.10
Projected earnings from 
the Panguna Mine
Is reopening Panguna commercially viable? 
Answering this question requires two sets of 
calculations. First, what would be the gross 
earnings from digging up the ore and selling it 
overseas? Second, what would it cost the com-
pany to reopen and then operate the mine?
Let us turn to the first part of the question. 
Panguna's reserves are mainly copper, 
although it also produced smaller amounts 
of gold and silver. The relative sales earnings 
changed depending on the relative price of 
copper and gold, but the percentage of per 
annum sales from Panguna varied in its years
9. Chand, ‘Transitioning to Fiscal Self-Reliance’, 7-8.
10. Bougainville Copper Limited Annual Report 2009, 32-33.
of operation between 50-80% for copper and 
20-50% for gold. Silver production tended 
only to yield about 1-2% of sales earnings.11
The ABG has long been clear (since around 
the year 2010) that the previous operator BCL 
would be its preferred partner in reopening 
Panguna. However, after a landowners’ meet-
ing in December 2017, the ABG announced 
in early 2018 that it would not extend BCL 
another mining exploration license. It appears 
that that some landowner groups are now 
talking with other interests including the 
Australian-headquartered RTG Mining about 
re-developing Panguna. With Rio Tinto giving 
away its 51% controlling interest in BCL in 
mid-2017, there are in any case questions over 
whether BCL can pull together enough finan-
cial backing for the project.
Nevertheless, BCL continues to make the 
case that reopening Panguna is commercially 
viable and that it is the company with the 
experience to do it. Even more importantly, 
BCL remains at present the only source of any 
hard data that might enable us to consider the 
mine’s commercial viability.
11. Bougainville Copper Limited Annual Report 2009, 32-33.
BCL remains at present the only 
source of any hard data that might 
enable us to consider the mine’s 
commercial viability. 
BCL's Estimates
BCL’s most recent presentation on the eco-
nomic viability of Panguna was made to the 
ABG’s Tax and Revenue Summit in September 
2017. The analysis does not specify com-
pany earnings nor profits. However, it does 
project possible revenues for PNG and for 
Bougainville (see next section). 
The amount of money that a mine grosses 
in any given year depends on a number of 
aspects: the amount of material that is mined, 
the ore grade, the mineral recovery rate and of 
course, the price of ore in the market. 
In BCL’s 2017 presentation to the tax summit, 
they stated their assumptions for contained 
copper and gold production, as well as their 
assumed copper and gold selling prices (see 
asterisk items in the table below). Although 
the BCL presentation did not include gross 
earnings, it is a relatively simple task to 
Table 1:  BCL projected annual yields and earnings per annum
Copper Gold Total
Assumes annual 
milling rate
60 million tonnes pa
Assumed ore grade 0.40% 0.46 g/tonne -
Contained ore 
production*
178,000 tonnes 570,000 ounces -
Assumes market 
price (US dollars)*
USD 3.00/lb or USD 
6,614/tonne
USD 1,300/oz -
Annual sales 
earnings (US dollars)
USD 1.177 billion USD 741 million USD 1.918 billion
Annual sales 
earnings (PGK PNG)
PGK 3.807 billion PGK 2.396 billion PGK 6.203 billion
* From BCL tax and revenue summit presentation. Data from BCL does not include poten-
tial earnings from silver.
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Photo credit: Christina Hill
 Example of basic infrastructure in Bougainville 
produce them as per Table 1.
If we are to believe BCL’s projections, then the 
mine could bring in gross earnings of as much 
as USD 1.9 billion or PGK 6.203 billion per year 
for up to 25 years. This is presumably based 
either on some sort of expansion of the mine, 
or the expectation that better technology will 
allow mining efficiency to increase.
Given these enormous sales earnings, it might 
seem that reopening Panguna is a bit of a 
no-brainer. However, these predictions are 
based on two very important assumptions. 
The first assumption is an average long-term 
copper price of USD 3.00 per pound (which 
produces most of the earnings from the mine). 
It is possible that the price of copper may 
average out to around USD 3.00 per pound 
over this period. However, as Graph 1 shows, 
the copper price is very volatile, as are the 
prices of metals generally. A fall in demand 
or an increase in supply – because other large 
suppliers come online for example – could 
easily see the copper price fall.
Another important factor on which the pro-
jected earnings are based are the various 
assumptions about the amount, quality and 
accessibility of the mineral reserves. Or to put 
it another way: how do we know how much 
copper and gold is actually there, and how 
easily can that copper and gold be extracted?
BCL’s projections assume a contained copper 
production of 178,000 tonnes per annum. This 
is higher than the average amount of copper 
extracted during the life of the mine (166,000 
tonnes).13 However, it is more or less consist-
ent with what BCL was extracting in the final 
full years of the mine’s life (1985 to 1988). 
BCL’s projected contained gold production of 
570,000 ounces per annum is relatively con-
sistent with 1980s trends.
12. https://www.macrotrends.net/1476/copper-pric-
es-historical-chart-data
13. Bougainville Copper Limited Annual Report 2015. 
BCL have projected the milling of 60 million 
tonnes of ore per year for at least 25 years.  
This is higher than historical data for ore 
milled each year and, with regards the 25 year  
lifespan, is based presumably on an ‘indi-
cated’ resource of 1,538 million tonnes.14
However, as BCL themselves acknowledge, 
BCL has yet to undertake scoping studies to 
demonstrate technical and financial viabil-
ity15 and as such these figures are unreliable.
Economic viability of 
Panguna for the mining 
company
However, if the mine earnings in the BCL 
presentation seem unreliable, one also must 
consider the operating and other costs in deter-
mining viability. These must be subtracted 
from sales earnings in order to determine 
whether the mine is profitable for the company 
and, perhaps more importantly, for its inves-
tors. These operating costs fall into three cate-
gories (1) start up costs; (2) waste management 
costs; and (3) payments made to the govern-
ment landowners, salaries and shareholders.
Capital costs of re-opening the 
operation 
Due to the conflict, the Panguna mine had 
to be abandoned in a hurry. As is evident 
from the many photos that have been taken 
over the years, bulldozers and other equip-
ment, buildings and roads that were part of 
the infrastructure of the project had to be 
abandoned. In a less hasty departure, much 
of this infrastructure and equipment would 
have been ‘mothballed’ – i.e. preserved to 
the greatest extent possible for later use. The 
long duration of time and the toll taken on the 
infrastructure and equipment in a tropical cli-
mate has seen further degradation. Reopening 
the mine, therefore, would not simply be a 
14. see Bougainville Copper Limited 2016 Annual Re-
port for Panguna mineral resource data.
15. Bougainville Copper Limited 2016 Annual Report. 
case of turning up again with staff and com-
mencing to dig. The mine more closely resem-
bles a greenfield site rather than a brownfield 
site. Equipment will need to be replaced, 
and infrastructure first demolished and then 
re-built. Finally, there is also the issue of 
whether a future operator of Pangua would 
be liable for cleaning up the environmental 
damage (see below) which would likely be a 
significant sum. 
So, what would the start-up costs be? The 
simple answer is that we do not know, as 
there has been no in depth or detailed study 
or information to investors or others on what 
the start-up costs would be. BCL’s current esti-
mation according to the 2017 Tax and Revenue 
Summit presentation is between USD 4 billion 
and USD 6 billion.16 Over time, BCL has made 
a number of estimates of the costs of reopen-
ing including ‘approximately USD 3 billion’ 
in its 2011 Annual Report and ‘in excess of 
USD 5 billion in the 2013 Annual Report. It 
is not clear whether any of these estimates 
included environmental clean-up costs or not. 
In its 2009 Annual Report, BCL stated that the 
actual start-up costs could not be properly 
assessed until a mining pre-feasibility study 
was completed. Needless to say, no such study 
is likely to be completed without an explora-
tion license being granted.
Waste management
                                                                                
In the first iteration of Panguna, the mine 
waste – tailings and waste rock – was simply 
dumped into the Kawerong and Jaba Rivers. 
The basic precaution of trying to use tailings 
dams was never used causing immense and 
permanent environmental damage onsite and 
downstream. Additional pollution of the rivers 
has occurred through Acid Rock Drainage 
(ARD). This is the process by which water run-
off from the mine site becomes highly acidic 
16. Bougainville Copper Limited, Development of the New 
Panguna Project—Potential Revenue Streams, ABG Tax 
and Revenue Summit, September 28, 2017. https://bit.
ly/2PX72VA (henceforth: BCL, Development of the New 
Panguna Project).
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BCL clearly has aspirations, whether 
Bougainville achieves independence 
or not, to negotiate a tax arrange-
ment that is more favourable to itself. 
which is caused by the oxidation of sulphide 
minerals founds naturally in the rock. Copper 
mines are often associated with ARD because 
they contain iron sufides (ie pyrites). Elevated 
levels of toxic heavy metals (including cop-
per) may also be present as these metals are 
more readily dissolved in highly acidic waters. 
Elevated copper levels are toxic to plant and 
animal life and in high levels are dangerous to 
human health. Anecdotally, the Jaba River is 
understood to be a ‘dead zone’, and the pictures 
of the Jaba and Kawerong Rivers show a bright 
turquoise-blue coloured deposit or stain (due to 
the elevated copper levels) on the riverbed.  
It is impossible to imagine that the people of 
Bougainville, let alone the Panguna landown-
ers, would sanction a repeat of this sort of 
environmental damage again.
The question thus becomes, what sort of 
waste management strategy would any rede-
veloper of the Panguna resource use, and how 
expensive would this be? Relatively straight-
forward tailings management systems can and 
do fail – as was seen in the 2014 failure of the 
Mount Polley copper mine in British Columbia 
(which is discussed by Catherine Coumans 
in her paper). There are more sophisticated 
tailings storage mechanisms these days, 
which generally go under the name of ‘inte-
grated tailings management’. Building a 
highly engineered tailings management 
system at Panguna, which is in an area of high 
rainfall and high seismic activity, while not 
impossible, would be very difficult and very 
expensive. The cost to design and construct a 
tailings dam at Panguna could easily exceed 
USD 1 billion, as might the cost to remediate 
existing environmental damage.17
Once again, it is impossible to know what the 
costs of tailings management would be with-
out some sort of feasibility study. If any such 
study has been done, it is certainly not pub-
licly available at this time. What we can say is 
that the safer the environmental management 
plan, the greater the cost.
Taxes and revenues
The third unknown that could potentially eat 
into the profits of any company that wanted 
to exploit the Panguna resource is the amount 
of taxes and other payments that a company 
would need to pay to access and extract the 
resource. Aside from operating costs, there 
are four major expenses: payments to the PNG 
Government (corporate tax and other types 
of taxes); payments to the ABG (royalties and 
development levies); payments to landowners 
(royalties, equity in BCL); payments to staff 
(salaries and other benefits). The amount of 
taxes and other revenues that BCL estimates it 
might pay under the current legal regime are 
discussed in detail below in the next section. 
An independent Bougainville could see new 
tax and revenue arrangements negotiated, but 
we have no idea what these might look like. 
If the people of Bougainville vote for inde-
pendence, decisions would have to be made 
as to whether to adopt PNG’s current tax code 
or not. The BCL presentation at the Tax and 
Revenue Summit says that the project may 
not proceed ‘unless the ABG and National 
Government can provide assurances as to 
what taxes will apply in the long term’. 
BCL clearly has aspirations, whether 
Bougainville achieves independence or not, 
to negotiate a tax arrangement that is more 
favourable to itself. BCL argues in its presenta-
tion that PNG’s Additional Profits Tax ‘reduces 
project value and probability (sic) prevents the 
Panguna mine from ever being redeveloped’. 
Needless to say, if rates are negotiated down, 
this may make the project more financially 
viable, but that will obviously translate into a 
worse deal for the people of Bougainville.
17. Personal communications, 17 July 2018, Dr Gavin 
M. Mudd, Associate Professor - Environmental 
Engineering, RMIT University. 
How much revenue would 
Panguna generate for 
Bougainville?
In the first life of the mine, BCL paid taxes on 
earnings to the PNG Government of approxi-
mately 20.2% (9.8% corporate income tax and 
10.4% additional taxes). The North Solomon 
Provincial Government (i.e. Bougainville) 
received just over 1% of revenues from royal-
ties and other payments. 
However, since 1990, the tax code in PNG 
has changed. Under current PNG tax law, 
there is a corporate tax rate of 30%, which is 
calculated on profits (not earnings). There is 
also an additional profits tax of 30%, which 
is applied to profit levels if they exceed 15% 
returns. Moreover, in 2015, the ABG passed 
a new Bougainville Mining Act, which sets 
the amount that the provincial government 
(i.e. the ABG) would receive in terms of roy-
alties, etc. It sets a 1.25 per cent regional 
development royalty, a 0.5 per cent health 
and education royalty and a 0.5% production 
levy.19 There is also a dividend withholding 
tax of 15%.
Assuming Bougainville were to remain part of 
PNG (i.e. no independence for now), BCL has 
estimated potential revenues breakdown as 
detailed in Table 2. As the table shows, without 
independence, most of the revenues would go 
to the National Government. This could how-
ever be partially justified by the fact that the 
PNG Government currently provides around 
90% of the ABG’s annual revenues. Obviously, 
if Bougainville were to gain independence, and 
it were to maintain similar tax code as PNG, 
then all the money currently going to PNG 
Government could theoretically go to a newly 
independent Bougainville Government.
18. Source: BCL, Development of the New Panguna 
Project. 
19. Bougainville Mining Act 2015, Clause 291, p. 164. 
http://www.abg.gov.pg/uploads/acts/Act_2015-3-
Bougainville_Mining.compressed.pdf.
Table 2: BCL Projected Annual Revenues from Panguna Mine (USD million 
per annum)18
Revenue stream Standard case 
assumption*
High case 
assumption**
Revenues to the ABG
Royalties, develop-
ment levies
44 53
Total 44 53
Revenues to the 
National 
Government
Corporate tax (30%) 286 345
Additional profit tax 
(30%)
133 178
Dividend withholding 
tax (15%)
70 82
Personal income tac 30 33
Total 519 639
* 60 million tonnes per annum
** 90 million tonnes per annum 
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[...] revenues from Exxon and its 
partners to PNG have been (and are 
expected to continue to be) much 
less than projected in the first few 
years of production. This could (and 
most likely would) also happen for 
Panguna revenues in the early years 
of the production phase (late 2020s 
and early 2030s). 
If these figures were to be taken at face value, 
this would amount to a very strong case for 
the reopening of Panguna. Bearing in mind 
the exchange rate, even without independ-
ence, royalties and development levies alone 
would boost ABG coffers; and the increased 
tax take for the PNG Government would be 
a strong case for the ABG to argue for a large 
increase in budget support from Port Moresby 
towards services in Bougainville.
However, taking these figures at face value 
would be very foolish indeed. First of all, 
these projections are subject to all the 
assumptions as regards to earnings discussed 
in Section 2 above: variations in the price of 
copper, in volume extracted and in the tax 
regime. As noted above it is not clear the basis 
for BCL’s projected milling rate of 60 million 
tonnes per year. The high case of 90 million 
per year therefore seems highly speculative. 
They are also subject to the assumptions 
discussed in Section 3 above, particularly the 
question of tailings management. A better 
tailings management system would have huge 
capital costs as well as ongoing maintenance 
costs, which would erode profits, thus cutting 
into the revenues from taxes and royalties.
The second problem with the above figures 
is that they do not address the question of 
timing. BCL’s timeline has feasibility study 
being conducted in 2020-21, raising finance 
in 2022, the construction phase 2023-24, and 
production from 2025 onwards. With the 
non-renewal of the exploration license, how-
ever temporary, this timing is now impossible. 
Production (and therefore revenues) would 
therefore not be likely before 2026 or 2027 – 
i.e. at least 7 to 8 years away.
The third problem with the above figures 
relates to the tax concessions that are likely to 
come to any company – as indicated earlier, 
BCL has indicated it would not proceed if it 
had to pay the Additional Profits Tax included 
in the above table. 
There is also a major issue concerning the 
timing of tax revenues. These will not only 
fluctuate greatly with international prices, 
but usual resource tax law allows taxes to be 
based on profits only after capital costs and 
debt repayments are taken out. Given the 
amount of capital investment needed, and the 
amount of debt any company is likely to need 
to take on to restart production, this means 
that for some years after production starts, 
the project may see little to no company taxes 
going to the PNG Government (or indeed a 
future independent Bougainville). Current 
PNG company tax law allows for all capital 
costs to be deducted against profits on a “25% 
declining balance basis”. This means that in 
its first year of operations, if the capital costs 
of restarting the mine were $US6 billion, then 
25% of this could be claimed against profits in 
the very first year – or $US1.5 billion. Another 
claim could be made in the second year of 
$US1.125 billion. Such deductions will be 
much greater than the profit levels implied by 
Table 2. Any mine operator would then be in a 
tax loss situation for many years. 
This is indeed what has transpired for PNG 
LNG revenues. Revenues from Exxon and its 
partners to PNG have been (and are expected 
to continue to be) much less than projected 
in the first few years of production.20 This 
could (and most likely would) also happen 
for Panguna revenues in the early years of 
the production phase (late 2020s and early 
2030s). It would therefore seem prudent to 
assume that Bougainville will see little finan-
cial benefits to its budget bottom line from 
company taxes until at least 5 years from the 
commencement of mine production given 
depreciation tax write-offs.
The final issue that needs to be taken into 
consideration is the question of risk. As is 
clear from other papers in this report and 
previous reports from Jubilee Australia, there 
is clearly a large part of the Panguna commu-
nity who are against any mining returning at 
this time. Leaving aside the ethical and moral 
questions around forcing or manufacturing 
consent upon a population with significant 
and legitimate concerns about any new mine, 
and considering the issue from a purely 
financial point of view, the question is still 
one of concern. Unless a larger player with 
deep pockets secures the rights to Panguna, 
the ability of a small company like BCL to find 
financing to back this project in the face of 
ongoing landowner discontent about the mine 
will be difficult.
Conclusion
A number of conclusions can be drawn from 
the above analysis. It is going to take a long 
time (decades) for Bougainville to become 
economically self-sufficient given its cur-
rent economic activities and trajectory. If 
Bougainville stays part of PNG, it would likely 
be dependent on financial support from the 
PNG Government for some time. If it were to 
choose independence, the financial situation 
would likely result in significant dependence 
on foreign aid. Given all these realities, it 
is perhaps understandable why many have 
made the case that mining is the obvious solu-
tion to a future dependence either on PNG or 
on foreign donors.
However, mining’s viability as an option 
would seem to be undermined by several 
important considerations. First, it seems 
unlikely, even if mining licenses could be 
approved, that Panguna is viable enough to 
make it commercially profitable for a com-
pany or for investors without a number of 
significant assumptions being met. The yields 
would need to stay as high as they were in 
the 1980s, the copper price would also need 
to maintain its recent level, the company 
may engage in questionable but cheaper 
environmental practices, the company would 
need to not meet any landowner resistance, 
and the tax regime would need to be favoura-
ble to the company. That all of these assump-
tions will prove to be met would seem to be 
highly unlikely. 
Second, even if a company (whether BCL or 
another actor) was able to restart Panguna, 
this would not likely bring any significant 
revenues to Bougainville in the short or even 
medium term. This is because of the time it 
would take to start operation and the likely 
reality of the tax regime that would be nego-
tiated between the mining company and the 
government. Even if some payments were to 
come at this point, whether they will provide 
the sort of financing that Bougainville is said 
to need remains an open question, and is 
dependent on many assumptions. It is hard 
not to avoid the conclusion that the mine may 
be profitable for the company, or for the gov-
ernment, but probably not to both. It is also 
an open question whether either the com-
pany or the government can make significant 
money without the risk of continuing environ-
mental destruction on the island.
For at least the next ten years, an independent 
Bougainville is therefore going to need sig-
nificant aid either from PNG or other donors 
whether or not Panguna (or other mines) are 
opened up. Given that this is the case, the 
question should perhaps be asked, is it worth 
the risk for the ABG to push the country down 
a mining path, or would it not be better to 
explore alternative paths – that are broad-
based and sustainable – for the next decade 
and see how these bear fruit in the meantime?
20. Paul Flanagan and Luke Fletcher, ‘Double or 
Nothing: The Broken Economic Promises of PNG LNG ’ 
(NSW: Jubilee Australia Research Centre, 2018).
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Introduction
Much of Bougainville is a matrilineal soci-
ety and women have been acknowledged as 
the driving force behind the ceasefire, the 
Bougainville Peace Agreement in 2001 and 
post-conflict attempts at reconciliation and 
transformation.1 In Bougainville land entitle-
ments pass through women to their children. 
These inherited entitlements are not the same 
as inheriting land ownership though 
– instead women inherit the role of custodi-
ans of the land. Part of that custodial role is 
to make sure the land is cared for and used 
not just for the current family and community 
but for future generations. Women are born 
on their land, learn about the land, know 
their land and tend to their land. Women 
grow the gardens that almost all the com-
munity depends on for sustenance. Women 
also learn about the plants, the rains, water 
sources, and the dangers and the remedies 
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CHAPTER 6
that the forests can provide. But this doesn’t 
mean that women have always been able to 
make decisions either about their own land or 
about the industries that impact on their land. 
Patriarchal attitudes, magnified by colonial 
assumptions about gender roles and power, 
deliver significant decision-making power and 
control to men. When women lose land and 
have no inheritance, they face a sudden loss 
of identity and community value. Landless 
women in a matrilineal, yet patriarchal soci-
ety, have very few survival options and are 
vulnerable to exploitation. 
Despite the central role women have played 
in the peace process and their role as custodi-
ans of land, they have largely been excluded 
from decision making over Bougainville’s 
development path. The original agreements 
to open the Panguna mine excluded women 
and attempts to reform the agreement mainly 
involved men. The same criticisms can be 
made of other development decisions where 
women are largely excluded yet routinely bear 
the brunt of the negative impacts.2
This paper argues that women can, and must, 
play a leading role in forging a new devel-
opment path for Bougainville. The paper 
describes women’s experiences of and resist-
ance to mining on Bougainville. Its argues 
that an extractivist-based economy is not a 
model for a gender equal society and that gen-
der equality must be at the heart of a just and 
sustainable economic model for Bougainville. 
In this context, past attempts at supporting 
women’s economic power are briefly cri-
tiqued. The paper concludes by outlining 
some elements of an alternative model for a 
sustainable and just economy and therefore 
future for Bougainville.
Women’s experiences of 
and resistance to mining 
on Bougainville
The Panguna mine had an irreparable, devas-
tating impact on women. Women lost their 
ancestral lands and with this their children’s 
future birthright. Women living around the 
mine lost lands through pollution, and the 
mine itself and its associated infrastructure. 
It was men, not women, who negotiated the 
deals that saw land sold to the mining com-
pany. Colonial administrators and foreign 
corporations imposed their own gendered 
ideas about property and decision making 
and approached male leaders, disrupting 
matrilineal systems.3 Negotiations were 
mostly held away from the village, in envi-
ronments and in ways that were unfamiliar to 
women who generally don’t feel comfortable 
negotiating outside of the community con-
text. Women received little compensation in 
return. The mine also changed the nature of 
the economy and of society. Almost all the 
employment offered at the mine went to men. 
The good jobs went to foreign men, the lower 
paid jobs went to men from Port Moresby or 
other parts of Papua New Guinea (PNG) and 
the lowest paid jobs went to Bougainvillean 
men. The mine directly employed very few 
women although some jobs were created for 
women to provide services to the mine and 
its workforce. Across Bougainville the price of 
food and other everyday goods increased – far 
outweighing any income women were able to 
earn because of the mine, such as selling pro-
duce from their gardens at the markets that 
sprang up around the mine site.
In Bougainville, women primarily manage 
water resources for their households and vil-
lages. Pollution from the mine then impacts
1. Barbara King (2009), Women and Peacebuilding: A 
Feminist Study of Contemporary Bougainville, PhD 
Thesis, The University of Queensland.
2. This experience is not unique to Bougainville. 
Michael Ross found that when extractive industries 
dominate the economy, women’s political influence 
is significantly reduced and countries “are left with 
atypically strong patriarchal norms, laws, and political 
institutions”. (Michael Ross, ‘Oil, Islam, and Women’, 
American Political Science Review, Vol. 102, 2008 No. 
1).
3. Helen Hakena, Peter Ninnes and Bert Jenkins (edi-
tors) NGO’s and post-conflict recovery: the Leitana Ne-
han Women’s Development Agency, Bougainville (Asia 
Pacific Press ANU E Press: Canberra, 2006).
CHAPTER 6/ GROWING BOUGAINVILLE'S FUTURE              61 
    
60                GROWING BOUGAINVILLE'S FUTURE/ CHAPTER 6  
     
Given women’s obligations to land 
it is not surprising that women have 
been at the forefront of movements to 
close Panguna and to keep it closed.
women more so than men because women 
are forced to walk much further to obtain 
clean water for their families. Some women 
are forced to use dangerous, polluted water 
for irrigation, cleaning, cooking and even 
drinking. When water becomes scarce, either 
because of pollution or drought, men often 
take over. Some men have placed locks on 
their family’s water tanks and the distribution 
of water then becomes a source of power for 
men.
Given women’s obligations to land it is not 
surprising that women have been at the 
forefront of movements to close Panguna 
and to keep it closed. Most recently, in June 
2017 women from the ‘seven sisters’ area of 
central Bougainville successfully blockaded 
a meeting at the Paguna mine site where a 
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) that 
might have paved the way for a re-opening of 
the mine was to be signed. At that time one of 
the women, Regina Erengmari, said “I don’t 
want mining to be opened, no BCL, no min-
ing. Because land is owned by the women, not 
the men”.4 The women also won an injunc-
tion against the signing of the MOU under 
Section 53 of the Constitution of PNG pro-
hibiting “unjust deprivation of property”, a 
provision preserved in the Constitution of the 
Autonomous Bougainville Government (ABG). 
Finally, in January 2018, the ABG imposed an 
indefinite moratorium on the site.
Opposition to the Panguna mine and other 
extractive, foreign-owned industries are born of 
multiple grievances. Environmental devastation 
4. Eric Tlozek, ‘Bougainville Copper Limited’s Pangu-
na mine hits roadblock from protesters’, Australian 
Broadcasting Corporation, 17 June 2017, http://www.
abc.net.au/news/2017-06-17/bougainville-copper-pan-
guna-mine-suffers-setback/8626762.
Credit: Rob Z - stock.adobe.com.
Women campaigned to keep the Panguna mine closed is a central concern as are, the inequalities that these projects create and exacerbate.
This includes the inequalities between men 
and women; between those in the community 
who profited from the mine and those who 
didn’t; between the Bougainvillean workers 
and the foreign workers; between the com-
panies who extracted the profit and the local 
people who received 1% of profit5 yet suffered 
the consequences; and between rich, pow-
erful countries and a people whose right to 
self-governance had long been denied.
Many people have written about the paradox 
of the ‘resource curse’: that countries with the 
most abundant resources suffer with the low-
est human development. Less has been writ-
ten about the way this impacts on women. It’s 
clear that an extractivist-based economy has 
direct negative impacts for women as women 
from Panguna have experienced but it also 
has long-term adverse economic and planning 
impacts that increase gender inequality. For 
example, extractive industries re-direct what 
little state funds there are into infrastructure 
for the business (roads and ports), into secu-
rity for the mine and even redirect education 
funding toward the skills needed in the mine, 
which again focuses on skills for male work-
ers. Similarly healthcare suffers from reduced 
public investment. While healthcare services 
might increase around the mine they can be 
focused on the health of a primarily male 
workforce. Finally, higher currencies (which 
is discussed by Paul Flanagan in his paper) 
mean alternative industries that women may 
foster can collapse.
The ‘masculinsation’ of the Bougainvillean 
economy caused by a focus on extractive 
industries and the subsequent conflict and 
militarisation of the community contributed 
to a horrific increase in violence against 
5. Bougainvillleans received 5% of the PNG govern-
ment’s profit. The PNG Government originally received 
only 1.25% of profits which was later renegotiated to 
20%. So the largest percentage attributed to Bougain-
villens was 1%. (Rory Ewins, The Bougainville Conflict, 
http://speedysnail.com/pacific/bougainville.html).
The ‘masculinsation’ of the 
Bougainvillean economy caused by a 
focus on extractive industries and the 
subsequent conflict and militarisa-
tion of the community contributed to 
a horrific increase in violence against 
women that continues to plague 
Bougainville today. 
women that continues to plague Bougainville 
today. A UN study found that 62% of men 
in Bougainville have admitted to raping a 
woman.6 The study places Bougainville as 
one of the most dangerous place for women 
outside of a war zone in the world. It’s not 
surprising given extractive industries and 
militarism both independently fundamentally 
change the nature of gender relations in soci-
ety and are associated with high rates of vio-
lence against women.7 8 Women leaders feel 
that the respect for community life and the 
central role women played within the commu-
nity was eroded during the conflict and many 
young men were schooled in conflict, rather 
than community harmony.
The disconnect between 
women’s economic 
empowerment programs 
and women’s economic 
power
There have been efforts to increase ‘women’s 
economic empowerment’ in Bougainville. Yet 
in practice economic empowerment projects 
have been mostly about increasing some 
women’s access to credit schemes to establish
6. Fulu, E., Warner, X., Miedema, S., Jewkes, R., Roselli, 
T. and Lang, J., ‘Why Do Some Men Use Violence 
Against Women and How Can We Prevent It? Quanti-
tative Findings from the United Nations Multi-country 
Study on Men and Violence in Asia and the Pacific’ 
(UNDP, UNFPA, UN Women and UNV: Bangkok, 2013). 
7. Katy Jenkins, ‘Women, mining and development: An 
emerging research agenda’ in The Extractive Industries 
and Society, 1 (2). 2014, pp. 329-339.
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With an abundance of resources, a 
young population and the knowledge 
that collectively people have already 
changed the development path of 
Bougainville, the foundations of a 
more just future exist.
micro-enterprises or improve access to mar-
kets. Despite the term ‘empowerment’, rarely
do these programs lead to increased power for 
women collectively. Instead they focus on try-
ing to build individual power yet ignore many 
of the structural barriers to greater economic 
power for women. While some women benefit 
from these schemes and non-discriminatory 
access to financial resources is important, 
international experience shows us that they 
do not deliver structural changes or increased 
collective power to women.
Economic empowerment cannot simply be 
about having increased access to money 
through credit, more women working for 
wages in extractive industries or more women 
being mine owners. Increased money does 
not necessarily translate to increased power 
if the money is then given to or taken by men. 
For example, the 2013 Bougainville Family, 
Health and Safety Study reported high rates 
of economic abuse of women by men: 35.2%of 
women reported that their male partner had 
taken their earnings against their will, and 
55.4% of women reported that they had been 
subject to economically abusive acts.9 Women 
have not increased power if the process of 
earning money has decreased their autonomy 
or influence (which can be the experience of 
some women employees); or if the increase in 
wages then leads to increased time demands 
as women juggle their work obligations with 
8. Erika Svedberg, ‘Militarization and Women: Gendered 
Militarization’, International Studies Association and Oxford 
University Press, 2012, http://internationalstudies.oxfordre.
com/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.001.0001/acre-
fore-9780190846626-e-263?print=pdf. 
9. Jewkes, R., E. Fulu and Y. Sikweyiya, ‘Family, Health 
and Safety Study, Bougainville, Papua New Guinea’, 2013 
Medical Research Council South Africa and Partners for 
Prevention.
household food production, water and energy 
management, and child and elderly care. 
Increased time demands on women can lead 
to reduced community power when women 
can no longer participate in community dis-
cussions or other civic processes.
Women’s economic power will only exist 
when women are able to make collective 
decisions over the economic model they want 
to adopt. Real, participatory processes to 
work on alternatives to educate women about 
options; to work with them to trial and then 
collectively evaluate different strategies; and 
to make decisions over how they are imple-
mented are required. Increasingly there is a 
recognition that women should be included 
in meetings. But too often women feel like 
flowerpots at meetings who are there for beau-
tifying the meeting. When women are asked 
how to plan a consultative process, and how 
women would like to come together to learn 
and collectively decide, then women will have 
power.
Towards a just and 
equitable economy
With an abundance of resources, a young pop-
ulation and the knowledge that collectively 
people have already changed the develop-
ment path of Bougainville, the foundations of 
a more just future exist. The elements of a sus-
tainable economy that aims for gender equal-
ity and sustainability must include: invest-
ments in and support for education, health 
and social care; cooperative resources for 
agricultural production that can be brought to 
local and international markets; cooperative 
energy and water management; community 
managed tourism and service industries; and 
new forms of international solidarity. Some 
of these elements are explored briefly in this 
section.
The elements of a more equitable economy 
need to redress the symptoms of past fail-
ures, restore elements of the shared economy 
and community life that existed before the 
conflict and also create new approaches to a 
‘solidarity economy’. Economic decisions are 
intertwined with social and cultural lives and 
the decisions we make need to create stronger 
and fairer social and cultural lives. This can 
be done by restoring community owned 
common land and making sure it is cared for 
and benefits all and ensuring our economic 
policies redistribute the fruits of our collec-
tive labour, whether it be paid or unpaid. A 
key feature of ‘solidarity economies’ is that 
decisions are democratically made by all 
involved. If we collectively build new indus-
tries, we can collectively decide where profits 
get reinvested. When women are at the centre 
of that decision making they often reinvest in 
common goods – whether that be in health-
care, energy, water or in shared tools for our 
agriculture.
Because of the conflict a generation of young 
people were denied education, and this has 
had long lasting and devastating impacts 
on Bougainville. Many skilled professionals 
now come from outside Bougainville to work 
which means Bougainvilleans miss out on 
the few jobs that pay a living wage in areas 
like health, and Bougainville loses oppor-
tunities to develop vocational skills. Part of 
the solution lies in providing education and 
vocational training to both young people and 
adults – particularly those who missed out 
during the crisis. Health education should be 
a priority as more health professionals and 
health research is needed to begin to address 
problems such as maternal mortality and 
childhood malnutrition. To take one example, 
there was previously a nurse training centre in 
Arawa, Central Bougainville, which was burnt 
down early on in the crisis, but now nurses 
come from outside Bougainville. Re-opening 
the centre and expanding it to include a 
research centre – which could be in partner-
ship with a tropical health research institute 
– should be a priority given the health needs 
in Bougainville.
Women have strong agricultural knowledge 
Photo credit: Christina Hill
Small-scale miners who work in the tailings downstream of the Panguna mine
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To truly re-shape our economy and 
achieve sustainable development we 
need stronger democratic participa-
tion of women.
yet better coordination to share safe agri-
cultural practices and traditional practices 
is required. Many women continue to use 
unsafe pesticides and fertilisers even though 
the environment is extremely fertile and 
shouldn’t require additional chemical inputs. 
Agricultural cooperatives and exchange 
centres where knowledge, equipment and 
inputs can be shared have proved useful in 
women’s collective farming efforts in other 
countries. Seed banks or libraries can assist 
women exchanging information on plants 
that thrive in Bougainville and in retaining 
Bougainville’s biodiversity.
Women’s cooperatives have proven to be 
economically, environmentally and socially 
transformative in other countries. In Morocco, 
for example, women’s cooperatives produc-
ing argan oil have transformed the lives and 
relationships of Amazigh women, increased 
the rate of girl’s education and halted the 
deforestation of large argan forests.10 In 
Bougainville, copra, virgin coconut oil and 
cocoa could benefit from a similar approach. 
To date, however, efforts to increase produc-
tion have focused on individual production 
and attracting foreign investors. Women are 
often the producers of these products but men 
have negotiated the sales and benefited from 
the profits. Women led cooperatives can pro-
vide much greater bargaining power and also 
support education, exchange and support. A 
cocoa cooperative existed before the crisis but 
hasn’t been effectively re-established despite 
the interest in increasing cocoa production.
Similar approaches could be utilised for 
energy. The majority of women and their fami-
lies live without reliable access to energy. Fuel 
costs can be high and variable. Bio-gas from
10. Zoubida Charrouf and Dom Guillaume, Sustainable 
Development in Northern Africa: The Argan Forest 
Case. Sustainability, 1, 2009.
pigs has been successfully used by some 
households but there are limits to the broader 
uptake of this. Some homes have access to 
solar power, but there are few skills to service 
the equipment and solar power is limited to 
primarily day use. Cooperatives could develop 
micro-grids and support efforts to give 
Bougainvillean women access to programs 
such as the barefoot solar engineers which 
has begun to spread to the Pacific.11
Women continue to be involved in arti-
sanal small-scale alluvial mining (ASM) in 
Bougainville. The impact on women’s health 
and the environment is alarming, and women 
and children are known to “suffer dust inhala-
tion leading to respiratory diseases, exposure 
to mercury and its neurotoxic affects and in 
some cases cyanide exposure when used in 
reworking tailings”.12 Yet ASM research in 
other environments has shown that “women’s 
ASM activities are crucial sources of revenue 
for themselves and their families, allowing 
for basic survival, health and education, as 
well as accumulation activities that improve 
the status of women and their dependents”.13 
Women miners need education and safer 
processing inputs as well as support for fairer 
wages and prices that could come through 
cooperatives designed specifically to support 
women miners.
To truly re-shape our economy and achieve 
sustainable development we need stronger dem-
ocratic participation of women. While there are 
three dedicated places for women in the ABG, 
Bougainville has been unable to get much past 
that quota. In addition to greater representation 
is the need for greater participation. The
11. https://www.barefootcollege.org/the-launch-of-our-pa-
cific-womens-barefoot-solar-initiative/.
12. Danellie Lynas, ‘Health and safety issues faced by 
women engaged in small scale mining in PNG - could 
a flexible and informal training program improve their 
quality of life?’, Proceedings 19th Triennial Congress of 
the IEA, Melbourne 9-14 August 2015.
13. Doris Buss et al, ‘Gender and Artisanal and Small-
Scale Mining in Central and East Africa: Barriers and 
Benefits’, GrOW Working Paper Series, Institute for the 
Studies of International Development, GWP-2017-02.
decisions around Bougainville’s development 
path would benefit from women’s input in 
participatory budget setting processes for 
example. A community development council 
involving at least 50% women could compli-
ment the role of the elected Government and 
work to harmonise development assistance 
as well as the necessary supporting fiscal 
policies. The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable 
Development14 points to the obligations of 
governments to establish community partner-
ships to meet the ambitious agenda.
Some concluding 
comments
Bougainville is clearly owed reparations for 
past damage to its environment, society and 
missed opportunities for its future. It’s a 
clear principle of international law that the 
‘polluter pays’. The global legal principle of 
solidarity that underpins the founding of the 
UN Charter also requires richer countries to 
provide development assistance of 0.7% of 
GDP. However, with international aid waning 
and aid often used as a means of supporting 
the interests of investors from donor coun-
tries, other forms of international solidarity 
are required.15
Bougainvillean women cannot bear an econ-
omy based on extraction and exploitation. 
If Bougainville is to enjoy a gender equita-
ble and thriving community, it must design 
an economy that benefits all, not just a tiny 
minority. To do that it needs to challenge 
the idea that economies must extract and 
produce financial wealth and instead meas-
ure economic success on the ability of the 
community to improve its health, its liveli-
hoods and reduce violence especially against 
women. Bougainville must establish new 
ways of working and new forms of solidarity. 
Bougainvilleans have shown themselves to 
be capable of survival in the worst circum-
stances. Bougainvilleans must now draw 
on their histories and prove that they have 
kinder, more creative, more equitable and 
more sustainable ways to thrive.
14. https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/post2015/
transformingourworld
15. As communities in the Global North seek to transi-
tion to sustainable and more caring economies, they of-
ten also seek ways to take responsibility for the failure 
of governments to address the climate and inequalities 
crises.  According to the Transnational Institute (TI), 
those communities might also seek ways to support 
global transitions “a key international intervention 
that individual Transition initiatives (primarily in the 
Global North) could therefore make would be to link 
with and support particular commons regimes in the 
Global South. This could expand the current focus on 
social enterprise in the Transition movement to include 
a focus on building economic, social, cultural and 
political connections between particular localities in 
the Global North and South” (Tom Henfrey and Justin 
Kenrick, Climate, commons and hope: the transition 
movement in global perspective, Transnational Insti-
tute, 2015, https://www.tni.org/files/publication-down-
loads/018138c_tni_climate-commons-hope.pdf).’
Bougainville Cultural Heritage Centre
Photo credit: Christina Hill
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Introduction
The principle of free prior informed consent 
(FPIC), as framed in international human 
rights law (IHRL), is grounded in indigenous 
peoples’ right to self-determination and is 
fundamental to its exercise. By virtue of their 
right to self-determination indigenous peoples 
freely determine their own economic, social 
and cultural development, freely dispose 
of their natural wealth and resources, and 
may not to be deprived of their own means 
of subsistence.1 The requirement to obtain 
indigenous peoples’ FPIC arises whenever the 
measures or activities proposed by external 
entities, be they State or corporate actors, 
could potentially place limitations on, or 
1. Common Article 1 International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights and International Covenant on Eco-
nomic Social and Cultural Rights. Articles 3, 26 and 32 
UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.
result in infringements of, the enjoyment of 
this right. The rights to give or withhold FPIC 
required that consent must be obtained in a 
manner that: is free from coercion or manip-
ulation; is prior to the authorisation and 
commencement of activities; and ensures the 
concerns peoples are fully informed as to the 
potential impacts on their rights as well as 
potential benefits. The concerns people must 
be free to provide or withhold their collective 
FPIC through their own representatives in 
accordance with their own processes, laws 
and decision-making practices and their tra-
ditional knowledge and worldviews must be 
respected.
The concept of obtaining indigenous peo-
ples’ consent is not new. As far back as the 
16th century, the founding fathers of the law 
of nations recognised that respect for natu-
ral law principles required that indigenous 
peoples’ be able to exercise their “free and 
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voluntary choice” when deciding whether or 
not to subjugate themselves to colonial rule.2 
However, as power imbalances between 
indigenous peoples and states amplified 
throughout the colonial and post-colonial 
eras, the use of force and coercion facilitated 
the widespread non-consensual exploita-
tion of indigenous lands and resources, 
with pre-existing agreements frequently 
reneged upon. By the late 19th century when 
Bougainville was first colonised, a positiv-
ist version of international law, premised 
purely on the consent of “civilized” nations 
as opposed to previous natural law informed 
conceptions, had essentially deemed native 
consent superfluous. Only in recent decades, 
with the emergence of the self-determination 
based requirement for FPIC under IHRL, has 
this situation gradually begun to change.
The paper provides a discussion on the 
self-determination based requirement for 
FPIC and its relationship with indigenous 
peoples’ right to development under IHRL. 
The paper then examines the extent to which 
FPIC is reflected in the 2015 Bougainville 
Mining Act, building on the analysis already 
done by Jubilee.3 It closes with a discussion 
on the contemporary context within which 
reopening of the Panguna mine is being pro-
moted and argues for a participatory analysis 
of all potential developmental options as a 
pre-requisite for genuine FPIC and self-deter-
mined development.
Indigenous peoples’ right 
to self-determination and a 
new relationship
The dawn of the contemporary human rights 
era, following the adoption of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, promised equal 
2. Doyle C Indigenous Peoples, Title to Territory, Rights 
and Resources: The Transformative Role of Free Prior 
and Informed Consent (London: Routledge, 2015).
3. See ‘The Devil in the Detail Analysis of the Bougain-
ville Mining Act 2015’ (NSW: Jubilee Australia Research 
Centre, 2015).
One the clearest barometers of the 
exercise of the on-going aspect of 
this right to self-determination is the 
extent to which indigenous peoples, 
as opposed to outsiders, maintain 
control over the land and resource 
base underpinning their subsistence, 
way of life and development. 
rights to all peoples. This included the right. 
to self-determination by virtue of which all 
peoples are free to determine their own social, 
economic, political and cultural development 
While there has been much debate to the 
content and the subjects of the right self-de-
termination, its embodiment of the notion of 
choice is consistently recognised as one of its 
core features and is also intrinsic to the notion 
of self-determination that emerges from the 
UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples (henceforth the Declaration).
The contemporary international law con-
cept of indigenous peoples’ right to self-de-
termination is broader than the concept of 
self-determination which emerged during 
the decolonisation process. While, inde-
pendence from Papua New Guinea (PNG) 
remains a potentially legitimate self-determi-
nation option in colonial-like contexts such 
as Bougainville, self-determination is not 
limited to this. In other words the exercise of 
this option does not exhaust the exercise of 
indigenous peoples’ right to self-determina-
tion. Instead, indigenous peoples’ self-deter-
mination, as recognised in the Declaration 
and IHRL jurisprudence more broadly, is an 
on-going right that is a flexible and dynamic 
concept aimed at addressing their diverse 
realities, worldviews, needs and future aspi-
rations. One the clearest barometers of the 
exercise of the on-going aspect of this right 
to self-determination is the extent to which 
indigenous peoples, as opposed to outsiders, 
maintain control over the land and resource 
base underpinning their subsistence, way of 
life and development. This social, cultural 
and economic development dimension of 
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self-determination is referred to by indigenous 
peoples as their right to self-determined devel-
opment. In other words, their right to govern 
their lands and territories and make informed 
developmental choices in the certainty that 
they will be free to pursue those choices with-
out outside interference. Viewed from this per-
spective, the opportunity to make an informed 
choice between the reopening of the Panguna 
mine (or indeed the opening other mines on 
the island) and potential alternative develop-
mental options is just as much an exercise of 
their right to self-determination as is participa-
tion in the anticipated independence referen-
dum currently scheduled for 2019.
By affirming indigenous peoples’ right to 
self-determination the UN General Assembly 
has, in adopting the Declaration, called on all 
states to build new consensual relationships 
with indigenous peoples based on equality, 
and which recognise and seek to strengthen 
them as empowered decisions-makers and 
masters of their own destiny. To realise this, 
indigenous people must not only be free to 
give or withhold FPIC to particular projects 
but must also be empowered to participate 
in the identification and assessment of, and 
exercise choice between, the range of alter-
native developmental options possibly open 
to them. It is only within such a framework 
that notion of FPIC becomes meaningful and 
fulfils its purpose as a safeguard and enabler 
for the self-determination right to determine 
social, cultural and economic development. 
Applying this logic to the Bougainville con-
text would imply the conduct of a transparent 
critique of and nation-wide debate about the 
premise that independence is not financially 
feasible without large scale mining.
The nexus of fpic, self-
determined development 
and the right to choose
Self-determination, the right to development 
Photo credit: Christina Hill
The Panguna mine and the right to give or withhold FPIC are at their core collective decision-making rights in 
relation to internally or externally triggered 
choices. These choices generally pertain to the 
use of lands and resources and related cul-
tural, economic, spiritual and social matters. 
Fundamental to realising indigenous peoples’ 
right to self-determination is their ability to give 
or withhold FPIC to proposals by state or cor-
porate actors that may impact on their lands, 
territories and resources. The exercise of the 
right to self-determined development and the 
requirement to obtain indigenous peoples’ FPIC 
are inextricably interlinked. The former facil-
itates the exercise of choice in relation to the 
determination of development plans, priorities 
and pathways while the latter offers certainty 
in relation to the realisation of those develop-
mental plans and strategies by preventing the 
subordination of indigenous peoples’ choices 
to the plans and priorities of external parties. 
If disconnected from self-determined develop-
ment, FPIC loses its integrity and risks being 
transformed into a disempowering concept.
The Declaration, as a synthesis of IHRL as it 
pertains to indigenous peoples, provides a 
clear articulation of this relationship between 
the requirement for FPIC and self-determined 
development.4 Article 32 succinctly captures 
its essence. The first provision, article 32(1), 
affirms indigenous peoples’ right “to deter-
mine and develop priorities and strategies 
for the development or use of their lands or 
territories and other resources”. This right is
4. This emerges from the UN Declaration on the Rights 
of Indigenous Peoples Articles 3, 5, 11, 18, 19, 20, 23, 32 
and 34. It is also reflected in the concluding observa-
tions of human rights treaty bodies which affirm the 
requirement to obtain FPIC in light of common article 1 
of the ICCPR and ICESCR. For a discussion on this point 
see Doyle C (2015) Indigenous Peoples, Title to Territory, 
Rights and Resources: The Transformative Role of Free 
Prior and Informed Consent (London: Routledge); Doyle, 
C., & Gilbert, J., (2009) Indigenous Peoples and Globali-
zation: From “Development Aggression” to “Self-Deter-
mined Development”, in European Yearbook of Minori-
ty Issues Volume 8. Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
219-262; Tauli-Corpuz, V., (2008), ‘The Concept of Indig-
enous Peoples’ Self-Determined Development or Devel-
opment with Identity and Culture,” Baguio: Tebtebba 
Foundation UN Doc. CLT/CPD/CPO/2008/IPS/02.
The option to consider and evaluate 
alternative culturally appropriate 
development options, prior to having to 
make decisions with regard to proposed 
developments, is essential to making a 
free and fully informed choice. 
recognised as constituting an aspect of the 
right to self-determination affirmed in arti-
cle 3.5 The requirement for FPIC affirmed in 
article 32(2) is effectively a derivate of this 
right to development, and by extension of 
the rights to self-determination and to lands, 
territories and resources. Article 32(2) outlines 
the mechanism of good faith consultation 
with the purpose of obtaining consent as the 
means to guarantee the realisation of the 
rights affirmed in article 32(1).
Read in light of the right to development 
affirmed in article 32(1), the FPIC requirement 
in article 32(2) therefore affirms a right of 
choice. The indivisibility of FPIC and self-de-
termined development arises because they 
are in fact two sides of this same coin. On one 
side of the coin, self-determined development 
embodies an indigenous peoples’ right to 
decide its own development priorities. FPIC 
protects this choice in the face of projects, 
policies or legislation that could run counter 
to these priorities or render them unachiev-
able. On the other side of the coin, genuine 
FPIC is only possible if the community has 
been afforded the possibility of choosing its 
development priorities in advance. The option 
to consider and evaluate alternative culturally 
appropriate development options, prior to 
having to make decisions with regard to pro-
posed developments, is essential to making a 
free and fully informed choice.
Fpic and the 2015 
Bougainville mining act
Unsurprisingly, there are opposing views 
among landowners in relation to the pursuit of 
large scale mining on Bougainville as a basis 
for economic development. The Autonomous 
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Bougainville Government’s (ABG) expressed
preference has been to reopen the Panguna 
mine, although in January this year it did 
impose an indefinite moratorium on mining at 
Panguna. Conscious of the potential for mining 
related tensions to erupt, and potentially for 
history to repeat itself, the ABG, while framing 
mining as a necessary enabler for financial 
autonomy and independence, has consistently 
stressed that landowners would have a veto 
over mining projects in their lands and that 
projects would not be enforced on them.
This philosophy underpinned the enactment 
of the 2015 Mining Act which transfers control 
of mining from PNG to the ABG. On the sur-
face, the Act contains provisions which mirror 
FPIC. The Act requires “landowner permis-
sion” prior to entering land that is the subject 
of reconnaissance licences,6 or prior to enter-
ing or disturbing land that is subject of
5. UN Doc. E/CN.4/2003/92 paras 19, 20 & 44; see also 
UN Doc. A/61/PV.107 at 25. 
6. Bougainville Mining Act 2015 Section 91(1).
exploration licences,7 and as part of mak-
ing applications for a mining lease.8 In the 
case of the latter, where the permission is 
not forthcoming, the Act states that mining 
leases will not be granted.9 Written evidence 
of landowner permission is also required for 
the expansion of mining lease areas10 and for 
mining easements.11
The notion of landowner permission, while 
it appears synonymous with FPIC, deviates 
from FPIC in some important regards.12 Unlike 
FPIC, it does not explicitly include the
7. Bougainville Mining Act 2015 Section 105(1).
8. Bougainville Mining Act 2015 Sections 119(1,b,x), 120 
(1,b,iv).
9. Bougainville Mining Act 2015 Section 126 (2,c).
10. Bougainville Mining Act 2015 Section 134 (1,b,vii), 135 
(3,c).
11. Bougainville Mining Act 2015 Section 189 (b, viii), 
191 (2,b).
12. For a more in-depth analysis of various problematic 
aspects the Mining Act see ‘The Devil in the Detail Anal-
ysis of the Bougainville Mining Act 2015’ (NSW: Jubilee 
Australia Research Centre, 2015).
Photo credit: Harjono Djoyobisono/ IWDA
Bougainville Women Human Rights Defenders Forum organised by Nazareth Centre 
for Rehabilitation (Siwai, November 2017)
requirements for those who are potentially 
impacted to be adequately and independently 
informed and for their consent to be freely 
obtained prior to the authorisation or initia-
tion of any activities impacting on their rights.
Under human rights law jurisprudence this 
requirement arises prior to the issuance of 
exploration licences, while under the Mining 
Act the requirement to obtain landowner
permission only arises after exploration 
licences are issued. Furthermore, the post 
exploration licence landowner permission 
seeking process consists of an unregulated 
engagement between companies and land-
owners, with no clarity provided on what 
should happen if this permission is not forth-
coming. In addition, the provisions that ren-
der access to land contingent on landowner 
permission can be overruled, or do not apply, 
in a number of scenarios.13
The law is again ambiguous and somewhat 
contradictory in relation to mining leases. 
While it unambiguously states in section 
126 that mining leases will not be granted if 
landowner permission is not forthcoming, 
it appears to retreat from this in subsequent 
provisions. Section 142 establishes that a 
mandatory process of mediation can be initi-
ated in “an attempt to obtain the outstanding 
landowner permission”.14 If this mediation 
fails, the Bougainville Executive Council (BEC) 
is required to “consult with approved land-
owner organisations, the applicant and other 
stakeholders; and reach a mutually acceptable 
decision”.15 As part of this consultation, the 
BEC is to take into account “whether the min-
ing development is necessary for the rehabili-
tation of Bougainville and its people from the 
destruction, injuries, trauma and dislocation 
suffered during the Bougainville Conflict” and 
“the importance of the mining development to
13. The requirement can be overruled by the Secretary 
of the Mining Department when conducting surveys. 
Likewise, it does not apply to authorized officials 
who are enforcing the Act, including when taking soil 
samples or when tenements are being marked out. Bou-
gainville Mining Act 2015 Sections 329, 331 & 238.
14. Bougainville Mining Act 2015 Section 142.
15. Bougainville Mining Act 2015 Section 143(2) a, b.
Bougainville achieving autonomy and fiscal 
self-reliance”.16 Apart from requiring con-
sideration of “measures that will be taken to 
prevent or minimise damage and destruction 
to land, sea, air and water resources”, all of 
the other criteria that are to be considered 
relate exclusively to the benefits rather than 
potential impacts or opportunity costs arising 
from mining.17
In order to satisfy the necessity requirement, 
an exhaustive, transparent and participatory 
assessment of potential alternatives to mining 
that could contribute to fiscal self-reliance 
and rehabilitation of Bougainville and its peo-
ple would be required.18 However, there is no 
reference to such an assessment in the Act. In 
addition, and critically from a human rights 
perspective, there is no reference to respect 
for the principle of proportionality in relation 
to the potential impacts on indigenous
16. Bougainville Mining Act 2015 Section 143(3).
17. Bougainville Mining Act 2015 Section 143(3).
18. While there is growing recognition of the need to 
ensure effective participation of indigenous peoples in 
the planning of development options at a regional or 
national level, there is limited practice to date of this. 
The experience of First Nations in Canada with land use 
planning could provide valuable lessons see for exam-
ple “BC First Nations Land Use Planning: Effective Prac-
tices A guide prepared for the New Relationship Trust” 
(EcoTrust Canada 2009). Other models, such as Indige-
nous Peoples’ Ancestral Domain Sustainable Develop-
ment and Protection Plans, which were intended to feed 
into an Indigenous Peoples’ Master Plan in accordance 
with the 1997 Indigenous Peoples Rights Act, also 
provide some principles (though practice has failed to 
live up to them to date) that could inform participatory 
formulation and assessment of developmental options, 
see “Guidelines on the Formulation of the Ancestral 
Domain Sustainable Development and Protection Plan 
(ADSDPP)” National Commission on Indigenous Peo-
ples Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 2004 available 
at https://bit.ly/2LdHgJC. Proactive measures taken by 
indigenous peoples, such as the development of the 
Autonomous Government of the Wampis in Peru offer 
some of the most promising developments in relation 
to peoples’ control over, and participation in, land use 
planning and proactive determination of development 
strategies see Gobierno Territorial Autonomo De La 
Nacion Wampis-GTANW Resumen Ejecutivo Recuper-
ando La Autonomia Socio Historica: Construccion Del 
Futuro Comun Territorios Integrales Para Tarimat Pujut 
available at https://bit.ly/2N7Z0Xr.
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[...] while the law is innovative and 
progressive in a number of impor-
tant areas, and offers the promise of 
landowner permission being sought, 
the limitations and ambiguity in 
certain provisions provide leeway for 
its implementation in a manner that 
deviates significantly from the princi-
ples of FPIC and IHRL standards. 
peoples’ human rights and the benefits to 
be realised by the Bougainvillean society at 
large.
 potential weakness in the notion of “land-
owner permission” in the Act is the extent 
to which it ensures respect for and protects 
communities’ own forms of decision-mak-
ing. The Act states that “permission must be 
obtained in the manner that is customary 
for decision-making for the group or groups 
comprising the landowners of that land”.19 
This is consistent with IHRL’s recognition of 
indigenous peoples’ right to maintain and 
develop their own institutions and to be 
consulted through representatives of their 
own choosing. However, this is undermined 
in the context of mediation processes envis-
aged under the Act where landowner permis-
sion is not forthcoming, as individuals may 
be required to provide a “written statement” 
their reasons for refusing permission20 – a 
practice that may not be acceptable under 
many collective customary decision-making 
processes. Likewise, it is unclear how obtain-
ing landowner permission through a Mineral 
Resources Forum could be consistent with 
customary decision-making processes.21 The 
BEC’s role in the establishment and approval 
of landowner organisations, its determination 
of who should mediate where consent is not 
forthcoming, and its unstated role in the
19. Bougainville Mining Act 2015 Section 32(2
20. Bougainville Mining Act 2015 Section 142(2)3b “may 
request from the relevant persons a written statement 
of their concerns that have resulted in the decision to 
withhold permission”.
21. Bougainville Mining Act 2015 Section 140(5).
determination of what constitutes a “mutually 
acceptable decision” where consent is not 
forthcoming, is also potentially problematic 
from the perspective of ensuring permission is 
freely given.
Other concerns in relation to “landowner 
permission” vis-à-vis FPIC are the apparent 
one-off nature of the requirement in the Act 
and the potential for criminalisation of any 
subsequent dissent to mining projects.22 The 
Act’s inclusion of a compulsory acquisition 
clause, allowing property to be taken for “a 
public purpose, namely mining, exploration 
for minerals, and other activities ancillary to 
mining”,23 also has the potential to under-
mine any protections offered under the land-
owner permission clauses.
Two of the core safeguards under IHRL that 
operate in conjunction with consultations to 
obtain FPIC are impact assessments
(including in relation to social, economic, 
environmental and human rights impacts), 
and benefit sharing agreements. The Act 
refers to the need to “avoid or minimize the 
deleterious, environmental, social and cul-
tural impacts” of mining projects. However, 
from an IHRL perspective, there is insufficient 
clarity of the relationship between impact 
assessments and the process for obtain-
ing landowner permission. As a result, it 
is unclear how consent sought can be ade-
quately informed. Nor is there any guarantee 
of independent technical advice regarding 
potential impacts. A similar issue arises in 
relation to ensuring fair compensation. While 
the Act addresses the need for compensation 
and community development agreements, it 
does not provide the necessary safeguards 
and mechanisms to ensure that fair and equi-
table compensation and benefits are guaran-
teed in line with IHRL standards.
In conclusion, while the law is innovative and 
progressive in a number of important areas, 
and offers the promise of landowner permis-
sion being sought, the limitations and ambi-
guity in certain provisions provide leeway for 
its implementation in a manner that deviates
significantly from the principles of FPIC and 
IHRL standards. The extent to which it will 
protect landowner rights in practice therefore 
remains a function of the political environ-
ment in which it will be implemented.
Bougainville today - a 
new opportunity for self-
determined development?
When addressing the requirement for FPIC, 
UN and regional human rights monitoring 
bodies have pointed to the importance of 
striving for mutual agreement between indig-
enous peoples and the state. However, in 
so doing they have stressed that indigenous 
peoples’ rights must be respected and that 
their FPIC is to be obtained as part of this 
process, in particular in the case of large scale 
mining. This requirement for FPIC has con-
sistently been framed within the framework 
of self-determination for indigenous peoples. 
Mining is one potential path that indigenous 
peoples may follow in the pursuit of their 
self-determination objectives. However, it 
is not, and should not be, presented as the 
only development option available to them. 
Experience throughout the world has demon-
strated that indigenous peoples are frequently 
worse off as a result of mining projects in 
their lands, unless pre-conditions including 
empowerment of their indigenous governance 
structures, respect for their human rights, 
in particular land and resource rights, and 
obtaining their FPIC are first guaranteed.
What emerges from the Bougainville Mining 
Act, and the political context in which it was 
adopted, is the perspective that large-scale 
mining offers the only feasible developmen-
tal path for Bougainville, and that significant 
efforts will be made to convince communities 
that this is the case. Despite political
22. ‘The Devil in the Detail Analysis of the Bougainville 
Mining Act 2015’ (NSW: Jubilee Australia Research 
Centre, 2015).
23. Bougainville Mining Act 2015 Section 2(2).
Experience throughout the world 
has demonstrated that indigenous 
peoples are frequently worse off as 
a result of mining projects in their 
lands, unless pre-conditions includ-
ing empowerment of their indigenous 
governance structures, respect for 
their human rights, in particular land 
and resource rights, and obtaining 
their FPIC are first guaranteed.
pronouncements to the contrary, the Act 
suggests that mining could ultimately proceed 
irrespective of landowner views and without 
necessarily conducting the type of independ-
ent broad-based participatory impact assess-
ments and obtaining FPIC as required under 
international standards.24 The political con-
sensus in relation to the necessity of mining 
has led to a scenario in which there appears 
to have been insufficient in-depth analysis of 
potential alternative development options. 
In such a context, those whose permission 
is being requested are deprived of the oppor-
tunity to make a fully informed choice with 
regard to their own preferred form of devel-
opment that is consistent with their future 
aspirations as peoples.  The publication this 
paper appears in may well support such an 
analysis and deliberation of other potential 
development options.
The struggle for independence in Bougainville 
has been inextricably linked with the right to 
decide if or how mineral resources should be 
exploited. Given this past, it would appear 
self-evident that the success of Bougainville’s 
future independence or autonomy rests on
24. See for example Saramaka v Suriname Inter-
American Court on Human Rights (2007) and UN 
Special Rapporteur on the rights of indigenous peo-
ples reference to the “Akwe: Kon Voluntary guidelines 
for the conduct of cultural, environmental and social 
impact assessments regarding developments proposed 
to take place on, or which are likely to impact on, 
sacred sites and on lands and waters traditionally occu-
pied or used by indigenous and local communities.”
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the freedom of its peoples to make informed 
choices about their development path. Mining 
may or may not ultimately form part of their 
chosen developmental options, but the pro-
cess for determining this must respect the
inherent rights of its peoples and withstand
the scrutiny of the current and future gener-
ations of Bougainvilleans, in particular those 
who stand to be most impacted. The trauma 
of imposed environmental, socially and 
culturally destructive mining in Bougainville 
reinforces the imperative to obtain FPIC and 
to empower its peoples to realise self-deter-
mined development. FPIC and self-deter-
mined development in such contexts embody 
a strong remedial and redress dimension, and 
would provide a strong foundation for long-
term peace, prosperity, equality and sustaina-
ble development, whatever the outcome of the 
independence referendum. 
This paper is an exploration of the impor-
tance of customary land in Melanesia, and 
in Bougainville. Customary land tenure in 
Melanesia is truly a window to a different 
way of relating to the land and resources 
of our planet. But it is not just about land. 
Customary land tenure is about how people 
and families relate to the land and to each 
other – and how they work together and 
share, so that the land provides for everyone. 
It is highly diverse and highly complex, and 
most people outside of rural Melanesia do not 
understand it.1 Customary land tenure is 
about deep histories and deep relationships 
between land and families – within which 
land is not a commodity, but part of the 
community and part of the family. Within 
Melanesia, Bougainville is unique due to its 
history of ten years of civil war precipitated by 
conflict related to a foreign-owned mine.
This paper explores the question of custom-
ary land in Melanesia, examining what is so 
distinctive about it and how this land tenure 
system relates to rural Melanesian economies. 
It then discusses the push by outside actors to 
replace customary land with western models 
of land tenure. Finally, it concludes by look-
ing at the combined Melanesian resistance
1. Co-Author’s note: as someone who grew up in urban 
Canada, I, Catherine Sparks, was privileged to spend 
over three years living in rural PNG (1996-99), going 
with my mother-in-law to work in the food gardens at 
least a couple of times every week. It was primarily 
from her (and my father-in-law too) that I gained an 
understanding of customary land tenure. 
LAND IN BOUGAINVILLE: THE 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
CUSTOMARY LAND TENURE AND 
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN 
MELANESIA
AUTHORS: CATHERINE SPARKS AND JOEL SIMO
Catherine Sparks has lived and worked in Melanesia (primarily Papua New 
Guinea, Bougainville and Vanuatu) for 25 years. She recently completed a 
ten-year term as the Melanesia Program Officer for The Christensen Fund, 
a US-based private charitable foundation that aims to “back the stewards of 
biological and cultural diversity”.
Joel Simo is a Founding Member of the Melanesian Indigenous Land Defence 
Alliance (MILDA) and is the Director of the Vanuatu Indigenous Land Defence 
Desk (VILDD).  Originally from Aneityum Island in Vanuatu, Joel did his 
BA Honours in Linguistics at the University of Papua New Guinea. He has 
travelled and worked extensively throughout Melanesia, including Bougainville. 
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These nations are also incredibly bio-
logically diverse, while being among 
the last places in the world where the 
people who have built an intimate 
relationship with the land over many 
generations still control its use, with 
80% of the population living in the 
rural areas and providing for them-
selves within the traditional, primar-
ily non-cash, economy. 
to this challenge, through MILDA, the 
Melanesian Indigenous Land Defence 
Alliance, and the impact that MILDA has had 
in Bougainville.
The Traditional Economy 
and Customary Land Ten-
ure in Melanesia
The Melanesian nations of Papua New Guinea 
(PNG), Bougainville, Solomon Islands, and 
Vanuatu are culturally and linguistically 
the most diverse in the world with more 
than 1,000 distinct languages spoken. These 
nations are also incredibly biologically 
diverse, while being among the last places in 
the world where the people who have built an 
intimate relationship with the land over many 
generations still control its use, with 80% of 
the population living in the rural areas and 
providing for themselves within the tradi-
tional, primarily non-cash, economy. This 
traditional clan-based regime provides the 
people with complete food, housing, employ-
ment, and other forms of social security, 
and protects them from scarcities created by 
the cash economy.2 The links between cus-
tomary land and the traditional economy in 
Melanesia have been described by Vanuatu 
2. Anderson 2015, 2; Bennholdt-Thomsen and Mies 
1999, 145; Faraclas 2001, 75; and Lepani, Charles, 2008, 
in Bourke, R. Michael, and Tracy Harwood (eds.), 2009. 
Food and Agriculture in Papua New Guinea. ANU  
E-Press. http://press-files.anu.edu.au/downloads/
press/p53311/pdf/whole_book_Part_1.pdf, p. vii.
Member of Parliament (MP) Ralph 
Regenvanu.3 Regenvanu explains that, 
“almost all of this 80% of the population:
Moreover, Regenvanu highlights how a high 
proportion of urban dwellers also participate 
in and depend on the traditional economy to 
a significant degree, using kinship networks 
to access food and other resources and resolv-
ing conflicts in the traditional way.5 While 
MP Regenvanu is talking specifically about 
the Vanuatu context, the same can be said of 
PNG, Bougainville, and Solomon Islands. And 
thus, because of the continued strength of the 
traditional economy, there is still no absolute 
poverty – that is, no pervasive hunger and no 
homelessness – in rural Melanesia.6
3. MP Ralph Regenvanu has been the Vanuatu Minister 
for Lands and Natural Resources for most of the time 
since 2011 and up until 19 December 2017 when he 
became the Vanuatu Minister for Foreign Affairs. 
4. Ralph Regenvanu, “The Traditional Economy as a 
Source of Resilience in Vanuatu” in In Defence of Mel-
anesian Customary Land. Ed. Tim Anderson and Gary 
Lee (AID/WATCH: Sydney, 2010), p 31.
5. Ralph Regenvanu, “The Traditional Economy as a 
Source of Resilience in Vanuatu” in In Defence of Mel-
anesian Customary Land. Ed. Tim Anderson and Gary 
Lee (AID/WATCH: Sydney, 2010).
live in settlements (villages) with other 
members of their traditional extended fami-
lies, on land that is theirs under the rules of 
custom;
satisfy most of their food and other require-
ments using traditional methods and forms 
of land, sea and resource utilisation (eg. 
gardening practices), on their customary 
land and sea;
speak their indigenous language;
are governed by traditional leaders;
have their disputes resolved within commu-
nities by traditional leaders using tradition-
al dispute resolution approaches; and
participate in custom ceremonies which 
cement their place as members of their 
community.” 4
Importantly, the basis for the traditional 
economy is a diverse range of systems of 
customary land tenure.7 But many people 
ask – what exactly is customary land tenure? 
To begin with, it is important to understand 
that the Melanesian relationship with land is 
traditionally inalienable and non-commodi-
fiable in nature – a dynamic highlighted by a 
statement made by the Vanuatu Minister for 
Lands, Sethy Regenvanu, in 1980, the year
6. Despite occasional short-term food shortages, 
household food security in PNG is generally high with 
over 80 percent of food energy consumed continuing 
to come from garden-grown foods; see Mousseau 2013, 
8; and Bourke, R. Michael, and Tracy Harwood (eds.), 
2009. Food and Agriculture in Papua New Guinea. ANU  
E-Press https://bit.ly/2NblYRv. p. 130.
7. Jamie Tanguay, “Melanesian Well-Being Indicators: A 
Biocultural Approach”, in Eleanor Sterling et al.  Cul-
turally Grounded Indicators of Resilience in Social-Eco-
logical Systems. Environment and Society: Advances in 
Research, 8 (2017): 68-71; and Ralph Regenvanu, “The 
Traditional Economy as a Source of Resilience in Vanua-
tu” in In Defence of Melanesian Customary Land. Ed. Tim 
Anderson and Gary Lee (AID/WATCH: Sydney, 2010).
that Vanuatu won its national independence:
 
The Core Value of Reciprocity
While in contemporary ‘western’ culture 
people tend to define themselves by their pos-
sessions, in Melanesian culture, people define 
themselves primarily by their relationships 
– their relationships to an extended family 
linked to a geographic locality.9 Systems 
of customary land tenure are based not on 
attainment of individual assets and profit, 
but on strengthening relationships wherein 
everyone has enough of everything. The
8. Sethy Regenvanu, Land is what a Mother is to a Baby, 
Pipol’s Forum, (12 August 2003), 6-7.
For ni-Vanuatu, land is more than simply 
a commodity to be used for gain and to 
be disposed of when it has been stripped 
of its value. Land is an intrinsic part of 
themselves and their whole being. Land to 
ni-Vanuatu is what a mother is to a baby.8
Photo credit: Christina Hill 
Typical household garden, northern Bougainville
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For decades now, various colonising 
(and neo-colonising) forces have 
been trying to change the non-
commoditised relationship between 
Melanesian people and their land 
in order to get them to work more 
readily within the wage labour 
economy. 
late William Takaku was a famous actor 
and cultural activist from Pidia in Central 
Bougainville. When asked about why he 
was working with communities to organise 
the Kaur (or Reeds) Festival in Bougainville, 
Takaku explained that the festival was ulti-
mately about highlighting and revaluing the 
concept of reciprocity that has been central to 
Melanesian culture – he said,
It is this value of reciprocity that is the basis 
for the traditional economy and customary 
land tenure.
In a world where the weaknesses and short-
comings of the cash economy are more and 
more evident every day, there is an urgent
9. Bernard Narokobi, Lo Bilong Yumi Yet, Law and Cus-
tom in Melanesia (Institute of Pacific Studies, Univer-
sity of the South Pacific, and the Melanesian Institute 
for Pastoral and Socio-Economic Service: Goroka, PNG, 
1989), p 21.
10. William Takaku, Tampara Duanta Melanesia Updates, 
1 August to 31 October 2010. (Project Report to Funder.)  
Awara, Bougainville:  Tampara Duanta Melanesia, p 4.
need to look for and to other ways of living 
on this planet. This paper makes the case 
that Melanesia – in places where its tradi-
tional economy and customary land tenure 
are strong – provides that example. And yet, 
this unique and critically important system is 
under urgent threat from the forces of globali-
sation and commoditisation. 
The Challenge to 
Customary Land Tenure
For decades now, various colonising (and 
neo-colonising) forces have been trying to 
change the non-commoditised relationship 
between Melanesian people and their land 
in order to get them to work more readily 
within the wage labour economy. Up to now 
they have not been successful. However, the 
process has started and is now well underway 
through long-term processes of colonisation, 
including colonial/neo-colonial education 
systems that change the way people think and 
change what they believe in. Most outsiders, 
and now even many Melanesians themselves, 
do not believe in the validity of customary 
land tenure – they believe that the land needs 
to be surveyed and registered in order for the 
tenure to be legitimate and for the land to be 
‘safe’. At the same time, foreign aid agencies 
often describe customary land tenure as an 
impediment to ‘development’11 and purport 
the need for ‘land reform’ in Melanesia – that 
is, the registration of individualized land 
titles12 under centralised state control to make 
it easier for companies, especially foreign 
ones, to access and control land.
11. AusAID. Pacific Regional Aid Strategy 2004-2009. 
Canberra, Australia. https://bit.ly/2wcIUoT; and Lissant 
Bolton, 2015, Women and Customary Land Tenure in 
Vanuatu: Changing understandings in Edvard Hviding 
and Geoffrey White (eds.) Pacific Alternatives: Cultural 
Politics in Contemporary Oceania. Canon Pyon: Sean 
Kingston Publishing, p 148-150.
12. There are now laws that allow for registration of 
group titles as well, but the point is that registration 
allows for identification of ‘landowners’ who can then 
be accessed by companies wanting to access their land 
for business development.
“The Reeds Festival is about sharing.  In 
our culture, ‘Taponang’ is the sharing 
of the garden harvest among women, 
and sharing of fish from the hunt among 
men. This was the paramount Melanesian 
biocultural community life done out of 
loving kindness so that everyone remains 
equal; so that no one goes home not hav-
ing a bit of what others have reaped from 
the land or the sea.  It was a distributing 
and sharing of goods and knowledge 
which is being replaced by ignorance, 
greed, and craving in the predictable and 
yet surprising ‘developed’ world.”10
Upon achieving Independence, the protection 
of customary land was guaranteed in the 
Constitutions of PNG, Solomon Islands, and 
Vanuatu (in 1975, 1978 and 1980 respectively). 
In PNG, the Constitutional Planning 
Committee (CPC) Report that informed the 
drafting of the Constitution states that it is 
vital to protect customary land rights, and 
that land rights and use of natural resources 
should be about trusteeship rather than 
ownership. The CPC noted that, “The recent 
report of the Commission of Inquiry into Land 
Matters emphasized the need to ensure that 
our people are not deprived of their ancient 
land rights, stressing that Papua New Guinea 
does not want to see the emergence of a class 
of landless people as has occurred in so many 
other developing countries” and “the basic 
concept in our society with regard to use of 
natural resources is that one generation holds 
and uses resources in the capacity of trustee 
for future generations”.13 Furthermore, the 
PNG Constitution and law are supposed to 
protect customary land, preventing it from 
being sold, leased, mortgaged or disposed 
of except in accordance with custom.14 In 
its 2008 report, Review of Incorporated Land 
Groups and Design of a System of Voluntary 
Customary Land Registration, the PNG 
Constitutional and Law Reform Commission 
states:
13. PNG Constitutional Planning Committee Report 
1974. http://www.paclii.org/pg/CPCReport/Cap2.htm.
14. Almah Tararia and Lisa Ogle, Incorporated Land 
Groups and the Registration of Customary Land: Recent 
Developments in PNG in In Defence of Melanesian 
Customary Land. Ed. Tim Anderson and Gary Lee (AID/
WATCH: Sydney, 2010), p 23.
15. Papua New Guinea Constitutional and Law Reform 
Commission, Review of Incorporated Land Groups and 
Design of a System of Voluntary Customary Land Regis-
tration. (Report No 5, May 2008). Constitutional and Law 
Reform Commission: Boroko, Papua New Guinea, p 2.
Each of the three Melanesian nations 
has different histories of how their 
post-Independence land laws have 
been developed and imposed, but in 
all cases the goal has been the same 
– to transfer control of land from the 
domain of Melanesian custom law to 
the domain of western-style law.
Independence have been focused not on 
protecting the land for the ongoing use 
and benefit of the indigenous communities 
and their descendants, but on ‘freeing 
up’ and ‘mobilising’ land for neo-liberal 
‘development’.16 Each of the three Melanesian 
nations has different histories of how their 
post-Independence land laws have been 
developed and imposed, but in all cases the 
goal has been the same – to transfer control 
of land from the domain of Melanesian 
custom law to the domain of western-style 
law (developed to protect property and 
‘rights’17), thereby converting the land into 
a commodity so it can be used by companies 
for their own profit. And in all cases, the 
push to ‘mobilise’ the land for ‘development’ 
has come from foreign aid and development 
agencies – particularly the World Bank, the 
Asian Development Bank, the Australian 
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 
(DFAT) and before that the Australian Agency 
for International Development (AusAID). For 
example, in 1995 the World Bank imposed a 
condition that PNG undertake ‘land reform’ as 
part of the World Bank’s Structural Adjustment 
Program, leading to massive opposition from
16. Even in cases where a land law has been amended 
to make the system less prone to corruption, still the 
basic reason for creating the laws was to make cus-
tomary land available for use by outside companies; 
see also Iati Iati. Customary Land Rights and Pacific 
Islands: Security & Stability. Asia Pacific Bulletin, 
Number 419 (April 19, 2018), Washington, DC: East West 
Centre.
17. In Melanesia, there is a critique of the promise of 
‘rights’ – many activists will explain that ‘rights’ are 
something small and insignificant compared to the 
God- and ancestor-given birthright ‘power’ of having 
control over / access to customary land.
“...the [customary land] system gives 
the members of the community self-
sufficiency and security, and unites them 
as a unit. Under existing law, customary 
landowners are protected from losing 
their land or becoming a landless 
class.”15
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“Notably, customary land tenure 
issues have a strong link to the major 
security issues in the region such as 
the Bougainville conflict, the Solomon 
Islands conflict, and the Fiji coups.”
- Dr. Iati Iati 
civil society. Despite this, AusAID’s Pacific 
Regional Aid Strategy 2004-2009 stated that it 
would continue to push for ‘land reform’:
In 2009, AID/WATCH published concerns 
that AusAID’s $54 million Pacific Land 
Program was financing support to Melanesian 
governments in undertaking land reforms that
were primarily donor-driven and aiming to 
enable foreign investment.19 And yet in 2015, 
DFAT continued to assert that, “land and 
land titling is a critical constraint to inclusive 
economic growth.”20 Dr. Iati Iati, a University 
of Otago academic from the Pacific, recently 
focused attention on how land reforms that 
“even intimate alienation of customary lands, 
have been very unpopular in the Pacific”, 
while also making links to security and
18. AusAID. Pacific Regional Aid Strategy 2004-2009. 
Canberra, Australia, p 29.
19. AID/WATCH, Australian Aid to the Pacific (The 
Pacific Land Program) Briefing (Prepared for the Pacific 
Regional Representative of the Office of The High Com-
missioner for Human Rights), (AID/WATCH: Sydney, 
Australia, 2009), p 3.
20. Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, An Aus-
tralian Investment to Support Law and Justice in Papua 
New Guinea, Justice Services and Stability for Develop-
ment, Investment Design Jan 2015. p 14.
“The traditional communal systems of 
land ownership have led to a low level 
of security of tenure for investors which 
impacts on the development of the 
private sector and economic growth. A 
lack of clarity around land ownership is 
creating conflict within Pacific societies. 
While clearly a long-term and challenging 
issue, Australia will support research, 
pilot approaches and consider options for 
progressing this issue.”18
Photo credit: Joel Simo 
Participants at the August 2017 MILDA meeting exploring the Panguna mine site stability in the region:
In the case of PNG, the first law introduced 
whereby customary land could be converted 
to private freehold land was the Land (Tenure 
Conversion) Act 1963. Land registration under 
this law results in permanent alienation. In 
1987 the Act was amended so that Incorporated 
Land Groups (ILGs) and other customary 
groups could apply to register their land. The 
Land Act 1996 provided for lease-lease back 
arrangements,22 including Special Agriculture 
Business Leases (SABLs) which have led to the 
alienation of 5.5 million hectares of customary 
land.23 The Somare Government introduced 
the Land Registration (Customary Land) Act 
2007, passed in 2009, to further facilitate the 
voluntary registration of customary land. 
Under this law, representatives of an ILG apply 
to the newly created Director of Customary 
Land Registration to register clan land; upon 
registration, a certificate of title is issued in the 
name of the ILG and the ILG can then lease or 
mortgage the land; customary law ceases to 
apply to the land.24
The 2008 Pacific Land Conference – 
sponsored by AusAID as part of its Pacific 
21. Iati Iati. Customary Land Rights and Pacific Islands: 
Security & Stability. Asia Pacific Bulletin, Number 419 
(April 19, 2018), Washington, DC: East West Centre.
22. Almah Tararia and Lisa Ogle, Incorporated Land 
Groups and the Registration of Customary Land: Recent 
Developments in PNG in In Defence of Melanesian 
Customary Land. Ed. Tim Anderson and Gary Lee (AID/
WATCH: Sydney, 2010), p, 25.
23. Act Now PNG, Customary Land Registration: Too 
Dangerous to Touch, 2017; and Frederic Mousseau, On 
Our Land: Modern Land Grabs Reversing Independence 
in Papua New Guinea (The Oakland Institute: Oakland, 
CA, 2013), p 11.
24. Almah Tararia and Lisa Ogle, Incorporated Land 
Groups and the Registration of Customary Land: Recent 
Developments in PNG in In Defence of Melanesian 
Customary Land. Ed. Tim Anderson and Gary Lee (AID/
WATCH: Sydney, 2010), p, 25. 
Land Program – was held in Port Vila, 
Vanuatu. The theme of the conference 
was ‘Making Land Work’.25 In his official 
presentation, Steven Sukot, a civil society 
representative from PNG, stated that in 
Melanesia, land had been working for 
generations and was still providing for the 
needs of 80% of the population living in 
the rural areas. He concluded by saying 
that land laws imposed since Independence 
in 1975 had benefited the multinational 
companies, not the people.26 The Australian 
Secretary for International Development 
Assistance, however, stressed that “obstacles 
to economic growth are based on uncertainty 
over land tenure”, necessitating continued 
land reform.27 Despite these criticisms, 
many point to the strengths of customary 
land tenure systems.28 In rural Melanesia, 
while some clans may control more land 
than others, the central importance of 
relationships, in addition to cultural norms 
of redistribution, reciprocity, and generosity, 
have continued to function to such an extent 
that even today the overwhelming majority of 
people has access to enough land to provide 
food and other basic needs for her/his 
family.29 At the same time, studies show that 
land registration and land law codification in 
other countries have had primarily negative 
social impacts, including increased rates
25. AusAID, Making Land Work: Reconciling Customary 
Land and Development in the Pacific:  Case Studies on 
Customary Land and Development in the Pacific (Au-
sAID: Canberra, Australia, 2018) http://dfat.gov.au/
about-us/publications/Pages/making-land-work.aspx. 
26. Steven Sukot, People’s Perspectives: Understanding 
the Relationship between People and Land in PNG and 
the Struggle to Maintain These Important Relationships 
(AID/WATCH: Sydney, 2008) http://milda.aidwatch.org.
au/resources/documents/people%E2%80%99s-per-
spectives-understanding-relationship-between-peo-
ple-and-land-png-and.
27. Bob McMullan, Launch of Making Land Work – 
Pacific Land Conference. Speech by Australian Govern-
ment Parliamentary Secretary for International Devel-
opment Assistance, Pacific Land Conference, 12-13 June 
2008, Port Vila, Vanuatu.
28. Act Now PNG, Customary Land Registration: Too 
Dangerous to Touch, 2017; and In Defence of Melanesian 
Customary Land. Ed. Tim Anderson and Gary Lee (AID/
WATCH: Sydney, 2010).
“Notably, customary land tenure 
issues have a strong link to the major 
security issues in the region such as 
the Bougainville conflict, the Solomon 
Islands conflict, and the Fiji coups.”21
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The MILDA network sees land 
mapping and registration as the key 
tool that has been used over the last 
500 years to alienate indigenous 
peoples from their lands.  
of community conflict, rural indebtedness, 
inequality, and landlessness.30
The Melanesian 
Indigenous Land Defence 
Alliance (MILDA)
After the 2008 Pacific Land Conference, 
civil society representatives from PNG and 
Vanuatu joined together to form a regional 
body to counter criticism of customary land 
tenure and to promote the real life narrative 
of how land is already working for the 
majority of rural Melanesians. Following 
on this, the first official meeting of MILDA 
was held in Madang, PNG, in June 2009. 
Since then, MILDA members have continued 
to meet regularly,31 to build networks and 
to continue to advocate the strengths of 
customary land tenure and warn against the 
dangers of misguided land reform agendas. 
29. Tim Anderson, Land and Livelihoods in Papua New 
Guinea (Australian Scholarly Publishing: North Mel-
bourne, 2015), p 149-50; Ralph Regenvanu, “The
Tradi tional Economy as a Source of Resilience in 
Vanuatu” in In Defence of Melanesian Customary Land. 
Ed. Tim Anderson and Gary Lee (AID/WATCH: Sydney, 
2010), p 33; Steven Sukot, People’s Perspectives: Un-
derstanding the Relationship between People and Land 
in PNG and the Struggle to Maintain These Important 
Relationships (AID/WATCH: Sydney, 2008); and Paige 
West, Dispossession and the Environment: Rhetoric and 
Inequality in Papua New Guinea (Columbia University 
Press: New York, 2017) p 82.
30. Tim Anderson, Land and Livelihoods in Papua New 
Guinea (Australian Scholarly Publishing: North Mel-
bourne, 2015), p 18-19; and A Ganjanapan, The North-
ern Thai Land Tenure System: Local Customs versus 
National Laws. Law and Society Review, 28(3), 1994, p 
609.
31. MILDA regional meetings: 2009 – Madang, PNG; 
2010 – Mele, Vanuatu; 2013 – Honiara, Solomon Is-
lands; 2014 – Lelepa, Vanuatu; 2016 – Buala, Solomon 
Islands; 2017 – Panguna/Arawa, Bougainville.
The network now includes members from 
throughout Melanesia – from Maluku and 
West Papua, to PNG, Bougainville, Solomon 
Islands, Vanuatu, Fiji, and Kanaky/New 
Caledonia.
The MILDA network sees land mapping and
registration as the key tool that has been 
used over the last 500 years to alienate 
indigenous peoples from their lands. And 
given that Melanesia is one of the very last 
places in the world where these processes 
of land tenure mapping and registration are 
still incomplete, MILDA is working to keep 
land in Melanesia under customary tenure. 
MILDA network members hold that land 
under customary tenure is within the 
sphere of indigenous power and control – 
they know the borders and they know the 
rules. But once the land has been mapped 
and registered, it is commoditised and 
transferred over to a legal system that 
the majority of indigenous Melanesians 
do not understand, nor control; a system 
that requires huge amounts of money to 
be successful within. In the experience 
of indigenous peoples here in Melanesia, 
once their land has been registered they 
lose control of it and seemingly forever. 
They have no way of competing with the 
moneyed people and companies that 
they are up against. What is more, MILDA 
members want to continue living within the 
non-commoditised world of reciprocity and 
mutual benefit that customary land tenure 
provides for.
At its second regional meeting, held in Mele, 
Vanuatu, in 2010, MILDA produced the Mele 
Declaration, which affirmed the ‘commitment 
to indigenous control of customary land’ 
and defended ‘the continued control of 
Melanesian communities over their land, 
sea, water, air and natural resources.’ It 
further declared land to be ‘a non-alienable 
resource that cannot be parted with.’ 
(See Appendix 1 for the complete Mele 
Declaration.)
MILDA 2017 in Bougainville
In August 2017, MILDA convened in Panguna 
and Arawa on Bougainville. One main 
objective of gathering in Bougainville was for 
youth from other parts of Melanesia to witness 
first-hand the impacts of large-scale extractive 
industries, and to learn from the hardships 
the people of Bougainville had endured – 
before the war, due to the environmental and 
social devastation that their societies had 
faced as a result of mining, and then during 
ten years of civil war fighting to defend their 
land and resources. Youth from around 
Melanesia were able to see how the people of 
Bougainville had stood up together against 
those with power and money, united in the 
belief that they were fighting for a better 
future for their children. Meeting participants 
from other parts of the region said that they 
will never forget visiting the Panguna mine 
pit, and seeing how the heart of the earth 
had been torn away and destroyed to feed the 
insatiable greed of a few.
For the Bougainvillean participants, the 
MILDA meeting was an important opportunity 
to share and increase understanding among 
their Melanesian neighbours about the 
current situation and process leading up 
to the 2019 referendum on Bougainville’s 
Independence.33 The Bougainvillean 
32. Melanesian Indigenous Land Defence Alliance, The 
Mele Declaration 2010.
33. Leonard Fong Roka, B'ville ex-combatants threat-
en violence against Panguna family. PNG Attitude, 17 
August 2017. http://asopa.typepad.com/asopa_peo-
ple/2017/08/panguna-ex-combatants-threaten-vio-
lence-against-roka-family.html#comments.
[...] the representatives from Vanuatu 
were able to provide an example of 
an independent nation that is moving 
forward without environmentally-
destructive large-scale extractive 
industries and with a focus on the 
traditional economy.
participants explained that they want political 
independence, while also ensuring that they 
maintain control over their land and natural 
resources. The people recognise that they 
need laws that truly reflect this key aspiration 
– laws that will benefit the Bougainvillean 
people rather than favouring companies and 
those with money. The local participants 
explained that they had fought to close down 
the Panguna mine, protect their land and 
environment, and achieve Independence.  
The MILDA meeting provided an opportunity 
for participants from all Melanesian nations 
– those still also colonised (West Papua and 
Kanaky); those that are independent but have 
destructive large-scale resource extraction 
industries, such as logging and mining (PNG, 
Solomon Islands, and Fiji); and one young 
independent nation with no large-scale 
logging or mining, but facing the threat of 
an aggressive real estate industry (Vanuatu) 
– to share with those from Bougainville. 
While the Bougainvilleans voiced their major 
concern about how they might run their 
own country without large-scale mining, 
the representatives from Vanuatu were able 
to provide an example of an independent 
nation that is moving forward without 
environmentally-destructive large-scale 
extractive industries and with a focus on the 
traditional economy.34
34. While Vanuatu does not presently have large-scale 
mining or logging, it is facing the onslaught of the real 
estate industry; however, its development and main-
streaming of Indicators of Wellbeing that measure and 
value the contributions of the non-cash traditional 
economy are a conscious attempt by the government to 
start measuring the contributions of customary land to 
people’s everyday lives in order to slow down the tide 
of land sales; see Tanguay 2017 for more on this. 
The land has belonged to us – and we 
to it – since time immemorial. Land is 
our mother and the source of life for our 
people. Land secures life, fosters and 
strengthens relationships that sustain our 
society. It embodies the link to our past, 
present and future and therefore sustains 
everything we do. MILDA members 
reaffirm the sanctity of land.”32
CHAPTER 8/ GROWING BOUGAINVILLE'S FUTURE              85 
    
84                GROWING BOUGAINVILLE'S FUTURE/ CHAPTER 8  
     
The meeting produced the Arawa Declaration 
2017 (see Appendix 2), which reaffirmed much 
of the sentiment of the Mele Declaration 2010, 
and ‘the right of all Melanesian peoples, 
specifically Bougainville, Kanaky and West 
Papua, to exercise the full process of self-
determination towards a referendum for 
independence without interference from 
outside influence.’35
Conclusion
It is asserted by some that Bougainville 
needs mining in order to support an 
independent Bougainville – a narrative based 
on the assumption that there are no viable 
‘alternatives’ for cash income generation 
and ‘development’ of an independent 
Bougainville. This paper has argued that 
the attempt to rewrite land tenure and the 
attempt to reopen the island to large-scale 
mining are inherently linked – one process 
supports and enables the other. However, 
the paper has also argued that an alternative 
path of development for Bougainville, one 
focused on land-based traditional economies, 
is one that is already embedded in traditional 
Melanesian culture and land tenure systems. 
It makes the case that the basis for the 
‘alternative’ already exists – being the 
way of life that most rural Bougainvilleans 
are already living, operating within a 
mixed economy that blends the non-cash 
contributions of the land-based traditional 
economy supplemented with cash earned 
from small-scale income generating activities 
(like sales of surplus agricultural products at 
local markets, sales of cash crops, etc.). 
Through the current global ‘development’ 
paradigm in Melanesia, Melanesians’ 
most important asset, land, is gradually 
slipping away in the name of ‘progress’ and 
development models prescribed by foreign 
consultants and adopted by our governments 
and elites. These models are paving the way
35. Melanesian Indigenous Land Defence Alliance, The 
Arawa Declaration 2017.
for the indigenous populations to lose their 
traditional power and control over land. 
Under the new imposed land registration 
laws in Melanesia, land becomes an alienable 
commodity. These laws are changing the 
intrinsic relationship that Melanesians have 
had with their land and if not remedied will 
eventually set us on a path of poverty and 
exclusion from what has been rightly in 
our control since time immemorial. These 
imposed laws are enabling what we call 
a ‘de-customisation of land’ that benefits 
foreign investors and developers with 
cash – this process has already displaced 
land from thousands of Melanesians and 
threatens to transform Melanesian people 
from communities of self-sufficient traditional 
producers into impoverished landless wage 
labourers, willing to work for less than 
subsistence wages.  
Bougainville does not need to reopen the 
Panguna mine, or any other large-scale mine, 
to fund its independence – real independence 
already exists through the traditional 
economy and customary land tenure. 
Whatever development path Bougainville 
chooses to follow from here on needs to 
ensure that it builds slowly and sustainably, 
and does not undermine this vital foundation.
‘Hidden strength’ of Pacific 
economies
Agriculture is easily the most important 
economic sector for Pacific island countries – 
providing the greatest source of livelihoods, 
cash-employment and food security for more 
than eight million people across the region. 
While urbanisation is an increasing trend, 
most Pacific Islanders live in rural areas 
and are reliant on local systems of food pro-
duction. Even in the cities and towns many 
people shop at outdoor markets stocked with 
fresh local produce. Typically then, food pro-
duction dominates the profile of the Pacific’s
agricultural sector – where ‘village-level’
1. This is an edited extract of a longer paper that was 
originally published as an Asia and the Pacific Policy 
Studies (APPS) Working Paper Series (05/2013) in De-
cember 2013 by the Crawford School of Public Policy at 
the Australian National University. See: https://papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2371452.
farmers grow and distribute a large quan-
tity and varied range of fresh vegetables, 
root crops, nuts, fruits and flowers. Because 
many of these farmers focus on growing food 
for their own families, or to share with oth-
ers through socially-embedded systems of 
exchange, traditional food production is often 
under-represented in national account and 
has been identified as a ‘hidden strength’ of 
Pacific economies.2 Localised food production 
also helps many Pacific communities to miti-
gate rising prices for imported foods. During 
the global food ‘crisis’ of 2008 for example 
(which saw spiraling prices for imported 
grains, meats, and dairy products) domestic 
food production helped to ensure food secu-
rity in Pacific island countries.
With many people growing their own food the 
Pacific islands have among the lowest rates of 
monetisation on earth.3 But this doesn’t mean 
people can get by without cash. Even in the 
most remote places money is all-important for 
GROWING ISLAND EXPORTS: 
HIGH VALUE CROPS AND THE 
FUTURE OF AGRICULTURE IN THE 
PACIFIC
AUTHOR: DR WESLEY MORGAN
Dr Wesley Morgan is a Lecturer in International Affairs at the School of Gov-
ernment, Development and International Affairs at the University of the South 
Pacific. He has written widely on contemporary development issues in the 
Pacific islands, including trade, migration, climate change, and the politics of 
regional cooperation. 
This paper, which explores prospects for agricultural production across the Pa-
cific islands, offers some valuable insights that may be useful for Bougainville.1 
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It is widely recognised that in the 
immediate future agriculture is, and 
will continue to be, the single most 
important source of livelihoods for 
Pacific islanders.
transport and travel, for visits to the doctor, 
for medicine and family planning, for church 
and community trusts, for mobile phones 
and school fees. Cash crops, grown both for 
local and international markets, play a vital 
role in communities right across the region. 
On remote atolls in the Marshall Islands 
farmers harvest copra to be exported and 
processed into a versatile vegetable oil, and 
in the highlands of Papua New Guinea (PNG) 
more than a million villagers are reliant on 
coffee for their cash needs. Indeed, it is esti-
mated that around half of all rural households 
in PNG earn cash from selling coffee beans 
destined for export.4 In many island states 
most commercial agriculture today is carried 
out by small-scale producers using inherited 
or negotiated access to customary land. It is 
the smallholder sector that is fastest growing, 
particularly in Melanesia, and the sector has 
proved to be remarkably price-sensitive with 
many farmers choosing what to grow based 
on the vagaries of international markets.
It is widely recognised that in the immediate 
future agriculture is, and will continue to 
be, the single most important source of live-
lihoods for Pacific islanders. Other sectors – 
particularly tourism and associated services 
– are important in some island states but are 
unlikely to provide the volume of job opportu-
nities required to meet the needs of growing
2. Bamman H (2007) ‘Participatory value chain analysis 
for improved farmer incomes, employment opportu-
nities and food security’, in Pacific Economic Bulletin 
22(3) 113-125.
3. Feeney S (2010) ‘The global economic crisis and the 
Millennium Development Goals in the Pacific’ in Pacific 
Economic Bulletin 25(1) 136-150. 
4. Allen M, Bourke M and McGregor A (2009) Cash in-
come from Agriculture, In Bourke M, Harwood T (Eds) 
Food and Agriculture in Papua New Guinea, pp 283-
424. Australian National University, Canberra.
island populations. Thus, the focus of policy 
for employment of the bulk of the population, 
and for economic growth, should be on pro-
moting improved productivity in agriculture.5
Colonial-era crops face 
long-term decline
Whether grown by smallholders or through 
large plantations, a limited suite of traditional 
commodities has dominated export produc-
tion across the Pacific over the past century. 
Today an emphasis on undifferentiated 
exports – especially copra, coffee, cocoa and 
sugar – continues to reflect the priorities of 
colonial-era plantation economies. For many 
island countries there has been little diversi-
fication of exports in the postcolonial period 
and 60% of agricultural exports are still des-
tined for European markets.6
Unfortunately farmers around the world 
have faced a long-term downward trend in 
prices for ‘bulk commodities’ since at least 
the 1970s, as global supply has outpaced 
demand.7 This has led to smaller returns for 
growers in the Pacific and to serious stagna-
tion for some industries. International prices 
for copra for example fell steadily throughout 
the 1980s and 1990s. For smaller Micronesian 
states the impacts of falling prices have been 
particularly pronounced as the islands have 
few other tradable resource-endowments. 
Countries like Kiribati and the Federated 
States of Micronesia continue to export copra 
at decreasing rates of return (though since 
2008 prices have fluctuated, with periodic 
higher prices).
 
5. Duncan R (2007) ‘Enhancing the labour absorption 
capacity of Pacific agriculture’, in Pacific Economic 
Bulletin, 22(1) 164-174.
6. Morge-Rofarello L, Swindinksy M, Vanzetti D (2005) 
Sink or Swin? Assessing the impact of agricultural 
trade liberalization on small island developing states 
In Chand S (Ed) Pacific Islands Regional Integration 
and Governance, pp 55-85, Australian National Univer-
sity, Canberra.
7. World Bank (2008) World Development Report 2008: 
Agriculture for Development World Bank, Washington DC.
Another key export facing serious decline in 
terms-of-trade is sugar, a development that 
is of particular concern for Fiji. The Fiji sugar 
industry was established in the late 19th 
Century by the Australian-based Colonial 
Sugar Refining Company (CSR) when large
numbers of labourers were shipped from 
India to cut cane on newly established plan-
tations. For more than 100 years since, raw 
sugar exports to Britain have dominated Fiji’s 
export profile and the sector has played a 
key role in the country’s economic develop-
ment. However, the industry has been heavily 
dependent on special trading arrangements 
with Europe, which saw Fijian farmers paid 
at above-world-prices. When these special 
arrangements were challenged at the World 
Trade Organisation (WTO) the European 
Union decided (in 2007) to withdraw preferen-
tial pricing for sugar sourced from its former 
colonies.
Fiji’s experience with sugar underscores the 
fact that, in a liberalised global trading envi-
ronment, the island countries simply cannot 
compete in the export of undifferentiated 
commodities. In the past trade preferences 
have helped to ameliorate inherent costs 
faced by island exporters but the benefits of 
these preferences are eroding fast. The World 
Bank acknowledges that it is increasingly 
difficult for the island states to compete in 
‘all but a few niche markets’.8 In the face of 
these trading realities Pacific states need to 
develop a more diversified suite of agricul-
tural exports, better targeted at higher-value 
markets.
There are two important caveats to the trend 
of declining commodity prices however, 
namely the potential presented by increasing 
energy prices (which are driving up prices 
offered for biofuels) and increasing prices 
for edible oils (including palm oil and coco-
nut oil). Oil palm production is the fastest 
growing of PNG’s agricultural exports and 
is increasingly important in the Solomon 
Islands as well. International prices for copra 
also spiked in 2008, 2011 and again in early to 
mid 2017, improving returns to growers and 
reigniting interest in the sector.
8. The World Bank (2009) Pacific islands development 
in 3D: Key findings from the World Development Report 
2009. The World Bank Washington DC.
Table 1: Regional bounty
Region Key niche agricultural products
Melanesia High-value plantation timber, fair-trade sug-
ar, bottled water, virgin coconut oil, coconut 
products (cosmetics, furniture etc), fresh 
tuna (sashimi), single-source cocoa and cof-
fee, kava, fresh fruit and vegetables, indige-
nous nuts, fresh flowers, preserved spices, 
organic beef, pearls
Polynesia Virgin coconut oil, cosmetics, black pearls, 
noni juice, dried organics fruits, spices, sin-
gle-source cocoa and coffee, kava, fresh fruit 
and vegetables (particularly squash), indige-
nous nuts, fresh fish, vanilla
Micronesia Virgin coconut oil, coconut products, import 
substitution
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Developing countries around the 
world are increasingly shifting their 
patterns of production toward high-
er-value agricultural exports includ-
ing fruit and vegetables, livestock, cut 
flowers and organic produce.
Islands of opportunity: new 
incomes from high-value 
crops 
Developing countries around the world are 
increasingly shifting their patterns of produc-
tion toward higher-value agricultural exports 
including fruit and vegetables, livestock, cut 
flowers and organic produce. Indeed, some 
argue that a ‘revolution’ is occurring as high-
value products from developing countries 
gain a dominant market share in destination 
markets.9 
High-value, low-volume exports certainly 
make a lot of sense in the Pacific context. 
Island producers are unlikely to compete 
either on price or volume with low-cost, 
high-volume producers in South-East Asia for 
example. Island producers also face inherent 
cost disadvantages. ‘Village-level’ production 
involves small economies of scale, input costs 
are high, natural disasters are common and 
transport between islands is often expensive 
and/or infrequent. In short, growers need to 
receive considerable returns to compensate 
for these unavoidable costs.
The key to the future of Pacific agriculture 
is to focus on high-value, non-perishable, 
products (see Table 1 for example). In the 
forestry sector for example, round log exports 
are likely to decline as island countries 
face resource depletion (particularly in the 
Solomon Islands) and as countries move
9. McGregor A, Bourke M, Manley M, Tubana S, Deo R 
(2008) ‘Pacific island food security: Situation, challeng-
es and opportunities’, in Pacific Economic Bulletin, 
24(2) 24-42.
to ban the export of unprocessed logs.10 
However, many high-value plantation tim-
bers are suitable for growing in the Pacific – 
including sandalwood, mahogany, rosewood 
and ebony. Recent estimates indicate that 
there is a worldwide shortfall in production 
for sandalwood, a product which is in high 
demand in China, Taiwan, Singapore and 
Japan. Indeed a 2012 Pacific trade delegation 
to China found that buyers were willing to pay 
around AUD 400 per kilogram for the prized 
wood.11
While some Pacific products are already 
high-value and non-perishable, others require 
additional processing, which itself helps 
to create local jobs and retain value in the 
region. In Samoa, Niue and the Cook Islands 
for example, a number of companies collect 
fruit of the Noni tree and process it to cre-
ate an organic health juice that is exported 
around the world (particularly to China and 
Japan). Noni juice has been Samoa’s single 
biggest agricultural export for much of the 
past decade.12 There is huge potential for 
other indigenous plants in the region as well, 
particularly for kava products and indigenous 
tree nuts. 
Around 200 different agricultural products 
are currently shipped from Fiji to 20 differ-
ent export markets and the value of major 
non-commodity agricultural exports is around 
FJD 40 million13 per annum.14
10. Secretariat of the Pacific Community (SPC) (2008) 
Increasing trade in island agriculture and forestry 
commodities. Paper prepared by the SPC for the Second 
Regional Conference of Ministers of Agriculture and 
Forestry. Apia, Samoa.  September 2008.  SPC, Suva 
11. Radio Australia (2012) Opportunities for Pacific from 
China’s economic book. May 29, 2012.
12. Rogers T S, Tuioti-Mariner L, Tuoro M (2009) Agri-
culture for Growth: Learning from experience in the 
Pacific Samoa Morinda citrifolia (Nonu) Case Study. 
Food and Agriculture Organisation (FOA), Rome.
13. FJD 40 million is worth approximately USD 20 mil-
lion based on current exchange rates.
14. McGregor A, Gonemaituba W, Stice K (2009) Na-
tures’ Way Cooperative (Fiji) Ltd: A Case Study of Agri-
culture for Growth in the Pacific.  Food and Agriculture 
Organisation (FAO), Rome.
Sharing benefits: 
commercialising 
community production 
Across the Pacific, traditional knowledge 
accumulated over thousands of years of adap-
tation to life on small tropical islands con-
tinues to determine the nature of much eco-
nomic activity. A key policy challenge then is 
to find ways to commercialise traditional sys-
tems of farming and improve cash-generating 
opportunities, without sacrificing community 
cohesion and local food security.15 Because 
Pacific island countries already possess a 
comparative advantage in the production of 
tropical timbers, nuts, fruits and vegetables, 
high-value agricultural exports offer an excel-
lent opportunity to complement traditional 
economies without supplanting them. 
15. Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), (2010) 
Agriculture for Growth: Learning from experience in 
the Pacific. FOA, Rome. 
Sometimes it’s as simple as growing food 
around and underneath high-value crops des-
tined for export. Crops like sandalwood, coco-
nuts, noni trees, indigenous nuts or kava are 
all suitable for intercropping in smallholder 
food gardens and village plantations. Indeed 
sandalwood, grown alongside nitrogen-fixing 
trees, is an excellent option for soil that is to 
be left fallow for a time to restore productivity.
While international markets are often fickle, 
agricultural exports still generally offer more 
sustainable and broad-based incomes than 
other sectors like mining and tourism. To 
maximise benefits policy makers need to pay 
attention to the inclusion of all community 
members – that is, both women and men – in 
the production process and the development 
of ethical value chains. Understanding how 
local enterprise fits into the global economy is 
vital if all members of the value chain are to 
benefit.
A focus on maintaining quality of supply is
Insert caption
Photo credit: Christina Hill
Concilia in her garden where she grows peanuts, taro, banana, cocoa and other fruit 
and vegetables.
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also important – particularly for fresh fruit 
and vegetables. A key role for government 
is to provide training and outreach support 
for Pacific communities about the exacting 
demands of export markets (and domestic 
tourism markets). Growers need to under-
stand when to harvest, and how to best han-
dle, store and transport produce to maximise 
its value. Community-level technologies such 
as solar crop dryers, which preserve fruits and 
nuts for longer periods, increase the range of 
crops that can be transported for sale in local 
and foreign markets and ensure community 
food security in times of natural disasters.
Marketing key to improved 
returns
The flip-side of high costs associated with 
island agricultural production is that many 
places in the Pacific are inherently marketa-
ble. Remote and ‘exotic’ locations, warm and 
happy people, and ‘clean and green’ pro-
duction fire up the imagination for would-be 
consumers. Sophisticated marketing strat-
egies which use the Pacific ‘brand’ to stand 
out from the crowd are one way of targeting 
discerning buyers who are prepared to pay 
more for island produce – a price premium 
that is vital to offset high costs of produc-
tion. An example of successful marketing for 
a niche product is that of Fiji water, which 
has become a drink-of-choice in Hollywood. 
Indeed, in recent years Fiji Water alone has 
accounted for up to 20% of all Fiji’s exports.16 
A number of agricultural exporters across the 
region are pursuing similar branding strate-
gies. ‘Single-source’ marketing is also impor-
tant, sharing the stories of Pacific producers 
with would-be consumers. New single-source 
labeled chocolate bars from Vanuatu are a 
prime example in this regard. 
Another way to stand out from the crowd, 
and to improve returns to growers, is through 
fair trade or organic certification. Here, con-
sumers are prepared to pay a price premium 
for Pacific produce if they know products are 
good for the environment and for people. In 
recent years sales of fair-trade labeled prod-
ucts have increased dramatically in Australia 
and New Zealand (particularly for coffee and 
chocolate). In Samoa hundreds of farms are 
certified as organic and a women’s business 
organisation sources organic coconut oil for a 
multinational cosmetics retailer and helps to 
export dried organic bananas to New Zealand. 
Both fair-trade and organic certification can 
be an expensive process, requiring regular 
assessment by external auditors, and costs 
can outweigh returns to growers. Improved 
returns require farmers working together – 
through growers’ cooperatives for example – 
to absorb these costs.
Government agencies and private-sector 
groups can help to market Pacific agricultural 
produce. Indeed, Pacific Trade and Invest – 
which has offices in Australia, New Zealand, 
16.  Lenzer A (2009) ‘Fiji Water: Spin the Bottle’. Mother 
Jones (magazine). Wednesday August 12, 2009. 
Papaya
Photo credit: Christina Hill
China, Japan and Geneva – already works 
hard to link potential buyers with Pacific 
growers.
Quarantine issues are a 
major barrier 
Developing accessible export pathways is key 
to growing Pacific agriculture. It’s no good 
harvesting high-value papaya or ginger or 
cut-flowers if there is no way to get produce to 
consumers who are prepared to pay top dollar 
for them. A key challenge of course is trans-
port – is there any way to get to market?  But 
perhaps an even bigger issue is market entry. 
Agricultural economist Andrew McGregor 
argues that quarantine is the weakest link in 
the Pacific’s horticultural export marketing 
chain.17 At the ‘sending’ end island gov-
ernments have limited capacity to support 
exporters by negotiating new market entry 
and resolving ongoing access issues. In many 
cases vital infrastructure is missing, such as 
heat-treatment facilities to remove fruit fly 
and other pests, or port and air-freight facili-
ties. At the ‘receiving’ end, developed country 
governments could do much to speed up the 
assessment of Pacific produce.  The current 
timelines for clearing biosecurity require-
ments are agonisingly slow in markets like 
Australia, New Zealand and the United States. 
Key to overcoming quarantine barriers will 
be cooperation between governments and the 
private sector to set priorities. Exporters (and 
would-be exporters) in each island country 
are often keenly aware of potential markets for 
their produce, but establishing and maintain-
ing quarantine arrangements with destination 
countries is a role for government.
Regional cooperation is 
vital
Growing Pacific exports will require innova-
tive regional cooperation, and in this regard 
support from the international community is 
Growing Pacific exports will require 
innovative regional cooperation, and 
in this regard support from the inter-
national community is crucial.
crucial. Current donor-funded projects aim 
to resolve quarantine issues, improve trade 
related infrastructure, provide information 
regarding international market opportunities, 
improve production techniques, maintain 
quality of supply, and develop new marketing 
and branding initiatives. Many of these ‘aid-
for-trade’ projects are subject to short-term 
funding cycles, and much could be done to 
coordinate support to would-be agricultural 
exporters in the Pacific on an ongoing basis. 
However, the good news is that there is much 
potential for the export of high value crops 
and improving exports will reap widespread 
benefits for Pacific communities and govern-
ments for decades to come.
17.  McGregor A (2007) ‘The export of horticultural 
and high-value agricultural products from the Pacific 
Islands’, in Pacific Economic Bulletin, 22(3) 81-99.
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Introduction
Bougainville’s independence, if achieved, 
will have implications for the international 
maritime and fisheries relations between 
Solomon Islands, Papua New Guinea (PNG) 
and Bougainville in particular, and the wider 
Pacific Islands more broadly. As an independ-
ent state, Bougainville would be entitled to a 
12-mile territorial sea and 200-mile exclusive 
economic zone (EEZ) and the concomitant 
rights and responsibilities that are often asso-
ciated with these maritime zones.
In this paper, the ramifications for an inde-
pendent Bougainville in the context of the 
current international maritime and fisheries 
regime are briefly surveyed. It is argued that 
independence will provide Bougainville with 
an opportunity to pursue a forward looking, 
innovative, rights-based approach to oceans 
management. Furthermore, there is potential 
for an independent Bougainville to shape its 
relations beyond the narrow limits of 
statehood by exploring options that would 
lead to more collaborative and innovative 
oceans management while at the same 
time building on its cultural links with the 
Solomon Islands and PNG.
Before proceeding, it is important to note that 
subsistence fisheries are a significant source 
of nutrients (ie protein) and food security in 
the Pacific. Further, subsistence and small-
scale commercial fisheries supports rural 
economies across the Pacific and can be an 
important source of cash income for both 
women and men. 
Fisheries are also an important source of reve-
nue for Pacific nations. Graph 1 gives an indi-
cation of the total tuna catch from the Western 
and Central Pacific Ocean (WCPO). Table 1 
provides the value of the catch by national 
waters of Pacific Island states. These pro-
vide an indication of what Bougainville can 
potentially earn under a well-managed fishery 
working with other Pacific Island states.
BOUGAINVILLE INDEPENDENCE 
AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR 
FISHERIES: A FRESH APPROACH 
TOWARDS CO-OPERATIVE 
OCEANS MANAGEMENT 
AUTHOR: DR TRANSFORM AQORAU
Dr Transform Aqorau is an international fisheries law consultant. He is an 
Adjunct Visiting Fellow at the School of Government, Development and In-
ternational Affairs (University of the South Pacific) and Visiting Fellow at the 
Australian National Center for Oceans, Resources and Security (University of 
Wollongong). 
CHAPTER 10
Table 1: Value of catch by national waters US$ (Millions)
2014 2015 2016
Cook Islands 51 51 46
Fiji 37 47 46
FSM 269 264 330
Kiribati 1242 936 702
Marshall Islands 168 69 166
Nauru 268 86 195
PNG 562 272 496
Palau 25 10 25
Samoa 5 6 9
Solomon Islands 264 312 326
Tokelau 39 70 25
Tonga 5 9 13
Tuvalu 153 107 184
Vanauatu 27 24 30
Source: Pacific Islands Fourm Fishersies Agency, WCPFC Area Catch Value Estimates, Value of WCPO tuna 
fishers, 2017.
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Graph 1: Total WCPO tuna catch (1960-2014)
Total tuna catch (tonnes)
Source: Tuna Fishery Yearbook 2016, Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission, 2017 
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If Bougainville were to become inde-
pendent, it would be the newest and 
youngest country in the modern era 
since South Sudan became independ-
ent in 2011. 
Shifting boundaries: what 
independence will do
States are for purposes of international law 
traditionally defined as having a territorial-
ly-defined boundary, a population and capac-
ity to conduct international relations. There 
are some states who arguably do not have all 
three characteristics but are still considered as 
states. For example, the international bound-
aries of Israel are in some respects unsettled 
but no one denies its right to exist as a nation. 
There are some doubts that Taiwan is a state 
because China considers it as its Province 
but this has not stopped some countries from 
engaging diplomatically with it nor most from 
trading with it making Taiwan among the top 
20 economies in the world. There is also the 
Principality of Monaco and the City State of 
the Vatican, whose geographic boundaries are 
scanty but no one doubts their competence to 
conduct international relations and no none 
has refused diplomatic ties with them.
 
If Bougainville were to become independent, 
it would be the newest and youngest country 
in the modern era since South Sudan became 
independent in 2011. Bougainville would be 
entitled to a maritime boundary because it 
will be an ocean state. Thus, it would have 
the right to claim a 12-mile territorial sea 
and a 200-mile EEZ. These are rights that it 
would have under customary international 
law but in order to avoid any doubts as to the 
legal powers for it to declare such extended 
maritime zones, one of its first sovereign acts 
should be to accede to international conven-
tions where these rights are set out. These 
include the 1982 United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea1 (LOSC), and the 1995 
Photo credit: Christina Hill
Boat used for fishing and travelling around the coast The status of the biodiversity of its 
surrounding waters is not well known 
but one can only assume that it swells 
with rich seafood, marine organisms 
and ecosystem properties that have 
considerable management value.
United Nations Agreement for the 
Implementation of the Provisions of the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 
10 December 1982 relating to the Conservation 
and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and 
Highly Migratory Fish Stocks2 (UNFSA). They 
also include regional agreements such as the 
2000 Convention for the Management and
2. United Nations, The United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea, UNGA, (New York: United Nations, 
1982).
3. United Nations, Agreement for the Implementation 
of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the 
Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks 
and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, UNGA (New York: 
United Nations, 1995).
Conservation of the Highly Migratory Fish 
Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific 
(WCPFC), the Convention establishing the Pa-
cific Islands Forum Fisheries Agency, the Nau-
ru Agreement for the Management of Common 
Fish Stocks, and the Palau Arrangement for 
the Management of the Western and Central 
Pacific Tuna Fisheries which is the overarch-
ing umbrella framework that establishes the 
Longline and Purse Seine Vessel Day Schemes 
(VDS).
The lines separating Solomon Islands and 
Bougainville will have to be redrawn on its 
southern side while new lines demarcating 
the division between Bougainville and PNG 
will also have to be negotiated. Article 56 
of the LOSC gives states the right to have an 
EEZ that extend beyond the baselines up to 
a distance of 200 miles. Bougainville will be 
entitled to a territorial sea that extends up 
to 12 miles and to claim a 200 mile EEZ. Its 
sovereignty would extend to areas where as a 
Provincial Government and subsequently as 
Photo credit: Christina Hill
Bougainville coastal line
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an Autonomous Region, it has never had to 
exercise jurisdiction.
The status of the biodiversity of its surround-
ing waters is not well known but one can 
only assume that it swells with rich seafood, 
marine organisms and ecosystem properties 
that have considerable management value. Its 
neighbours, PNG and Solomon Islands, have 
well established tuna processing plants and 
a rich and diverse coastal fishery and there-
fore one can only assume that Bougainville 
also has the same albeit untapped poten-
tial. All these rich diverse and valuable 
ecosystems would fall within the rights of 
Bougainvillians. Under international fisheries 
law, Bougainville would have sovereign rights
in its EEZ to manage, explore, exploit and 
conserve the living and non-living resources 
that are found there.
These rights however are accompanied by cer-
tain responsibilities, duties and obligations. 
These include the duty to ensure the resources 
are well managed and that measures must 
be put in place to prevent overexploitation. 
Administrative, institutional and legislative 
structures and systems must be put in place to 
support its fisheries and oceans management 
policies. These include having the institu-
tional capacity to carry out the necessary 
enforcement of its oceans management regu-
lations and policies.
The development of the systems and struc-
tures as well as the laws that are required for 
the effective management of its oceans and 
fisheries are easy because they are matters 
of process that any independent country are 
required to go through. However, there is a 
considerable amount of capacity building that 
will be required in developing the expertise 
in stocks assessment, fisheries management, 
fisheries law, development, economics and 
especially their capacity in monitoring, sur-
veillance and compliance. In this regard, they 
can seek the support of existing regional and 
international organisations such as the Pacific 
Photo credit: Christina Hill
Coast near Loloho Beach, central Bougainville  Islands Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA), the Secretariat of the Pacific Community (SPC), 
and the Food and Agriculture Organisation 
(FAO) of the United Natons to support build 
their capacity. Negotiating new international 
boundary lines will be more complex. These 
are matters of diplomacy and national interest 
and for PNG and Solomon Islands reshaping 
the international boundary lines would ulti-
mately result in the reduction of their current 
ocean space. Reducing the size of their EEZs 
would also reduce their fishing grounds. 
These are sensitive areas where national and 
economic interests intertwine, and it would 
require careful navigation.
At the same time, it could also perhaps 
require fresh thinking and new ways of look-
ing at the oceans rather than the traditional 
view where the oceans are perceived in terms 
of the geographic limits of the EEZ and terri-
torial seas. This might be the key to unlocking 
the complexities that would inevitably be 
associated with taking a very technical and 
legalistic approach towards the establishment 
of Bougainville’s EEZ.
Paving the way for new 
possibilities 
Technological innovations have made fish-
eries management so much easier and with 
developments in other complementary 
information technology areas, such as block-
chain and cryptocurrency, the challenges 
of addressing illegal fishing and traceabil-
ity in the value chain of a fishery are not as 
pronounced as they once were. Having well 
defined boundaries is a necessary facet of 
fisheries enforcement, but in the context of 
PNG and Solomon Islands and their fisheries 
relationships with Bougainville, the under-
pinning policy impetus should be about 
exploring ways in which they can share in 
the benefits from the oceans, encourage cross 
border investments and establish joint devel-
opment zones. The joint development zone 
under the PNA-Australia Torres Strait Treaty 
Technological innovations have made 
fisheries management so much easier 
and with developments in other com-
plementary information technology 
areas, such as blockchain and crypto-
currency, the challenges of address-
ing illegal fishing and traceability in 
the value chain of a fishery are not as 
pronounced as they once were. 
can be used as a possible model. Further, in 
the case of Bougainville and Solomon Islands, 
the development of an economic and cus-
toms union between Bougainville and the 
Western and Choiseul Provinces should also 
be considered.
Pending agreement on the finalisation of the 
external limits of Bougainville’s EEZ, Solomon 
Islands, PNG and Bougainville could agree 
on provisional lines. These provisional lines 
would demarcate for enforcement purposes 
the outer limits of Bougainville’s EEZ. Initially 
this could be declared as a joint development 
zone whereby the monitoring of fishing activi-
ties could be jointly undertaken in the overlap 
areas during the transitional phase. Indeed, 
the EEZs of Solomon Islands, Bougainville 
and PNG could be declared as a joint develop-
ment zone for enforcement purposes where 
reciprocal, joint or individual patrols could be 
done by authorised vessels from the respec-
tive countries. There are economic efficiency 
gains if this were to be done and would 
be consistent with regional trends already 
pursued under the Niue Treaty – which is 
a broader regional agreement that allows 
for reciprocal enforcement and patrols that 
Pacific Island countries have signed. Under 
this arrangement, the Pacific Island countries 
are able to have ship rider agreements with 
US Coast Guard vessels that carry out fisheries 
surveillance in their EEZs.
As a newly independent country, 
Bougainville’s oceans and fisheries policy 
framework should be directed at creating 
jobs for its peoples and ensuring that its EEZ 
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is secured and its resources are managed 
sustainably. However, having a joint devel-
opment zone with Solomon Islands and PNG 
would contribute towards ensuring that its 
waters are secured against illegal intruders. 
Within this broad framework, Bougainville 
could develop a fisheries policy based on the 
allocation of long-term rights to incentivize 
investments in onshore processing to provide 
jobs. Bougainville has the necessary physical 
attributes that are required for the develop-
ment of an onshore fishing processing indus-
try, namely land, water and a ready human 
power. Developing the right policies will be 
necessary and having longer-term rights allo-
cated to investors will provide the attraction 
that investors are invariably looking for when 
investing in the Pacific. Most fishing opportu-
nities for tuna fishing are rarely if ever issued 
for more than 12 months. Thus, if Bougainville 
were to pursue such a policy, it would cer-
tainly be a novel approach that would make 
investments viable.
Almost inevitably, Bougainville would 
become part of the PNA+3 and participate in 
the VDS which would allow it to interact with 
a broader grouping of Pacific Island coun-
tries. As part of its strategic approach towards 
managing its own space, Bougainville may 
decide to base its policies around the eco-
systems valuation of its entire ocean space.  
In other words, the value of the ecosystems 
services provided by the oceans forms the 
basis on which the monetary value of its EEZ 
is determined. In a marked departure from 
the traditional norms currently applied to 
oceans management in the Pacific Islands, 
Bougainville could elect to pursue a pol-
icy around the notion of the blue economy, 
valuing the oceans for more than just the 
licenses that can be generated from the living 
and non-living resources. They could develop 
an oceans policy based on the integration 
of the total value of the ecosystems of the 
oceans into their domestic economy, with 
management costs based on the total value of 
the ocean services. These services could also 
include tourism.
Conclusion
This paper has only taken a snapshot view 
of the possible scenarios and options that 
could inform the development of a com-
prehensive offshore oceans and fisheries 
policy for an independent Bougainville. 
The survey has its limitations in that it has 
focussed on off-shore fisheries and has not 
asked questions about appropriate policy 
interventions relevant to coastal fisheries. 
It is suggested that Bougainville’s interest 
would be served by pursuing a cooperative 
approach, leaning towards the creation of 
joint development zones, having more flex-
ible longer-term arrangements to incentiv-
ise investments. In short, it has advocated 
adopting a Bougavilleandisation approach 
to oceans management which at its very core 
should ensure that Bougainvilleans are not 
bystanders in the development of their marine 
resources. 
3. The PNA is an acronym for the Parties to the Nauru 
Agreement. The Nauru Agreement countries are the 
Federated States of Micronesia, Kiribati, Marshall 
Islands, Nauru, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Solomon 
Islands, and Tuvalu. The PNA + refers to the fact that 
Tokelau is a participant of the Palau Arrangement, 
another agreement consisting of the same grouping 
of countries and the Vessel Day Scheme. Tokelau is a 
Territory of New Zealand and is an Observer in the PNA. 
These grouping countries are the custodians of more 
than 50% of the World’s tuna stocks.
Christina Hill:  You were born during the crisis on Bougainville. What do you remember about 
that time? 
Theonila Roka-Matbob:  I remember a lot of things. We are talking about the year 1991 com-
ing up 1992 because I cannot remember anything in the year I was born which was 1990. The 
volumes of memories I have and that I consider quite significant and distributing at the some 
time are those like the memory of seeing harms. Being born at that time and growing up I 
thought that was a normal life every human being lives. Some of the things I remember are 
gun shots, next neighbours dying, and then hearing stories like that person in that village has 
been dragged away from his family in the night and he has been murdered or is missing or 
these other kinds of memories that I have in my mind. Also, I should say there are other very 
horrific kind of memories I have in my mind is those like seeing slaughtered people and people 
whose bodies are like crushed in whatever way that is very violent, and seeing the corpse lying 
on front of me. These are all the kind of memories that I have even today having grown up and 
already being a mother and married women these are like memories that I have seen yesterday. 
CH:  Do you remember any good times or happy moments?
TR:  I would hardly think of a happy moment I have of my family because having grown up in 
that period of time when there was just fear. Having being born amid that fear and then grow-
ing up all the way until the early 2000s I really don’t remember a time where there was some 
kind of happiness shared in the family, apart from just laughing amongst ourselves, because 
during that period of time when we were growing up there was always fear in the society. Even 
if it is in the family we have got to be very careful of what we have say to each other.
FROM CRISIS TO OPTIMISM: 
BUILDING BOUGAINVILLE’S 
FUTURE
AUTHORS: THEONILA ROKA-MATBOB AND CHRISTINA HILL 
Theonila Roka-Matbob grew up around Panguna in central Bougainville. She 
is a qualified teacher, having completed studies at Divine Word University and 
the University of Goroka in Papua New Guinea, and is an experienced re-
searcher and activist.
Christina Hill’s work focuses on human rights, gender and corporate account-
ability. She is Jubilee Australia’s Bougainville 2020 Project coordinator and 
editor of this publication. Christina travelled to Bougainville in January 2018 
where she met and interviewed Theonila.  
CHAPTER 11
CHAPTER 11/ GROWING BOUGAINVILLE'S FUTURE             101 
    
100            GROWING BOUGAINVILLE'S FUTURE/ CHAPTER 10  
     
CH: Do you often wonder how your life might now be different if you were born during a time 
of peace rather than conflict? 
TR:  The biggest part of my life that I wonder if it had have been different is the fact that I 
grew up being fatherless as a result of the crisis. This is something that today that as a mature 
person, as a grown-up person, I wonder what it feels like to have a father and having growing 
up saying papa. Recalling my memories back I used to wonder how life . . . life would have 
probably better than the life that I lived if it was in a time of peace but then there is no point to 
regret because there are also other positive things I see like if I was born at a time of peace then 
I wouldn’t have this experience to be a voice for the voiceless. 
CH:  You now have a young son. With some talk of reopening the Panguna mine and the inde-
pendence referendum scheduled for next year are you worried that history might repeat itself? 
Or are you more optimistic about the immediate future for Bougainville?
TR:  I should say this is the biggest worry being a young mother to a young life because the last 
thing that I would want to see is the repeat of our history, to see my own son suffering the way I 
suffered. If there is a possibility that history repeats itself then I would be no different from the 
life I lived because I am fully aware of the fact that I am married to a Papua New Guinean and 
due to this kind of misunderstanding people have, especially on the front of racism, I think 
that my son would be the victim of that if history is to be repeated. But otherwise within myself 
I am quite optimistic about the future because at that time [of the crisis] I see that a lot of 
people were not aware of the kind of lies corporations play on indigenous people and today we 
have a good number of population who are aware of the tricks they play on the lives of people, 
Photo credit: Christina Hill
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like keeping us divided to fight against each other. I think today the level of awareness has 
gone up compared to back then in the 80s.  
CH:  What is like to be a young person in Bougainville now? 
TR:  Being a young Bougainvillean at this point in time, especially the period where we in 
the transitional period from the conflict era, post-conflict and now we are going into another 
chapter in the political process of Bougainville, I really feel that within myself and as a person 
contributing into the nation building in small ways, I should say it is a blessing, it really is a 
blessing for me. But then on the other hand as I look at my own generation there is the biggest 
worry. I think that if our generation can have the sense of ownership, can have the sense of 
service I think Bougainville will at least move some steps further than this. But instead peo-
ple live a life of selfishness. I should say because at this point in time when if we are to talk 
about Bougainville’s independence, we are talking about a generation who has to be of service 
because if we can be able to give then we will build the nation. But at the moment I see my 
own generation, we are so fond of money, building ourselves and not building others and we 
do not want to render our service for free, we want to render it for money and that is a problem 
we have. This is the biggest worry that if Bougainville is already developing this culture from 
my generation then this generation will be controlling the bureaucracy of Bougainville, the 
administration of Bougainville, and the business sector of Bougainville, then we will become 
profit oriented and this will be the fall of our nation. Our elders, the generation this is ahead of 
us, they’ve lost a sense of patriotism as Bougainvilleans and there’s a lot of imitations and our 
generation seem to copy, we tend to imitate and that is the biggest problem I see.
Photo credit: Christina Hill
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The Kawerong River downstream of the Panguna Mine, and next to Theonila’s village, 
showing a blue coloured deposit on the riverbed caused by elevated copper levels in 
water discharged from the mine site
CH:  Are young people given the opportunity to participate in public life? Or are they encour-
aged to participate in public life? 
TR:  The community leaders they encourage us to stand up but they do not give us space, this 
is the problem. To really create that avenue where young people can walk in and exercise what-
ever potential they have I think this is the biggest part missing in Bougainville. When we come 
out and then whatever views that we have and when we are trying to come out with it we are 
suppressed and for that reason most of our young people are going back, they are laying back, 
they become laid back. The few of us who keep coming out are the ones who force ourselves 
because we believe that nothing can beat the truth that if we believe that our perspective is for 
the justice and for social inclusion for every single Bougainvillean. These are the things that 
keep pushing us. 
CH: What needs to happen to change the situation you’ve just described?
TR:  I have the biggest confidence that the only way we will change this attitude, or change 
this mentality, or change this trend is to go down and tap the shoulders of these very young 
children coming up. This is the whole reason why I with the support of my family were able 
to come up with this little school for kids because we believe that real change will come from 
that generation. My generation is a bit of a confused generation because we have these people 
who fought for independence, those who fought for liberation, but then we see that they are 
not living the spirit, they are rather making themselves look as though they lifted the guns to 
fight against the corporation, to build themselves materially. There is nothing really for my 
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generation to look at because the warlords are actually becoming rich and they are suppress-
ing everyone else so really there is no example left for us to see. So, I really believe for young 
children, like those aged 3 coming up to age 7, these are the people who we really need to look 
into and then start influencing them, so that is the way we can really change for the good of 
Bougainville. I am very much positive that if we can influence a good number of children and 
then by the time that they become youths they are at the stage to question, they will be able to 
question, and then they will see the difference. Then if a number of our generation come up as 
leaders later on then we will at least have some people to bank onto because we already tried 
our best to create, to impart, different perspectives on Bougainville.
CH: What are your hopes for the future and how are you going to get there? 
TR:  My biggest hope for Bougainville is to change the education system. We’d rather talk about 
a curriculum that we will develop in the context of Bougainville. This is the whole reason why 
when I look back into my own life I am thankful for whatever has happened, all the challenges, 
because then these are the things that we can always use as building blocks to be able to create 
a new beginning for the young people. If only we can change the education system. The reason 
why I will keep pressing on changing the education system is because I believe that a lot of 
influences also comes in with the system of education. Having gone through the formal system 
and having reached university I’ve realised that a lot of things, a lot of concepts, a lot of theo-
ries, that are taught in the classroom are actually challenged by the practices that creates har-
mony in Bougainville. Having practiced it for the past 5 years with the school that I developed, 
I’ve seen that if we can be able to teach our children the values of the community and then 
just putting in whatever we believe is necessary from outside then that is the way forward for 
Bougainville. And the only way that we will be able to achieve this is to teach from the heart,  
and not to teach simply because we are professional teachers, we have to become teachers who 
want to change the path that Bougainville is going into which is I believe, that if our leaders 
are not careful, we are going into a very disastrous period of time.  
My biggest hope for Bougainville is to change the education 
system.... The reason why I will keep pressing on changing the 
education system is because I believe that a lot of influences also 
comes in with the system of education. Having gone through the 
formal system and having reached university I’ve realised that a 
lot of things, a lot of concepts, a lot of theories, that are taught in 
the classroom are actually challenged by the practices that creates 
harmony in Bougainville. 
- Theonila Roka-Matbob
“
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Introduction
What is the problem facing Bougainville today 
that the referendum seeks to address?  Some 
may view the problem as one of continued 
colonisation by Papua New Guinea (PNG). In 
this instance the solution appears relatively 
straight forward – vote for independence. 
Others may view the problem as lack of op-
tions for economic development to support an 
independent Bougainville and subsequently 
the threat of re-opening the Panguna mine in 
order that Bougainville is able to sustain itself 
economically. For those of this view, if the cost 
of independence is re-opening the mine, then 
this may be too high a price.
This paper takes the position that the ref-
erendum is a continuation of the struggle in 
Bougainville against the ‘colonial-capitalist 
system’. As the term ‘colonial-capitalist sys-
tem’ implies, capitalism was introduced and 
propagated in Bougainville through colonial-
ist intervention. As Kristian Lasslett explains, 
by the 1960s Bougainville was gradually be-
sieged politically, economically, and ideologi-
cally, by an Australian colonial power seeking 
to induct communities into the logic of liberal 
capitalism.1 At the centre of this colonial-cap-
italist system was a large-scale copper and 
gold mine (the Panguna mine) operated by 
the Rio Tinto subsidiary Bougainville Copper 
Limited (BCL) between 1972 and 1988. With 
Australia and then PNG governing the affairs 
of Bougainville, the mine was portrayed as 
a vehicle through which Bougainville, and 
PNG more widely, would earn the revenues to 
secure the form of life enjoyed by the for-
mer colonial power and ‘progress’ towards a 
successful modern state. However, the mine 
significantly impacted on communities, in-
cluding the dispossession of community land 
and its contents; forced displacement from 
ancestral homes; imprisonment for resisting 
the mine’s construction; and the large-scale 
devastation of the surrounding ecosystems, 
which was experienced as a deeply spiritual 
and material loss.2 
Such conditions provided the motivation for 
the armed resistance that followed, led by 
the revolution’s figurehead, Francis Ona. In 
a letter written by Ona dated 29 November 
1989, he aptly describes the colonial-capitalist 
system when he explains how “Others have 
become rich by exploiting us especially the 
foreigners and a handful black power wield-
ers in Papua New Guinea. We are the ‘sacrifi-
cial lamb’ for the few capitalists whose hunger 
for wealth is quenchless and unceasing…We 
are not going to sit by and watch capitalists 
and their Papua New Guinean political allies 
exploiting us”.3
However, while capitalism may still be consid-
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ered an externally imposed system, the gov-
ernance arrangements that enable the system 
to continue to expand in Bougainville today 
are no longer the remit of a colonial power. 
Rather, today it is certain groups from within 
Bougainville that are continuing the coloni-
al-capitalist legacy by arguing that mining 
is the guarantee that Bougainville can prove 
itself as an economically self-reliant and 
modern state. For example, in an obscene per-
version of the revolutionary struggle against 
the colonial-capitalist system, Bougainville’s 
President, John Momis, claims “Francis [Ona] 
was not trying to end the mine for ever. No 
– his complaint was about the unfair treat-
ment of Bougainville. He wanted the rights of 
Bougainvilleans recognised. He wanted fair 
distribution of the revenue ... We have contin-
ued that same struggle throughout the peace
1. Kristian Lasslett, State Crime on the Margins of Em-
pire: Rio Tinto, the War on Bougainville and Resistance 
to Mining (London: Pluto Press, 2014).
2. Ibid.
3. Francis Ona, 29 November 1989, p. 3.
process”.4 Similarly, at a ceremony in Febru-
ary 2018 recognising the granting of a mining 
exploration license in Tunania, Deputy Oppo-
sition Leader Timothy Masiu stated, “This is a 
breakthrough. This is the day that our former 
leaders and our people have dreamt of and 
fought for”.5
Therefore, what if the source of the problem 
today is not simply independence from Papua 
New Guinea, but the very failure of the revolu-
tionary uprising to lead to an enduring alter-
native to western liberal-capitalist govern-
ance? In other words, what if the key problem 
today for Bougainville is the task of transform-
ing governance mechanisms in Bougainville 
so that they function in a different way? What 
options has the Government? What are the 
concrete possibilities for governance that will 
4. John Momis, cited in, ‘Voices of the People’, Jubilee 
Australia, September 2014, p. 14.
5. Franklin Kolma, ‘ABG Grants Second Mining Li-
cense’, Post Courier, 8 February 2018, https://postcouri-
er.com.pg/abg-grants-second-mining-license/.
Photo credit: Ben Bohane/Australian War Memorial
Francis Ona, a leader of the Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA), (sixth from left) 
meets with a group of BRA guerillas at Guava village near the Panguna mine, central 
Bougainville, circa 1994
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[...] the concept of ‘good governance’ 
is a slippery one and is something 
that not only seems to defy clear 
definition, but some would argue it 
is a concept that has been used to 
discipline states to conform to the 
global capitalist system. 
move Bougainville beyond a ‘colonial-capital-
ist system’? This paper will explore the notion 
of ‘good governance’ and its implications for 
Bougainville. It briefly discusses liberal-cap-
italist forms of governance and explores the 
potential for alternative approaches to govern-
ance in Bougainville that can effectively con-
tinue the struggle beyond the colonial-capital-
ist system.
‘Good’ governance
Governance is a relatively straightforward 
term that at its simplest refers to the way a 
government administers state processes, ser-
vices and systems and makes decisions about 
the allocation of resources. ‘Good govern-
ance’, in combination with the rule of law and 
democracy, are seen to be essential to effec-
tive statehood. However, the concept of ‘good 
governance’ is a slippery one and is some-
thing that not only seems to defy clear defini-
tion, but some would argue it is a concept that 
has been used to discipline states to conform 
to the global capitalist system. For example, 
under the current global liberal democratic 
capitalist system, good governance means en-
suring the conditions within which economic 
growth can thrive through enabling foreign 
direct investment, liberalisation of markets, 
and privatisation of services. Furthermore, in 
some instances such as Bougainville, capital-
ist good governance should facilitate possibil-
ities for resource extraction by transforming 
land tenure laws. Indeed, this was the govern-
ance transformation being implemented by 
colonial powers in Bougainville that sparked 
the civil war. For example, Francis Ona argued 
the state of Papua New Guinea “is an instru-
ment for the few rich to accumulate wealth…
the state is the instrument for the rich to sup-
press the suffering masses. The Parliament 
House in Port Moresby [capital city of Papua 
New Guinea] is nothing more than a central 
market place where the indigenous capitalists 
exchange large sums of money and make bar-
gains for large foreign loans and investments 
for personal benefits in the name of national 
development”.6
Despite these difficulties with the concept, the 
Bougainville Peace Agreement (BPA) none-
theless specifically refers to good governance, 
stating, “the actual date of the referendum 
will be set taking into account of standards of 
good governance”.7 In the BPA, ‘good govern-
ance’ is defined as including democracy, par-
ticipation, transparency, accountability, and 
respect for human rights and the rule of law. 
To complicate matters, although not officially 
stated in the BPA, some commentators none-
theless argue that ‘good governance’ in the 
context of Bougainville necessarily includes 
the ability to be economically self-reliant. 
Although the referendum would appear to be 
going ahead, thereby suggesting that the con-
dition of ‘good governance’ has been met, it 
remains to be seen whether ‘good governance’ 
or lack thereof will be a factor in determining 
whether PNG will endorse a vote in favour of 
Bougainville independence should that be the 
outcome of the referendum vote.
In addition to the explicit policies and reg-
ulations of state governance in facilitating 
capitalist accumulation, Lasslett’s extensive 
work on state crime in Bougainville emphasis-
es the co-existence of a hidden and shadowy 
underbelly of governance.8 This underside 
of governance consists of clientelism, cor-
ruption, bribery and misappropriation that 
ensure government policies serve the needs of 
particular corporate and economic interests. 
For example, Lasslett highlights how political 
leadership in Bougainville has been used to
6. Francis Ona, 29 November 1989, p. 3.
7. ‘Bougainville Peace Agreement’, 30 August 2001, p. 5.
8. Kristian Lasslett, State Crime on the Margins of Em-
pire: Rio Tinto, the War on Bougainville and Resistance 
to Mining (London: Pluto Press, 2014).
leverage resistance within landowning com-
munities to have their own private companies 
awarded lucrative exploration licenses over 
mineral deposits on Bougainville. Further-
more, groups claiming to represent land-
owners are now partnering with investors to 
conduct mineral explorations and moderate 
elements within what was the BRA have 
refashioned themselves into a new class of 
entrepreneurs, working with dubious outside 
interests, to accumulate capital through a 
range of industries, ranging from scrap metal 
through to security services. 
The point to be emphasised here is that far 
from being a transgression of good govern-
ance, this shadowy underbelly of liberal dem-
ocratic governance is the ultimate support for 
the capitalist system. That is, “democracy, like 
freedom, becomes a purely nominal, pre-emp-
tive, ‘fetishistic’ reference which ‘abounds in 
the mouths of our politicians’ so as to prevent 
articulation of alternative discourses – while 
everyone knows that it functions by undem-
ocratic means”.9 Or in other words, liberal 
democracy only allows us to choose what 
does not interfere with the sovereign interests 
of capital.10 Indeed, to actually take good 
governance seriously would undermine these 
particular economic interests.
Considering some options
This leads to the question of what kind of gov-
ernance system should replace the existing 
liberal-democratic representative state? What 
might an alternative form of governance look 
like? Perhaps the typical alternative to this 
form of liberal-capitalist governance are calls 
for a more indigenous form of governance 
that respects the preservation of culture and 
nature. There are two apparent possibilities 
that come to mind here when thinking of an 
indigenous-based form of governance. The 
9. Fabio Vighi, On Zizek’s Dialectics: Surplus, Subtrac-
tion, Sublimation (London: Continuum, 2010).
10. Ibid.
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Ceremony in February 2018 recognising the granting of a mining exploration license 
in Tunania
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[...] a key governance challenge is 
how one can deploy the state in a 
different way that, for example, 
ensures equal distribution of services 
and resources and regulates the 
protection and value of culture and 
the commons.
first is some sort of decentralised governance 
in which a multitude of local communities 
govern themselves without, or at least at a 
distance from, the state. This model of gov-
ernance may be motivated by a replication of 
Bougainville during the years of the blockade 
and is a popular alternative advocated by 
various social movements including the Zap-
atista in Mexico and Gandhi’s ‘constructive 
program’ in India. Typically, such models of 
governance are based on the premise that the 
state is an integral part of the colonial-capital-
ist system, and therefore undoing or overcom-
ing the state is a key goal.
However, there are important problems with 
this position. Firstly, while the state is indeed 
an integral part of the colonial-capitalist 
system, it does not mean the state itself is the 
problem. Rather, as discussed earlier, liberal 
capitalism defines and deploys the state in a 
particular way. Therefore, a key governance 
challenge is how one can deploy the state in a 
different way that, for example, ensures equal 
distribution of services and resources and reg-
ulates the protection and value of culture and 
the commons. While indigenous culture can 
be used to draw out and highlight the contra-
dictions of the colonial-capitalism system, it 
does not in any way mean that the ‘solution’ 
is indigenous-based governance. Indeed, we 
cannot ignore that one of the lessons from the 
decentralised, local ‘commune’ governance 
during the years of the blockade was that it 
did not lead to an enduring alternative to the 
colonial-capitalist system.
Another example of some relevance to Bou-
gainville is the government of Evo Morales 
in Bolivia. Bolivia is a majority indigenous 
country that is dependent on export mining. 
Morales’ government has a base of support 
underpinned by indigenous social movements 
and its governance is framed around a dis-
course of decolonisation and living well.11 
In its eleven years in power, the government 
has made significant achievements, such as 
achieving the region’s highest growth rate, 
tripling the size of the economy, reducing pov-
erty by half, and reducing income inequality 
by one-fifth. However, as Farthing observes, 
“Nevertheless, the underlying economic struc-
ture remains largely untouched. While a new 
class of (often indigenous) traders and small 
miners has become wealthy, the traditional 
elites have not been displaced”.12 Further-
more, governance and politics has largely 
reverted back to that based on clientelism and 
political patronage.
Rethinking the possibilities
These examples emphasise the hard reality 
of what it means to implement an enduring 
governance alternative in the world of global 
capital. Indeed when such alternatives do 
emerge, they “encounter a hostile institution 
organized to frustrate its plans…the moment 
one is just perceived as a possible agent of 
such disturbance, tremendous forces are 
unleashed”.13 Indeed, this was the experience 
of young activists in Bougainville who not 
only took action against the mine but openly 
advocated for different alternatives. Therefore, 
as Alain Badiou aptly explains, “the goal of 
all enemy propaganda is not to annihilate an 
existing force (this function is generally left 
to police forces), but rather to annihilate an 
unnoticed possibility of the situation”.14
11.  Linda Farthing, ‘Between Party and Move-
ments’, Jacobin, 19 August 2017, https://jacobinmag.
com/2017/08/bolivia-morales-pink-tide-indigenous-lat-
in-america.
12. Ibid.
13. Costas Douzinas, ‘The Left in Power? Notes on 
Syriza’s Rise. Fall, and (Possible) Second Rise’, Near 
Futures Online, March 2016, http://nearfuturesonline.
org/the-left-in-power-notes-on-syrizas-rise-fall-and-
possible-second-rise/#en-62-1.
14. Alain Badiou, cited in Slavoj Zizek, The Courage of 
Hopelessness (London: Allen Lane, 2017), p. 57.
Therefore, we need to consider the forces pre-
venting serious consideration of alternatives 
in Bougainville today. Lasslett’s claim that 
the BPA reintroduced the structural violence 
that the struggle was seeking to overcome 
is important here. One could argue that the 
BPA serves as a form of enemy propaganda 
in that it exerts pressure on Bougainville to 
meet a certain set of conditions for govern-
ance, including, unofficially, the condition of 
economic self-reliance, if it wishes to obtain 
independence. Through this blackmail the 
BPA serves as the instrument through which 
the former and current colonial powers con-
trol and regulate the possibilities available to 
Bougainville. That is, Bougainville is guilty 
if they fail to meet the conditions for good 
governance, but also guilty if they do because 
that means giving up on their desire for an 
independent Bougainville beyond the colonial 
capitalist system.
What is to be done in this predicament? 
Perhaps what is required today to overcome 
this blackmail is not to escape from the state 
in favour of localised indigenous-based gov-
ernance, nor to seek some hybrid form of 
governance that balances the limitations and 
excesses of both Western and indigenous 
governance. Rather, perhaps what is required 
in Bougainville today is a ‘governmental 
event’,15 of transforming the ‘culture of gov-
ernance’ in Bougainville itself. Surprisingly, 
such an event in Bougainville today might 
assume the form of taking the concept of good 
governance more seriously than those who 
espouse it want it to be taken. That is, rath-
er than simply dismissing the condition for 
good governance (including the addition of 
economic self-reliance) what if Bougainville 
accepted it fully as its own condition by ac-
tively working to rid the culture of governance 
in Bougainville of its shadowy underside. This 
would mean directly addressing the challenge 
of persistent clientelism, bribery and corrup-
tion and initiating democratic and transpar-
ent governance, particularly in the economic 
sphere.16 To be clear, the aim of shifting this 
shadowy underside is not to enable a pure 
liberal democratic governance, but rather to 
move beyond such a model of governance.
Based on this approach a key question for 
Bougainville today is whether or not there are 
any concrete possibilities for such a transfor-
mation to take place. What is happening in 
Bougainville today that could trigger or enable 
a governmental event? Does a vote either way 
in the referendum provide concrete oppor-
tunities for a governmental event to occur? 
It would seem that a ‘yes’ to independence 
would not necessarily indicate a readiness to 
break free from liberal-capitalism any more 
than a ‘no’ vote would indicate a willingness 
to remain within it. Indeed, there is a cer-
tain ambiguity in the referendum: a decision 
either way provides no specific content or 
strategic direction for what comes next.
Somewhat controversially, perhaps one 
should consider the implications of the 
referendum for Papua New Guinea. For ex-
ample, as Francis Ona observed, “The only 
significant development we have seen since 
independence [in PNG] is the widening gap 
between the few rich and the poor majori-
ty”.17 Or, in the words of Blaise Iruinu, today 
“Papua New Guinea now has nowhere to go. 
Instead of surviving, she is dying. Borrow for 
investment, borrow for services, becomes a 
slave to the master”.18 Therefore, what are 
the implications of a governmental event in 
Bougainville if it chooses to remain part of the 
Papua New Guinea state? Could it reverberate 
across the country to other provinces, deliv-
ering Papua New Guinea from its own failed 
independence?
15. Slavoj Zizek, The Courage of Hopelessness (London: 
Allen Lane, 2017).
16. Indeed, one can learn from recent actions taken 
by the Governor of Oro Province in PNG, Gary Juffa, in 
which a group of foreign workers were arrested and 
heavy equipment seized after authorities shut down an 
illegal logging operation in the province. Juffa comment-
ed that the company was aided by a member of his own 
administration who provided fraudulent ‘forest clear-
ing’ authorities (for example see https://bit.ly/2JeEjXN).
17. Francis Ona, 29 November 1989, p. 3.
18. Iruinu, B., Interview – The Panguna Seminars, 
Arsam International, Bougainville Peoples Research 
Centre and Fourth World Films, 25 August 2015.
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Governments need revenue and how govern-
ments secure this revenue is an important pol-
icy consideration. It would be a particularly 
pressing challenge for a future independent 
Bougainville Government.  
What happens in Bougainville in the future 
is up to the people of Bougainville to deter-
mine. Nevertheless, their ability to make wise 
choices will be dependent on their capacity 
make informed decisions about their eco-
nomic and political future. It will also be 
influenced by the attitude taken by policy-
makers outside the country, especially by 
major aid donors such Australia.
It is therefore unfortunate that the political 
consensus that large-scale mining offers 
the only feasible developmental path for 
Bougainville has led to a scenario in which 
there appears to have been insufficient 
in-depth analysis of potential alternative eco-
nomic strategies.  
The aim of this project has been to redress 
this imbalance. In doing so, we hope that it 
will inform debate in Bougainville and among 
policy makers in Bougainville and elsewhere, 
including in Australia. 
It is not our intention to present detailed 
policy recommendations in this conclusion. 
However, it is possible to draw out the major 
themes and conclusions from the papers in 
this report:
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Bougainvilleans have their own history, 
knowledge, social institutions, cultural 
assets, traditional economy and systems 
of customary land tenure which provides 
a vital foundation on which Bougainville’s 
future can be built.
Land is of central importance to Bougain-
villeans. Land connects people, regulates 
relationships, binds the present day to the 
past and the future. It is the source of social 
security, and the base for identity, memory, 
culture, and spirituality. 
Land also supports a way of life that most 
rural Bougainvilleans are already living.  
Land allows people to operate within a 
mixed economy that blends the non-cash 
contributions of the traditional economy 
supplemented with cash earned from 
small-scale income generating activities, 
such as the sale of cocoa for example. 
As the case study on Papua New Guinea 
(PNG) clearly shows, converting mineral 
wealth into positive outcomes for the bulk 
of the population is a serious challenge. 
The extractive industries have contributed 
less to PNG Government revenues and 
employment than expected, particularly in 
recent years. In fact the sector has distorted 
PNG’s economy and its currency, making 
it harder for non-resource sector exports 
– particularly in agriculture – to bring in 
revenues. 
The Panguna mine is unlikely to be a 
significant source of Government revenues, 
at least in the short to medium term. The 
argument that self-sufficiency is only pos-
sible through mining is, at the very least, 
questionable. Equally open to question is 
whether the reintroduction of mining in 
Bougainville would avoid past mistakes, 
especially when it comes to environmental 
consequences and social impacts. 
Much of Bougainville is a matrilineal socie-
ty and the connection between women and 
land is inseparable. However, this connec-
tion has suffered, and women’s position in 
society has been weakened and marginal-
ised since the period of colonisation.
Women have been acknowledged as the 
driving force behind the ceasefire, the 
Bougainville Peace Agreement in 2001 and 
post-conflict attempts at reconciliation and 
transformation. Yet despite the central role 
women have played in the peace process 
and their role as custodians of land, they 
have largely been excluded from deci-
sion-making over Bougainville’s economic 
future and social policy.
It is widely recognised that in the immedi-
ate future agriculture is, and will continue 
to be, the single most important source 
of livelihoods for Pacific islanders. Thus, 
the focus of policy for employment of the 
bulk of the population, and for economic 
growth and government revenues, should 
be on promoting improved productivity in 
agriculture. 
Agriculture is an area where Bougainville 
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Cocoa farm, northern Bougainville 
enjoys an advantage as there is already a 
high level of participation in this sector. 
An economy based on agriculture has the 
potential to benefit all Bougainvilleans, not 
just a small minority. 
The challenge for the Government of Bou-
gainville may be to find ways to commer-
cialise traditional systems of farming and 
improve cash-generating opportunities, 
without sacrificing community cohesion, 
local food security and customary land 
tenure systems. 
Through the current global ‘development’ 
paradigm in Melanesia, there is a push by 
outside actors to replace customary systems 
with western models of land tenure. The 
result is that indigenous peoples are losing 
control over their land and rates of commu-
nity conflict, rural indebtedness, inequality, 
and landlessness are increasing. Such a 
push is inconsistent with Melanesian efforts 
to keep land under customary tenure.
Sustainable fisheries also offer the potential 
for the creation of jobs for Bougainvilleans. 
An innovative oceans management frame-
work may also build on Bougainville’s 
cultural links with the Solomon Islands and 
PNG.
Gender equality must be at the heart of 
a just and sustainable economic model 
for Bougainville. This economic model 
must be one in which women retain their 
relationships to their customary lands, 
are able to cultivate it and make collective 
development decisions that benefit future 
generations as well as the current genera-
tion. Increasing women’s economic power 
must be part of this model.
To achieve a just and sustainable economic 
model for Bougainville, and to achieve sus-
tainable development, stronger democratic 
participation of women in decision-making 
processes is also needed.
Finally, some of the papers ask if there is a 
In summary, the collective wisdom of the 
papers presented here demonstrate that alter-
natives to large-scale mining do exist. Many 
Bougainvilleans are already participating in 
and developing these alternatives. Bougain-
villeans enjoy the benefits the traditional 
economy and customary land tenure provides 
through food, housing, employment, and 
other forms of social security.  
Properly supported, innovative approach-
es that build on what is already done have 
the potential to support inclusive economic 
growth and with it increase government reve-
nues. That this growth is likely to be gradual 
rather than instantaneous is not necessarily 
a drawback given the doubts about the reve-
nues that would be generated by a reintroduc-
tion of industrial scale mining. 
Perhaps more importantly, how much revenue 
a future Bougainville Government might need, 
and for what, depends on what sort of govern-
ment Bougainvilleans want, and what sort of 
a country they would like to become.
need to transform the ‘culture of Govern-
ance’ in Bougainville so that government 
policies serve the needs of Bougainvilleans, 
rather than particular corporate and 
economic interests, and so that systems 
of governance sit more sympathetically 
alongside local cultures, social systems, 
and value frameworks.
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The Mele Declaration 2010 
 
The declaration of the 2nd annual meeting of the Melanesian Indigenous Land 
Defence Alliance, held at Mele Village in Port Vila, Vanuatu, 14-19 June 2010 
 
In response to increasing threats to customary land systems posed by the land reform 
agendas of international financial institutions, aid agencies, governments and elites within 
our own countries, the second annual meeting of the Melanesian Indigenous Land 
Defence Alliance (MILDA) affirms its commitment to indigenous control of customary land 
systems. Recognising that the threats to customary land are directed against the 
Melanesian Pacific as a region, our intention is to unite and organize on a regional basis, 
to defend the continued control of Melanesian communities over their land, sea, water, air 
and natural resources. We assert that the customary land systems are the basis of life and 
community in Melanesia. 
 
Established in 2009, MILDA is an alliance of groups and individuals united by a shared 
vision, a common cause, and a commitment to working together. Our members are 
fieldworkers and community members, women’s representatives and mothers, fathers and 
grandfathers. We include church leaders and traditional leaders, academics, regional 
NGOs and international supporters. We first came together last year in Madang, PNG, and 
following from that we came together this year in Port Vila, Vanuatu.  We came from 
Papua New Guinea, Bougainville, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, Fiji and Australia, and were 
privileged to have traditional chiefs with us. We came to share experiences, stories and 
skills, and strategize a regional response to the persistent pressure for registration and 
leasing of customary land. 
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Land has always been of the highest value to the lives of our peoples, and so it will be for 
generations to come.  In all Melanesian traditions, land is regarded as a non-alienable 
resource that cannot be parted with. The relationship which we have with our land is 
special and unique, and cannot be accounted for through Western systems of value. The 
Melanesian definition of land is inclusive. Land extends from the surface of the ground to 
the centre of the earth. It stretches above us to the limits of the sky. It includes the waters 
of our rivers, streams and creeks. It includes our oceans. The land has belonged to us – 
and we to it – since time immemorial.  
 
Land is our mother and the source of life for our people. Land secures life, fosters and 
strengthens relationships that sustain our society.  It embodies the link to our past, present 
and future and therefore sustains everything we do.  MILDA members reaffirm the sanctity 
of land. 
 
The meeting asserted the following: 
1. We are opposed to any form of alienation of land from customary landowners, 
whether by outright sale or through leases which remove landowners’ capacity to 
effectively control, access and use their land. 
2. We believe that the ways in which land is used and distributed should be determined 
by Melanesian custom, and not Western legal systems. 
3. We assert the value of traditional economy, which promotes self-reliance amongst 
our people and communities, and we are opposed to actions and policies which 
encourage the dependency of Melanesian peoples on others, including the state.  
4. We reject all policies which require that customary land be registered as a 
precondition for business or development activities, and demand that Melanesian 
governments cease all pressures for customary land registration, whether voluntary 
or involuntary. 
5. We oppose all foreign programs, bribes and inducements to bring about customary 
land registration in Melanesia. 
6. We call for a total overhauling of the current land administration in Melanesia to weed 
out corrupt land dealings and fraudulent titling. All customary land taken by these 
means should be returned to customary owners. 
 
The Melanesian Indigenous Land Defence Alliance resolved that it will meet again next 
year in the Autonomous Region of Bougainville. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
The Arawa Declaration 2017 
 
The declaration of the 5th meeting of the Melanesian Indigenous Land Defence 
Alliance (MILDA), held at Arawa, Central Bougainville, 14-18 August 2017 
 
In response to continued and increasing severity of threats to customary land and sea 
systems posed by land reforms, land/sea mining, other large-scale resource extraction 
projects, and other foreign development agendas of international financial institutions, aid 
agencies, governments and elites within our own countries, the fifth meeting of the 
Melanesian Indigenous Land Defence Alliance (MILDA) re-affirms its commitment to 
indigenous control of customary land/sea systems in relation to Melanesian ways. We 
recognise that external threats to customary land and seas are directed against the 
Melanesian Pacific as a region. We, therefore, are united and organized as a region to 
defend the continued control of Melanesian communities over our land, sea, water, air and 
ancestral heritage. We re-assert that the customary land / sea systems are the basis of life 
and community in Melanesia. 
 
MILDA is an alliance of groups and individuals with a shared vision and commitment to 
working together united by a common cause to protect our indigenous land/sea extending 
from the surface of the ground to the centre of the earth and underneath the sea, including 
our ecosystems, biodiversity, and intangible cultural heritage, the waters of our rivers and 
streams, and our air. Our members comprise of traditional leaders, community members 
including men, women, youths, children and people with special needs, churches, 
academics, regional NGOs, and international supporters. 
 
The Melanesian definition of land is collective and inclusive and includes the sea. Land has 
and always will be of the highest value to the lives of our peoples, and so it will be for 
generations to come. In all Melanesian traditions, land is regarded as a non-alienable 
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resource that cannot be parted with. The relationship which we have with our land and sea 
is special and unique, and cannot be replaced by foreign value systems. We are custodians 
of the land and sea since time immemorial. 
 
Land, including the sea, is our mother and the source of life for our people. Land secures 
life, fosters and strengthens relationships that sustain our society.  It embodies the 
connections to our past, present and future and therefore sustains everything we aspire to.  
MILDA members, hailing from the Autonomous Region of Bougainville, Fiji, Kanaky / 
Nouvelle Caledonie, Papua New Guinea, Maluku, Solomon Islands, West Papua, and 
Vanuatu, reaffirm the sanctity of land and sea. 
 
We declare the following: 
 
1. As Indigenous Peoples of Melanesia we are committed to upholding and safeguarding 
our Melanesian indigenous traditional and cultural heritage, customs, values and 
beliefs. 
2. We acknowledge and support the value and use of Traditional Resource Management, 
Traditional Knowledge and vernacular language in the sustainable management of, 
and cultural links with, the environment and natural resources. 
3. We oppose any form of alienation of land and sea from customary landowners, whether 
by outright sale, leases or acquisition which remove landowners’ capacity to effectively 
control, access and use their land and sea. 
4. We believe that the ways in which land and sea are used and distributed should be 
determined by Melanesian custom, and not by foreign systems. 
5. We assert the value of our traditional economy, which promotes self-reliance amongst 
our people and communities, and we oppose actions and policies which promote the 
dependency of Melanesian peoples on others, including the State and foreign aid 
agencies.  
6. We say NO to all policies which require customary land be registered as a precondition 
for business or development activities, and demand that Melanesian governments and 
aid donors cease all pressures for customary land registration, whether voluntary or 
involuntary. 
7. We say NO to all legislative changes with respect to land and sea resources that take 
away power and control from our people, and give exclusive rights and control to 
governments and foreign investors, and call for a review of legislative changes that 
have undermined our indigenous power over our land/sea and our Melanesian Ways.  
  
8. We oppose all foreign programs, bribes and other methods that take away the right to 
self-determination over our lands, reflective in Article 3 of the United Nations 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, including customary land registration, 
foreign land and sea (ocean) grabbing, and extractive industries in Melanesia. 
9. We are opposed to any form of experimental seabed resource extraction (including 
exploration activities) from our seas. 
10. We call for a total review of the current land and sea administration in Melanesia to 
eliminate corrupt dealings and fraudulent practices. All customary land and sea 
acquired by these means should be returned to the rightful ancestral inheritors. 
11. We affirm the rights and freedom of all Melanesian peoples, specifically Bougainville, 
Kanaky / Nouvelle Caledonie, and West Papua, to exercise the full process of self-
determination towards referendum for independence without interference from outside 
influence.    
12. We affirm the power and principles of Bougainvillean MATRILINIAL heritage and its 
vital role in the self-determination process towards the referendum for independence. 
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